By Dr. Raju Narayana Swamy, IAS
October 3, 2022
Cloud Computing : The Concept
Cloud computing involves a subscription based service that satisfies computing and storage needs from a virtually unlimited hardware and communication infrastructure which is managed by a third-party provider. Put it a bit differently, cloud computing occurs when an internet connection delivers hardware power and software functionality to users regardless of where they are or which computer they are using. NIST (National Institution of Standards and Technology) defines it as “Cloud is a model for enabling convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool of all configurable computing resources (storage, networks, services, servers and applications) that are easily released and rapidly provisioned with minimum management effort.” Needless to say, the five critical characteristics that form the hallmark of the above standard definition are – on demand self service, broad network access, rapid elasticity, resource pooling and measured services. By contrast, the Gartner Group defines cloud computing as a style of computing in which massively scalable IT – related capabilities are provided as a service using internet technologies to multiple external users.
Clouds are essentially data centres or server farms on which software and data can be remotely stored, instead of on- site. It is a natural evolution of distributed computing and the general variation of virtualization and service oriented architecture (SOA). Cloud computing activities are often described as falling into one or more of the following service categories:
a) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): raw computing resources such as processing power and storage.
b) Platform as a Service (PaaS): platforms for developing and deploying software applications (Google App Engine is a classic example)
c) Software as a Service (SaaS): end user applications
Apart from the above three service models, there are four deployment models too – public, private, hybrid and community. The essential characteristics of all these models are
(I)Pay as per use
(II)Use it as and when required
(III)Services provided by a third party service provider
(IV)No change in the ownership of the main property.
Rationale behind cloud computing
The genesis of cloud computing days back to the early 2000s when organizations started spending money to set up their IT infrastructure for improvement of business by purchasing own dedicated server. As the day progressed, these servers became virtual and easily available publicly through internet. Thus the cloud was born as a model that is easily manageable, accountable and configurable. Perhaps the best example of this kind of service is one that is almost ubiquitous now : web-based email services like gmail and hotmail. From legal research to word processing, file storage and movie viewing, computer users are able to take advantage of the cloud for a variety of tasks –some mundane and some others extremely sensitive and highly technical (storing and securing personal information for millions of credit card subscribers or health records for insureds being classical examples). Google has introduced Google Chrome OS, an operating system designed to function almost completely through the cloud providing essentially remote computing software that can be updated automatically through the web.
No discussion on cloud computing will be complete without the case study of Animoto – a software provider that converts personal photos into music videos it developed a Facebook application that took the company from 25000 users to 2,50,000 users in three days . At its peak, Animoto was signing up 20000 new users per hour. It launched the service with five virtual servers and by the end of three days expanded to 3500 servers. Animoto’s ability to scale up at such an incredible rate was accomplished by using a cloud provider that was able to add resources as demand for product increased. Mention also needs to be made of the increasing popular concept of netbooks – low cost light weight laptop computers with reduced hardware capacity and processing power – that provide users with vast resources because the cloud is fully accessible. Today companies such as Google, Facebook and Microsoft who need to process large quantities of data operate numerous massive cloud data centres that may each occupy tens of thousands of square feet and contain thousands of computers. Like Feynman’s Los Alamos team – narrated in his wonderful auto biography “Surely You’re Joking, Mr Feynman” – these computing complexes provide computing as a service for many people.
What Cloud Computing can offer us : the next generation of internet.
The existing internet provides us content in the form of videos, emails and information served up in webpages. With cloud computing, the next generation of internet will allow us to “buy” IT services from a web portal, drastically expanding the types of merchandise available beyond those on e-commerce sites such as eBay. We would be able to rent from a virtual store front the basic necessities to build a virtual data center – such as CPU, memory and on top of that the middleware necessary : web application servers, databases, enterprise server bus etc as the platforms to support the applications we would like to either rent from an independent software vendor or develop ourselves. Together this is what we call “IT as a Service” (ITaaS) bundled to us – the end users – as a virtual data center.
Advantages of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing offers the following advantages:
a) Scalability in terms of resources : A company can start small and increase its hardware resources as it needs.
b) Flexibility in terms of the different software packages and operating systems
c) Pay – as – you – go economic model borrowed from utility computing
d) Consolidation of System Maintenance and Management : this overhead is shifted from cloud users to its providers
e) Reliability : The system’s fault tolerance is managed by the cloud providers and users no longer need to worry about it
f) High utilization and reduced carbon footprint as typically a large number of custom servers is consolidated into a smaller number of shared servers.
Legal Issues
Cloud computing service providers – whether global or regional – will inevitably run up against international law, particularly data protection law and privacy regulations. Each country has its own set of laws – some being dramatically more stringent than others . There are no laws unique to the cloud. But the cloud brings with it some legal issues which while not applying only to the cloud are perhaps now uniquely important to those operating or using a cloud-based service. The most important among these pertains to sovereignty on the internet: location and use of data. A key question with any cloud computing service is “where is the data stored or processed?”. The reality in this regard is that even the cloud service provider may not know where the data is residing.
Unlike a fixed server in the office or at a data centre, data in the cloud could potentially be located anywhere in the world – even in multiple data centres in multiple copies worldwide. Read these with the fact that cloud computing services involve processing of masses of data that is often commercially sensitive, confidential and “personal information” and the picture is complete. To put it a bit differently, sending and processing data around the globe could in the process fail to comply with data protection and privacy laws in various countries. The EU for example provides a strict legal regime under the EU Data Protection Directive where unless certain steps are taken, companies can be prohibited from transferring personal information to countries that do not give the same level of protection. If a European company is processing data on the cloud and is processing personal information in the EU, it may not be complying with EU laws if data is moved to countries outside the EU.
The classic case of Microsoft Corporation Vs US District Court
No discussion on the legal issues pertaining to cloud computing can be complete without a reference to the Microsoft Corporation case. Microsoft is a major player in the cloud industry with a 12% market share. Their innovation – Office 365- is a highly popular cloud based office software and email platform.
It all started in 2013 when the Justice Department asked for access to the email account contents and Microsoft refused that query with a response that data which are not stored in US is outside of US jurisdiction. In 2014, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a search warrant (under the SCA 18 USC) seeking access to the contents therein whose data was stored in Ireland. Francis M.J, the US judge issued the warrant since he believed that the government presented enough evidence to support the belief that the mail account was being used for narcotics trafficking. Microsoft delivered all contents of the mail account whose data were stored in locations inside US, but advised that the most valuable data were located in their Irish based storage and that to provide the same they would need to transfer the data from Irish based storage to US based storage which they declined to do. Instead they requested for revocation of the warrant. But the District Court denied the motion to quash and ruled Microsoft to be in civil contempt.
Microsoft‘s contention was that a warrant intrinsically includes territorial restrictions and hence in the present case does not cover Europe. The government on the other hand argued that the warrant was applied as a compelled disclosure similar to a subpoena. Therefore the actual physical location of the object is of no consequence if it is under the control of Microsoft and can be delivered by them.
Upon having their motion to quash the warrant dismissed, Microsoft appealed to the US Court of Appeals. The Court deduced that the warrant is against extra territoriality as it may bring international conflicts. Since Microsoft satisfied the warrant by providing all data that were stored in US and only refused to provide data stored outside US territory, the Court of Appeal lacked authority to enforce the warrant. Thus the US Court of Appeals (2015) reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the request to quash the warrant.
The aforesaid case has had profound implications on the future of internet privacy, ethics in technology, respecting other countries borders and user’s privacy. It needs special mention here that Microsoft successfully illustrated that no matter how big or small the case is, the company take privacy of users very seriously. However the persistent nature of US government’s attempts to access user’s data without their consent has sent shivers down many spines. In a kneejerk response, many users have signed cloud service contracts with oversees cloud providers. Another situation is for users to encrypt their data. Mention must be made here of the Open Whisper Systems encryption algorithm which is known for its high reliability. In fact, the algorithm is so reliable that governments would not bother to request access to the users’ data as they know that even if the data is supplied, encryption will mean that it is not possible to view the contents. Add to these the fact that many countries have decided to pass “data localization laws” and the picture is complete.
The US case is not the first one wherein Microsoft was requested to provide users’ data nor will it be the last time. For instance, in 2013, Brazil asked Microsoft for the same kind of access, but it was for access to Skype application data located outside of Brazil. Microsoft refused to provide the data. The result was that the Brazilian authorities arrested the local manager of Microsoft in January 2014.
The EU, it needs to be mention here, takes this kind of transaction very seriously. An example is a case wherein the European authorities found that by virtue of a US court’s order, the Belgium based branch of an international bank and the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) provided some financial transaction data of a European citizen to the US government. Belgium found this act to be a violation of EU privacy law. SWIFT was forced to change its network structure in order to remove any possible future transfer of European data to outside of EU unless it complied with EU data privacy legislation.
Issues pertaining to Lock In
A major concern of cloud computing is lock in which refers to the complexity to switch from one cloud service provider to another. Needless to say, it increases dependency on the service provider.
Questions that arise in this context are:-
a) Is the data portable between service providers ?
b) If service providers change, can the records be accessed ?
c) What are the obligations on each party regarding an exit plan?
Vint Cerf, the computer scientist who is often called the father of the internet, has identified the issue of moving data between clouds as one of vital importance. According to him, developing intercloud standards and protocols so that data does not get caught in one cloud is the equivalent now of the issues faced in 1973 when networks could not communicate with each other.
Concerns of data security
Unlike the traditional model wherein users had control over their data and could implement whatever safeguards they thought necessary to retain control, cloud users neither possess nor control their data. This raises serious apprehensions on the data security front. The issue vis-a-vis cloud computing is that the customer using the services is not aware what part of their data is getting saved on their device and what is getting saved on the cloud. In fact, data security in the context of cloud computing has to be analyzed in the backdrop of the triad concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality is the anticipation of intended or unintended unauthorized disclosure of contents whereas integrity guards both data and system against any illegal modification or deletion thereby ensuring originality and nonrepudiation of data. Availability on the other hand gives the assurance of trustworthy and timely access of information. This concern centres on critical applications and data being available. Well publicized incidents of cloud outages include gmail’s one-day outage in mid October 2008, Amazon S3’s over seven – hour downtime on July 20, 2008 and Flexi Scale’s 18 hour outage on October 31, 2008. Availability also means the extent to which user’s data can be recovered when accidents such as hard disk damage, fire and network failures occur. Viewed from this triad, the security issues in cloud computing can be categorized into three broad classes – traditional security concerns, availability issues and third party data control related issues. Common security concerns in the cloud are:-
a) Data breaches :- The chances of data breaches or losses increase in cloud environment. According to a research carried out by the Ponemon Institute titled “Man in Cloud Attack”, the likelihood of over all data breaches is three fold in a cloud environment.
b) Hijacking of Accounts:- Hackers having login information to remotely contact data in cloud can cause hijacking. Moreover they can manipulate data through captured credentials.
c) Denial of Service Attack:- it tries to make websites and servers unavailable to legitimate users.
d) Insider Threat:- Employees can utilize authorized access to misuse or access sensitive information.
e) Abuse of Cloud Service :- It affects both the service provider and its client
f) Insecure APIs (Application Programming Interfaces)
g) Malware Injection:- These are scripts/codes embedded deliberately into cloud service. Once executed, attackers can eaves drop and compromise integrity.
h) Side Channel Attacks:-An emerging concern for cloud delivery models using virtualization platforms is the risk of side channel attacks causing data leakage across co-resident virtual machine instances.
Transfer to public cloud involves a change of responsibility and giving accessibility of data to the provider. This can be ensured by building clauses in the contract with the provider which have appropriate provisions for security and help in maintaining legal protections for data stored. The user also must ensure foolproof services within their own systems. Issues like standard of the services being provided, the ownership of IP, service level agreements, liability regimes, warranties and indemnity provisions, confidentiality obligations and termination clauses must all find their places in the contract for cloud based services. Needless to say, the various requirements imposed by law will subsist in addition to the terms of the contract. A classic example in this regard is the provision regarding liability of the parties under the Australian Trade Practices Act.
An interesting example of the inadequacy of standard terms and conditions to meet the expectations of a business user can be seen from a successful bid by Google to provide cloud based services to the city of Los Angels. The contract included unlimited damages for data breach, guarantees as to where the data will remain and penalties if the services are not available for longer than five minutes a month.
No discussion on data security in the context of cloud computing will be complete without a reference to mash-up authorization. As adoption of cloud computing grows, more services performing mash-ups of data will be witnessed. A case study in this regard is provided by Facebook, the users of which upload both sensitive and non-sensitive data. This data is used by Facebook to present data to other users and this data is also utilized by third party applications. Since these applications are typically not verified by Facebook, malicious apps running in Facebook’s cloud can potentially steal sensitive data.
Problems vis-a-vis data privacy
Privacy refers to the right of self determination. It is the ability of an individual or group to seclude information about themselves and thereby reveal them selectively. It has the elements of when, how and extent. A good reference for use in defining universal principles for the protection of personal data and privacy is the Madrid Resolution (2009). The basic principles that must govern the use of personal data include those of lawfulness and fairness, proportionality, purpose specification, data quality, openness and accountability. It needs to be mentioned here that there is a huge divide between developed and developing countries in terms of adequate legislation of protection of personal data.
In the cloud, privacy means when users visit sensitive data, the cloud services can prevent potential adversaries from inferring the user’s behaviour by the user’s visit model. ORAM (Oblivious RAM) is a promising technology in protecting privacy in the cloud.
No discussion on confidential and sensitive data in the context of cloud computing can be complete without a mention of the Odense Municipality case. The view of the Municipality was that sensitive data about students and parents can be processed in Google Apps. However, the Municipality’s use of cloud computing to store sensitive information was rejected by the Danish Data Protection Agency (DDPA). The case confirms that a serious risk assessment must be made before switching to cloud services. It also points out that standards should play an essential role in fostering adoption thereof.
Issues pertaining to incomplete data deletion
A major concern of cloud computing is that it is always possible that data has not been properly deleted and that multiple copies or traces may have been stored. When users delete their data with confirmation, all copies of data should be deleted at the same time. Cloud storage providers should ensure that the deleted data of users cannot be recovered and used by other unauthenticated users. This is particularly important in the backdrop of data recovery technologies that could recover data deleted by users from the hard disks. To avoid data be recovered and unauthenticatedly used, a possible approach is to encrypt the data before uploading to the cloud storage space. A classic example is FADE system which is based on technologies such as Ephemenzer.
Cloud service providers and liability for content
Cloud providers are by no means exempted from any accountability if the material that users store in the service is the ground for a civil or criminal offence. The general rule in this regard is that the provider is exempt from liability for illegal or infringing content on its servers if the following two conditions apply:-
A) It has no part in determining the content of the transmission or it has no knowledge or control of illegal information stored on its servers and
B) It acts expeditiously to remove or prevent further storage and transmission of any illegal information it is made aware of.
The latter requirement is referred to as notice and take down obligation.
However due to the differences in the various regimes, the applicability thereof to cloud computing services must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, depending on the provisions of the specific country and nature of the service provided on the cloud. In particular, cloud providers in EU and US can generally benefit from all the liability exemptions generically offered to ISPs (Internet Service Providers).
Concerns regarding IPRs
These concerns are closely connected to the question: Who owns the data in the cloud? The answer lies in the observation that normal copyright rules apply if the data being stored in the cloud is fit for copyright protection (ie) it has some degree of novelty and is the product of author’s intellectual work. Thus the user of the cloud service can very well have the author’s right over the work. However, the cloud terms of service may include provisions according to which the provider has some power over the data stored in the cloud. This is not an actual copyright transfer, but the author might be limited in exercising his monopolistic rights over the copyrighted material. Ownership of IP can be eroded by a formal agreement or dedication of the work to the public domain, but in the cloud computing environment, mere uploading of information in a cloud platform does not entail losing IPRs. But it is important that the rights over the content in the cloud be kept well distinct from rights over cloud assets. By doing so, it is possible for the cloud customer to avoid undesired consequences such as loss of IPRs to the cloud provider. Conversely, the provider’s IPs need to be protected horizontally from unfair business practices by competitors and vertically from possible illicit behaviours by customers. Thus the provider will hold exclusive ownership over the rights used in providing the cloud service (ie) it owns IPRs to the software and the customer will be granted a license to use the technology. In the PaaS and IaaS delivery models, separation of ownership for applications developed by the customers and the tools used to develop them should be made clear in the contract terms. Mention also needs to be made here of the Japanese initiative towards introduction of a new form of IP protection for big data.
Concerns regarding bandwidth costs
With cloud computing, companies can save money on hardware and software, but they could incur higher network bandwidth charges. Bandwidth cost may be low for smaller internet based applications, which are not data intensive, but could significantly grow for data-intensive applications.
Laws, Standards and Regulations pertaining to Cloud Computing
These fall into four broad categories:-
a) Compelled disclosure to the government
Classic examples are
1) USA : Stored Communications Act (SCA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), National Patriot Act and Fair Information Practice.
2) UK : The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
3) Australia : Privacy Act in the APPs, APP12:Access to Personal Information, Freedom of Information Act 1982
Moreover policies of national cryptography in UK, Singapore, Malaysia etc may allow a court order to access cryptography.
b) Regulations dictating how a cloud service provider protects customer data security
Examples are
1) USA : Gramm – Leach – Biley Act (GLBA), Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH), Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
2) UK : Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive), Data Protection Act and Directive
3) Australia : Privacy Act in the APPs, APP 11: Security of Personal Information
c) Relating to transfer, retention and privacy of data between the clients and the data storage provider
Examples are
1) USA : FTC Fair Information Practice, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS), Freedom of Information Act
2) UK : The Safe Harbor Agreement (defined in data transfer between USA and Europe)
3) Australia : Privacy Act in the APPs, APP 8 : Cross-border disclosure of personal information, Privacy Act 1988 – Section 16C, Privacy business resource & Sending personal information overseas
d) Relating to physical location of data storage servers
Examples are
1) USA : Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS), NARA regulations
2) UK : Euro Data Protection Directive
3) Australia : Privacy Act in the APPs, APP 8 : Cross-border disclosure of personal information
The Legal Framework for Cloud Computing in India
Cloud computing services that deal with personal or sensitive information need to comply with the requirements set out under the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules 2011 relating to security, encryption, access to data subject, disclosure, international transfer and publication of policy statements. Thus a cloud computing service company before trading with “sensitive personal information” having a link to India has to make sure to be in observance with the aforesaid Rules as any non-compliance would invite penalties and imprisonment. Cloud service providers in India may also be required to comply with the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011.
In addition to the IT Act and Rules, use of cloud computing in banking and insurance sectors is subject to specific restrictions. The RBI’s guidelines on Managing Risks and Code of Conduct in Outsourcing of Financial Services by Banks sets out specific requirements to be complied with by banks while engaging cloud service providers. These requirements inter alia relate to vendor selection, data security, form of agreement, business continuity and disaster recovery or management practices. On the other hand, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India’s Guidelines on Information and Cyber Security require insurers to comply with requirements in relation to data, application and network security, indent management and information security audit while using services from a cloud service provider.
Conclusion
Cloud services are the best method to offer a dynamic and self adjustable computing and storage resource service to a wide range of clients – from residential users through small businesses to large multi-national organizations. A cloud is a pool of virtualized computer resources and can host a variety of different workloads, including batch-style backend jobs and interactive, nay user-facing applications. It supports redundant, self- recovering, highly scalable programming models that allow workloads to recover from many unavoidable hardware/software failures. However a word of caution is needed here – the cloud ecosystem must be designed to be secure, trustworthy and dependable. Cloud security faces different challenges and issues at various levels in the form of vulnerabilities and attacks – multitenancy, cloud secure federation, vendor lock in , loss of control, confidentiality, data integrity and privacy, data intrusion, virtualization vulnerabilities, cloning and resource pooling, UM hopping, XML signature attack, XSS attack, SQL injection attack and flooding attack, to name a few. Moreover, international law is not agile enough to compete with cloud computing developments. The onus therefore is on international cloud service providers to be familiar with data protection laws and policies of each country that they have a presence in – regardless of their essential understanding about the technology that they are providing via their platforms. In addition, the policies regarding data transfer between countries need to be seriously accounted for in their business plans.
Issues surrounding development of standards and best practices in the areas of interoperability, escrow and privacy need to be addressed along with questions as to whether adequate due diligence has been carried out along the chain of responsibility. Otherwise cloud service providers will be exposed to an avalanche of claims including those pertaining to liability for data mining and liability under securities laws for improper dissemination of investment information on social networking websites. The currently pending cases including class action litigations pertaining to Netflix Inc, Facebook “Beacon” Google “Buzz” should be eye openers in this regard. Mention also needs to be made here of the emergence of a parallel form of business called cloud brokering whose objective is to guide the potential enterprise in the choice of a cloud service provider, untwining the tangle of differential features.
In a de jure condendo perspective, a uniform legislative approach would be advisable. Internet services operate in a global market. Hence a unified approach – possibly one based on a WIPO treaty – would provide benefits to cloud customers by establishing uniform terms and conditions which drive consistency in the protection of data in the cloud. Opinions are galore that a “cyber seas” agreement may be the ideal vehicle for this kind of system because it provides a balance between a state’s ability to regulate the cloud and an over seeing international authority. Taking the prudent steps now to harness the cloud may in the near future allow the world to reflect on an entirely man-made global public utility and the beginnings of a truly cooperative world market. Needless to say, ultimately it is the users who will choose the model that makes the most sense given their needs – which may end up being a hybrid of cloud computing and the traditional model.
Dr Raju Narayana Swamy is the all India topper of the 1991 batch of the IAS and is presently posted as Principal Secretary to the Government of Kerala. He holds a B. Tech in computer science and engineering from IIT Madras and a Ph D from the Gujarat National Law University. A recipient of the prestigious Homi Bhabha Fellowship in Information Technology and Cyber Law, Dr Swamy was honoured by the IIT Kanpur with the Satyendra K Dubey Memorial Award in 2018.
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4) Bartolini C L, El Kateb D, Le Traon Y, Hagen D, Cloud Providers Viability: how to address it from an IT and legal perspective ? in Altman J, Silaghi G C, Rana O F Editors Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems and Services Vol 9512 Computer Communication Networks and Telecommunications, Springer International Publishing, 2016; 281-295
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The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on March 23, 2020(“Order”) took suo moto cognizance of the pandemic due to Covid-19 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020) and passed an order vide which the period of limitation in filing petitions, applications, suits, appeals and all other proceedings, irrespective of the period of limitation prescribed under the general or special laws was extended with effect from March 15, 2020 till further orders. Thereafter, on March 8, 2021, it was noticed that the country was returning to normalcy and since all the courts and tribunals had started functioning either physically or virtually, extension of limitation was brought to an end by the Supreme Court in March, 2021.However, on an application being filed by the Supreme Court Advocate on Record Association vide Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 in SMW(C) No. 3/2020, the Apex Court restored the Order till further orders, on April 27, 2021.Thereafter, on September 23, 2021 the Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021was disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the order that with effect from October 2, 2021, the limitation period will not be extended any further, due to imminent normalcy. Presently, the Hon’ble Apex Court has again restored the Order, on January 10, 2022 passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 2022 in Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 in SMW(C) No. 3/2020, by virtue of which the period from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022 shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
The bone of contention here is the impact of this Order on the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), which is a special statute, especially on the timelines envisaged under Sections 34(3) and 36 of the Act. Section 34(3) of the Act provides that an application for setting aside an Arbitral Award has to be preferred within a period of three months from the date the award was received or if an application for correction or modification of an award has been preferred, three months from the period on which such application was disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. The proviso to Section 34(3) furnishes an additional 30 days to challenge an award provided the applicant shows reasonable cause.
Section 36 of the Act deals with enforcement of arbitral awards passed in India. As per Section 36(1) of the Act, after the time prescribed for making an application to set aside an award under Section 34 has elapsed, an award is to be enforced as a decree of a court. From a conjoint reading of Sections 34 and 36 of the Act, it clearly emerges that an arbitral award is to be enforced as a decree of the civil court upon the expiration of three months or in the event the proviso has been invoked, 120 days from the date the award was received. Sections 34 and 36 are set out hereunder for the sake of convenience:
“Section 34 – Application for setting aside arbitral award
…………………..
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
……………
“Section 36 – Enforcement
Provided that the Court shall, while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, have due regard to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
Provided further that where the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out that,-
Explanation.–For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the above proviso shall apply to all court cases arising out of or in relation to arbitral proceedings, irrespective of whether the arbitral or court proceedings were commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016).”
The Supreme Court had explained the importance of Section 34(3), while interpreting it strictly and had held in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd. that the phrase “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to Section 34(3) would amount to an express bar on the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1960. The Apex Court also held that –
“To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose.”
The Court further referred to its decision in Simplex Infrastructure Vs Union of India wherein it had held that “the phrase “but not thereafter” provided under Section 34(3) of the Act makes it evident that the statutory period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside is three months, which is extendable by thirty days, if sufficient cause is made out. No further period of time can be granted for the filing of an application under Section 34.”
In simple words, the period of enforcement of an Award commences as soon as the period for filing objections provided under Section 34(3) is over. Even a mere petition under Section 34(2) for setting aside the arbitral award shall per se not render the award unenforceable, unless the court grants an order of stay of the operation of the arbitral award in accordance with Section 36(3)on a separate application made for such purpose. This was enunciated by the Calcutta High Court in Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Vs South City Projects (Kolkata) Ltd. and Ors. while expounding that, “…Sub-Section (2) of Section 36 has recognised that, an application for setting aside of the arbitral award by itself shall not render the award unenforceable, unless the Courts grants an order of stay of the operation of the arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Act of 1996, on a separate application made for such purpose. …”
However, the pandemic, and the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court, have left parties befuddled about whether to file an application for enforcement after 90/120 days are over or whether to wait for further orders of the Apex Court. There is not much precedential basis to take a stand on this, although the Calcutta High Court in SREI Equipment Finance Limited Vs Marg Limited has adopted the Supreme Court’s order stricto sensu. The High Court held that an award cannot be enforced until the period of limitation for filing a Section 34 application has not expired in the following terms:
“11. The question in the present case is whether the time for the award-debtor to apply under Section 34 for setting aside of the award has elapsed or continues to run. The answer to the question then must entirely turn on the effect of the order of the Supreme Court dated 27th April, 2021. The portion set out above makes it clear that the earlier order of 23rd March, 2020 was being restored as an extraordinary measure to lessen the difficulties faced by litigants in the upsurge of the pandemic. The order clarifies that the period of limitation whether under general or special laws or in respect of judicial/quasi judicial proceedings, shall stand extended till further orders. The intention of the Supreme Court is to preserve the rights of litigants who would otherwise have missed the statutory deadlines for instituting proceedings in the courts. The applicant’s time to file the Section 34 expired on 7th December, 2020 and the applicant hence comes within the zone of benefit given to litigants commenced from 15th March, 2020 and continued to run as on the date of filing the present application – 21st June, 2021. Simply put, the time to apply for setting aside of the award dated 31st August, 2020 has still not expired.
12. Any other interpretation of the orders passed by the Supreme Court would lead to an absurd result. If the Supreme Court orders were construed as not limiting an award holder from enforcing the award under Section 36(1) and (2) of the Act, it would in effect take away the benefit given to litigants who failed to institute proceedings within the period of limitation. It would lead to a scenario akin to opening a window but drawing the curtains to prevent the sunlight from coming in; a more topical analogy would be lifting of travel curbs but shutting down places where people may visit. This surely cannot be what the Supreme Court intended.”
As such, the award cannot be enforced. However, the Calcutta High Court’s decision was not unconditional. While applying the Supreme Court’s decision to extend the limitation periods to challenging an arbitral award under Section 34, the High Court also added that the rights of the award holder cannot be kept in abeyance indefinitely and thus, the award debtor was directed to take requisite steps under the Act within 10 days from the date of the judgment, as the law protects litigants who are vigilant and not those who take their rights for granted indefinitely.
The authorsdo not completely concur with this decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, as Section 36 enables a party to apply for enforcement of award when the period for challenging an award under Section 34 has expired and it cannot be deemed that the period would stand extended for an uncertain period by the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is essential to note that the Supreme Court’s intent was to pass a welfare ruling to diminish the inconvenience of the stringent limitation periods. But if the Calcutta High Court’s proposition were to be accepted, then enforcement of an arbitral award can be delayed by an award debtor taking recourse to the order of the Supreme Court, thereby, defeating the ethos of speedy alternative dispute redressal enshrined in the Act.
This is reinforced by a recent decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Bharat Kalra Vs Raj Kishan Chabra wherein the following observation was made with respect to the Order:
“13. While it is true that the power to condone delay is intended to advance substantive justice, nevertheless, procedure cannot be given a complete go by. The powers of the court to condone delay is to be used in appropriate cases. No litigant can assume that, as a matter of right, the delay in taking steps would be condoned, because procedure is the handmaiden of substantive justice. Rights accruing to the opposite party on account of the delayed action need to be also kept in mind. The reasons given for explaining the delay are of paramount importance and not the length of the delay. The shortness of delay alone ought not to suffice for exercise of discretion to condone it. Cogent and clear explanations have led the courts to condone the delay, even of five years in filing the pleadings. …
…15. It was thus made clear that the benefit of the order dated 23rd March, 2020 would be available only to those who were vigilant of their rights and not lethargic.”
Although the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly mentioned in its order dated July 10, 2020 (Cognizance for extension of limitation, In Re) that all periods of limitation under the Act shall stand extended as the Order will be deemed applicable to the Act as well, however, the dubiety regarding the enforcement of award is still an open-ended question and is yet to be decided finally by the Hon’ble Supreme Court but until then, in the humble submission of the Authors, the perk of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order should not be misused to cause inconvenience to award holders.
Anant Garg is Partner, and Sreejita Mitra is Associate, at L&L Partners Law Offices.
January 27, 2021
Real Estate is one of the most up-and-coming sectors in India. It has become the second highest employment generating industry after the agriculture sector. The real estate sector in India is expected to reach US$ 1 trillion by 2030. By 2025, it will contribute 13% to the country’s GDP. With the ever-rising population, the demands for commercial and residential spaces haveincreased in not only major cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore etc. but smaller developing cities as well. The provisions of real estate have undergone major changes since the advent of liberalization and have seen many amendments in the recent years. There is no doubt that excellent acts, amendments and precedents have been set out in the real estate laws.However, due to the contemporary nature of the area,there is a lack of protection to homebuyers, builders and developers. More than anyone it is the homebuyers or flat buyers who land in trouble due to the subservient position. Working class and low-pay families are by all account not the only casualty of slowed down land projects in Mumbai. Around Rs.13,000 crores paid by high total assets people to the manufacturer of India’s tallest under-development private pinnacle is stuck for 10 years.
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is a semi-legal authority joined for managing corporate debates that are of common nature emerging under the Companies Act, relating to cases of abuse and botch of an organization, ending of organizations and any remaining powers endorsed under the Companies Act. The Central Government has formed the NCLT under section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) in June 2016.
Real estate is a significant area for the public economy, one of the significant work generators. But it has a ton of issues. In 1973, when the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act (MOFA) came up, the preface of the Act said there are various maltreatments, acts of neglect, data unevenness. Disregarding those issues way back in the mid-seventies and raising regulation to amend it, things didn’t change a lot. Infringements proceeded and the complaint redressal component for investigating these infringements was an extremely muddled one.
It will require some investment for us to get over that. Who can be an engineer — there were no limits or section obstructions earlier. Particularly with the execution of different plans like the stopped structure redevelopment, Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority, 1977 (MHADA) redevelopment to Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), you would have a large group of individuals who have no expert ability. They go there and get 70% assent and turn into a designer. I’m not projecting defamations on anyone.However, at that point you have issues of tasks, particularly redevelopment projects, mulling for quite a long time. Then, at that point, individuals race to MHADA or SRA to say they need this engineer out yet that makes more serious issues in light of the fact that at that point the designer has likewise made outsider freedoms. In any case, since it is a RERA-enrolled project, it necessitates that for a difference in designer needs go through Section 15, which implies the new engineer takes on every one of the liabilities of the task. Like I said, progress is an agonizing interaction and how much is the aggravation I actually don’t have the foggiest idea. We’re equipped to perceive how we will support ourselves in the agonizing system and emerge from this.
Homebuyers’ dream to reside in their homes is as yet a fantasy for themselves. Some homebuyers are not excessively monetarily solid and presently thumping at the entryway of legal executive to get equity. Assuming the firm goes for liquidation, they might not get anything – no level or discount. All returns of Liquidation are to stream to Banks and Financial Institution.
There are different instances of the families living in stopped properties and there are gigantic numbers of buildings which are re-creating or immature including more than great many tenants without a rooftop over their heads.
It is high time that the public authority should take the matter into consideration. One such milestone judgment will help level the buyers by setting a genuine model against defaulting manufacturers and will be recollected in future.
Chaitanyashil Priyadarshi is Partner, Mimansa Law Offices.
By Krishnamohan Menon
On December 11, 2019, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (“JPC”) was established to investigate and examine the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019. The JPC was supposed to give its report to Parliament during the 2020 Budget Session, but after receiving a two-year extension, the JPC tabled its report in both houses of Parliament on December 16, 2021.
The JPC report includes a list of policy recommendations, an examination of key sections of the 2019 Bill, and a draft bill titled the Data Protection Bill, 2021, among other things. The JPC report focused on answering questions and clarifying issues relating to public policy concerns about data protection in India, as well as making recommendations in that regard while taking into account the Honourable Supreme Court’s decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India and the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee’s recommendations. Read on to find out the recommendations provided by the JPC on the PDP Bill.
One of the JPC’s first recommendations is to alter the bill’s name from ‘Personal Data Protection’ to ‘Data Protection,’ because it is impossible to distinguish between personal and non-personal data, and thus it is necessary to have a single law that covers both datasets. But the stakeholders are concerned that integrating both personal and non-personal data in the same legislation may weaken the PDP Bill’s goals, which were to provide a framework for personal data protection.
According to the PDP Bill, only members of the Ministry of Legal Affairs and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology were allowed to participate in the DPA selection process. However, the Report recommends that the DPA selection committee should include more technical, legal, and academic expertise, as well as the bureaucrat officers who make up the selection committee. As all members of the selection committee are nominated at the Central Government’s request, the DPA members will be indirectly in control of the Central Government.
According to the report, social media intermediaries should be scrutinized more strictly. The Report recommends that all user accounts on social media intermediaries should be verified in order to combat the threat of fake news and accounts. Further, the report suggests that social media intermediaries be recognized as “publishers” in certain circumstances, particularly when it comes to content from unverified accounts. Furthermore, it has been suggested that no social media platform should be permitted to operate in India until the parent company behind the technology establishes an office in the country.
With the object of protecting the national interest, the PDP Bill granted the government an exemption for compliance with the proposed legislation. The Report adds restrictions to this exemption, recommending that the government only be exempted from the provisions after following a fair, just, reasonable, and proportionate method. This is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Right to Privacy Case, which established the legality, legitimate goal, proportionality, and procedural safeguards that must be met for the government to infringe on people’s right to privacy under the exemptions available to it.
Companies must report personal data breaches when they cause harm to the data principal, according to the PDP Bill. In addition, the Report not only compels the keeping of a log of all types of data breaches, regardless of whether the breach involves personal or non-personal data, and regardless of the possibility of harm to the data principal, but also sets a 72-hour reporting deadline for such breaches. As a result, in addition to reporting obligations for personal data breaches, the keeping of a log will be required for both personal and non-personal data, and will not be contingent on the data principal suffering any harm.
The PDP Bill included special safeguards for the protection of children’s data. The notion of a guardian data fiduciary was described in the PDP Bill as a data fiduciary who maintains commercial websites or online services aimed towards children or processes vast amounts of personal data about children. The PDP Bill exempted such a guardian data fiduciary from taking approval of the child’s parent or guardian. However, the Report recommended that the concept of a guardian as a different class of data fiduciary should be eliminated, because it may undermine the goal of protecting children. Further, the Report recommends that all data fiduciaries should be prohibited from profiling, tracking, or behavioral monitoring of children, or targeted advertising intended at children, as well as processing personal data that may cause serious harm to children. Previously, this bar only applied to guardian data fiduciaries.
While measures for data localization were previously included in the PDP Bill, the JPC has strongly recommended that all data be stored in India for national and security considerations. According to the report, the government should bring back mirror copies of all sensitive and vital personal data that is now housed outside of India, and all organizations operating in India should gradually move toward data localization. In addition to data localization, the Report recommends that the Central Government should draft a comprehensive data localization policy aimed at developing adequate infrastructure for local data storage and aiding start-ups in complying with localization requirements, all while keeping the Government’s ‘ease of doing business’ objectives in mind.
Several members of the Lok Sabha have dissenting opinions against the Report’s recommendations. The following are the key issues about the Report’s recommendations and the proposed “Data Protection Bill”:
While the JPC Report and the 2021 Bill are positive steps forward towards addressing various difficulties that people face in today’s digital world, they have also been faced with criticism. Critics of the 2021 Bill believe that in its current form, the bill is prone to be misapplied by the state, jeopardizing people’s fundamental rights. Privacy and data protection assume primacy in the digital era, and both must be protected to the same extent. The way the powers provided in the 2021 Bill are used will determine whether they are necessary for state function or whether they leave digital data rights unsecured and diminish the code’s aim.
Krishnamohan Menon is Managing Partner, Mimansa Law Offices
By Kumar Shashwat
March 3, 2022
In this article, I argue a proposition that a challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“the Act”] though not inform, but in substance assumes the flavour of appellate proceedings.
Section 34(2) (a) of the Act mentions certain grounds on account of which the Court can set aside the arbitral award, if the party proves that:
Moreover under section34(2)(b) of the Act the court may set aside the Award if:
Despite specific grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the Act,the proceedings under the said section assumes the nature of an appellate court. The reasons in support of this argument are elaborated herein below:
Reasoning:
In support of my argument, I have relied upon three classes of cases on propositions that (i) the qualitative nature of the appreciation of the material on record in an adjudication under Section 34 of the Act, (ii) instance where the Arbitration Court has upheld a minority Award of the Ld. Arbitrator Tribunal, and (iii) permissibility for the Arbitration Court to examine material not propounded before the Ld. Arbitrator.
The proceedings under Section 34 of the Act being of a first instance before a Court is only legal fiction since the same assumes existence of Arbitral Award, arrived at, at least theoretically, pursuant to a rigorous judicial process, akin to a civil trial, which is the first marker of an appellate proceeding.
The qualitative nature of appreciation of the Award, as well as pleading and material relied upon therein, i.e., of award being arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked, or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter is when interference of the Court is warranted. Though the burden to discharge may be high, however, the qualitative nature of appreciation of material is no different from appreciation in appellate proceedings.
Ordinarily, the appellate court assumes the jurisdiction as the court of first instance in the manner of appreciation of evidence, facts, law, etc.
While, the Arbitration Court under Section 34 of the Act undertakes the same qualitative nature of analysis. However, statutorily, its jurisdiction is limited to arrive at only a singular finding that the Award is liable to be set aside.
In fact, curiously Courts have departed from the outcome mandated under Section 34 of the Act of setting aside the majority Award and have upheld award of the minority of the Tribunal.(Ssangyong Engineering And Construction Co. Ltd v. National Highways Authority Of India). This was premised on the logic under the scheme of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the disputes that were decided by the majority award under challenge would have to be referred afresh to another arbitration once the said award would be set aside, the Court held that adopting the said procedure would cause considerable delay. It was further observed that the same would be contrary to the objectives of the Act, namely, speedy resolution of disputes by the arbitral process.
However, in ONGC Ltd v. Interocean Shipping (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2017;ONGC Ltd v. Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd, the High Courts also adopted the course of setting aside the majority Award and upholding award of the minority, but sans any reasoning adopted for such course of action.
The Courts have also adopted a course of action, though as an exception rather than rule that ordinarily it will not examine material beyond the record of the Ld. Arbitrator. However, in the event that there are facts not stated in such record, and are relevant to the determination of issues, the Court may permit the parties to bring such facts on record by way of affidavits, wherein cross examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary, as the truth will emerge on a reading of the affidavits filed by both the parties (Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd v. Girdhar Sondhi)
Similarly, if certain facts were concealed, having a causative link with the facts constituting or inducing the award, such facts become relevant for the purpose of deciding adjudication under Section 34 of the Act proceedings. If such facts are discovered after the filing of challenge proceedings (underSection34),they maybe brought on record by way of amendment. (Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services ltd and Ors.)
Thus, proceedings under Section 34 of theActhave the colour of appellate proceedings.
Conclusion
In view of the fact that (i) the Arbitration Court under Section 34 of the Act is a Court of First Instance but only as a result of a legal fiction since it assumes existence of ‘judicially’ arrived at Award (ii) the qualitative nature of the proceedings in terms of appreciation of evidence, pleadings, Award, etc, (iii) the assuming of jurisdiction to uphold “minority view” of the Tribunal, while setting aside the “majority view” (iv) permissibility of the parties to bring fresh material on record before the Arbitration Courts, germane for the issues in the Award, leads to a conclusion that a proceeding under Section 34 of Act is though not inform, but in substance, in the nature of appellate proceedings.
Kumar Shashwat is Partner, Kumar & Singh Associates, New Delhi.
By Mayank Grover & Gurleen Kaur
April 14, 2022
Wireless communication involves transmission of information by using electromagnetic waves without wires and cables. The wireless revolution began in the 1990s with the advent of digital wireless networks which sparked a social revolution and switched technology from wired to wireless.
What is ETA?
The Wireless Planning and Coordination Wing (WPC) of Government of India’s Department of Telecommunications (DoT) is the National Radio Regulatory Authority in charge of frequency spectrum management and licensing, as well as catering to the needs of all wireless users. Products with radio and/or wireless functionality which are manufactured in India or imported and function in the de-licensed frequency band / license free radio frequency band must obtain an Equipment Type Approval (ETA) certificate from the WPC under the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. This includes devices with bluetooth, wireless local area network technology (Wi-Fi), digital radios (Zigbee technology), radio frequency identification (RFID) tags etc.
Scope of Approval
The scope of ETA from WPC covers mobile phones, RFIDs, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices like earphones, speakers, microphones, drones etc. Some frequency bands have been assigned a license-free status and therefore, a license from WPC is not required for products operating in those frequencies. In order to obtain an ETA, a detailed test report of the equipment obtained from a well-recognized laboratory has to be submitted to WPC for evaluation.
Documents required for ETA
Procedure to apply for ETA / WPC License
Who can apply for ETA?
Manufacturers/Importers of products with radio, wireless or both features are required to obtain ETA Certificate from WPC and Import License Certificate from the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Import). As per Public Notice No.12/2017 dated 23.08.2017 issued by the Office of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Import), for import of wireless equipments, the Applicant has to obtain valid import licence after getting ETA.
Devices eligible for ETA
Transceivers, transmitters, receivers, all blue-tooth devices, wireless home appliances, RFID tags and readers, wireless mouse and keypads, wireless headphones, small digital radios, wireless medical products used for patient profiling laptops, mobile phones, digital radios, remote key for entry, wireless music players, wireless remotes and any other radio frequency modules.
Exemption from ETA by filing a self-declaration
The online facility for obtaining ETA through self-declaration is available on the Saral Sanchar portal of DoT. As per Office Memorandum dated 26.02.2019 issued by DoT[1], ETA through self-declaration is permitted for:
which operate in license exemption bands as permitted in India.
A self-declaration from an importer/authorized Indian representative is sufficient for wireless equipments operating in license exempt bands with low transmission power for clearance by the Customs and Central Excise Authorities.
ETA through self-declaration is applicable to the products which meet two conditions:
These products may be imported by submitting a self-declaration to Custom Authorities and informing WPC via email.
As per another Office Memorandum dated 26.02.2019 of DoT[2], the requirement of ETA is exempted for R&D/ testing/ demo/ prototype/ pre-launch devices in the categories of mobiles, laptops, electronic notepads, smart watches, Short Range devices (including accessories), microphones, speakers, headphones, earphones, printers, scanners, cameras etc. and Test & Measurement equipment operating in license exempt bands as permitted in India.
A self-declaration from an importer/authorized Indian representative is sufficient for clearance by the Customs and Central Excise Authorities permitting 1000 units per model. The importer is also required to undertake that after completion of test/prototype exercise, equipments would either be exported back to the country of origin or destroyed as per destruction guidelines of WPC and may not be sold in the Indian market.
Thus, ETA clearance is required for wireless equipments which operate in license exempt frequency bands in India. With the introduction of self-declaration mechanism and exemption for prototypes, the process to obtain ETA license has been simplified by WPC to expedite launch of new devices and ensure ease of doing business in India.
[1]https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/ETA%20through%20Self%20declaration%20for%20Certain%20Categories%20of%20Wires%20Equipment%20dt%2026-02-2019_0.pdf
[2]https://www.tuv.com/content-media-files/master-content/rs/Attachments/1075_WPC%20Notification_Exemption%20ETA-Test-Prototype%20dt%2026-02-2019.pdf
Mayank Grover is a Partner and Gurleen Kaur is an Associate at Seraphic Advisors, Advocates & Solicitors in New Delhi.
By Siddharth Narula
Abstract
With morality at the crux of its arguments this article highlights the issue that is the ethical conundrum faced while making a choice, to do either the right thing, but go against the law, or the legally correct thing and ignore ones beliefs. Using the hypothetical scenario, the ‘trolley problem’, this article attempts at deciphering the correct course of action, while evaluating the difference between past and present opinions in the form of both, laws and ones understanding of what is correct.
Introduction
Most people reading this would probably know of, or have at least heard of the ‘Trolley problem’. For those who are unaware, the problem describes a fictional scenario wherein ‘You’ an ‘onlooker’ sees five people tied to one side of a tram track and one person tied to the other side. Near you is a switch that changes the direction of the main track and approaching from a distance is a tram travelling on those very tracks, heading towards the group of five. The onlooker is left with a decision to make – whether to save the lives of five people by sacrificing the single person tied to the other side, or to let those five die and spare the one.
Majority would conform to the theory of utilitarianism, ie. anything is right if done for the greater good and choose to save the five. Ironically though, if one was to judge this from a legal perspective, the person would be held accountable for manslaughter (culpable homicide) if he were to sacrifice the single individual to save the other five. Despite taking into account the theory, since the person proactively made a choice of killing the one, even if it was to save the others, it would be considered illegal. Under the common law of most English speaking countries such as the U.K and the US, there exists a rule of ‘no duty to rescue’, where a person is not compelled to help anyone in need and is not held liable as such if they fail to provide it.
However, the way this concept is construed varies across countries. It is a legal requirement in some countries to provide assistance unless doing so would prove detrimental to oneself or others. Providing basic aid such as alerting the authorities in cases such as a car crash or a person collapsing due to health issues, is compulsory. For example, under the Danish penal code, ‘all persons are required to provide aid to any person who appears to be lifeless or in mortal danger’ provided, that in acting they would not endanger themselves. Similarly, in France, anyone who fails to render assistance will be found liable before French courts.
Therefore, it is not as though legal systems around the world entirely abandon the concept of morality yet, it must be observed that in none of these examples is the safety of the one assisting or a third party is being jeopardised. And so, when it comes down to the matter of survival between two different parties, no explicit rules have been laid down concerning the required course of action. Even if one side has a larger number of people being put at risk, as law dictates that all subjects before it be treated equally, giving greater weightage to the larger group would tantamount to quantifying the worth of people and so in such scenarios, the legally correct thing would be to not intervene.
With the problem from before, if the same scenario would be implemented with a few changes such as replacing the one person with the onlooker’s family member or close relative or even a person of higher stature than the other five, the answers would vastly differ. Though this is not an effective test to determine one’s morality, it does allow us a peek into the inner workings of the mind and understand how people arrange the importance of others such that it does not come into conflict with their ethics.
This, then begs the question— what is the right thing to do? We are only able to exist today as a result of thousands of years of evolution, evolving not only physically but mentally as well, allowing us to think diagonally. The least we can expect is for there to be a clear distinction between what is good and what is bad. It seems that despite the purpose for which law exists— to provide justice, there is still moral uncertainty with regard to the right course of action for such matters. Does law even take morality into account? Well, if it doesn’t, should one discard their morality to be legally correct? After all, the majority would think twice about doing something if they become aware of its illegality, especially in today’s world which pushes people toward a perfect public persona. Where even a single misstep would cause the people to look askance upon them; as a result people have started to tread carefully. They have developed a more self-centered attitude abandoning their already diminishing morality.
Attempting to answer the unanswerable
What is the right thing to do? — this is a tough question. The definition of ‘right’ is far too vague. To even attempt to answer that would require a person to venture deep into the realm of philosophy and the inner workings of the human mind. This subject is something which even great philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and the like have barely scratched the surface of. So, what we can do is merely guess and theorise.
Based off of what can be gathered by observing one’s surroundings, one may notice that the definition of ‘right’ varies from individual to individual. To some, doing the right thing may mean making the other suffer ten times more than the suffering that was caused to them, while to others It may mean the exact opposite. They strive to forgive and forget.
Similarly, in a situation where one has to choose between the survival of two groups, the answer may vary. The opinion on this generally remains divided (albeit unequally), however, if one wants a straightforward answer then doing the correct thing would be to keep losses to a minimum. This is where law is introduced, but it is also where it falls short.
Law acts as a deterrent to conflict arising out of a divided opinion. By codifying opinion in the form of rules, law imposes something common on all. The end result— harmony despite divided opinions. A simple analogy to understand this is imagining law as the ‘good guy’ being forced to play the ‘bad guy’ for the greater good. Laws discourage violence between two groups of thought while setting a common rule for all to follow. Two prominent examples can be laws regarding the freedom of speech and taxation.
Both of the aforementioned laws embody the principle – “For The Greater Good”.
Freedom of speech is a double-edged sword— While laws do allow a person freedom of speech in all forms (oral and in print), it maintains a certain bottom line in this regard.
Article 19(2) imposes certain (reasonable) restrictions on this right which prevents its interference with the state procedures regarding law making, the security of the state, relations with foreign states, public order, or incitement to an offence.
Similarly, taxation, more particularly, the progressive taxation system also falls within the same category. Tax is a universal concept and is imposed on all. However, the way it is imposed differs according to the economic status of those taxed. The wealthy are taxed more while the poor are taxed less.
At a glance it may seem unfair, discriminatory even, to tax the former more. However, this discrimination helps maintain a balance in society. The idea being to patch up the ever widening gap between the rich and the poor.
On the other hand, the rigidity of law can be one of its biggest flaws. Law tries to maintain harmony and functions such that losses occurred are minimal. However, the cost of maintaining this harmony is what some believe to be a clear disregard for morality. To achieve its purpose, law needs to maintain a certain level of neutrality in order to avoid being perceived as partial.
This neutrality can often be construed as a total disregard towards human emotions; emotions being one of the main driving forces behind an individual’s actions. The rationale is to maintain order and minimise the intervention of any third party, but by doing so, it deprives both the victim as well as any third party the chance to receive and/or give any assistance without fear of possible repercussions.
It can be argued that nothing exists without flaws and it is something that is bound to happen, however, this is precisely the reason why simply abiding by the law is not enough. Citizens need to actively participate in the lawmaking process. To be dissatisfied with any law on account of it being outdated or violative of a citizen’s rights is natural, but mere criticism is not enough. The Constitution of our country assures our rights however, it is entirely dependent upon us to assert them and prevent their violation.
The thought behind the action
Even though an action might not be legally correct, to some not doing it might tantamount to abandoning their moral principles. They, thus abide by the ideology of ‘doing the right thing’, and would much rather be punished for doing something illegal, rather than be simply reticent.
As such, it does make one wonder what defences would be available to such an individual. After all, their action was out of honest intentions and if not for the situation before them they would not have had to make such a choice. Having been reduced to making a choice between two evils, one would choose to do what they abhor less, although their feelings towards it may be as extreme as if it were the worse between the two.
Setting aside the fact that an occurrence similar to the trolley problem is nearly impossible, judging it according to the standards mentioned before, the person who acted (regardless of the outcome) will be held liable for his actions. According to the procedure established by law, this person will promptly be produced before the court and will await trial. The only route to absolve him of his crime or at least reduce his sentence is for him to employ necessity as a defence. Section 81 of the IPC states that an act which is likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent and to prevent harm to another is not an offence. Thus, in accordance with the above, the individual can plead not guilty and based on what the law states, it is most likely that the person will be absolved of his crime. However, as there is no concrete evidence on the outcome of such a trial, one must look to other similar instances. Cases with a common nexus, though they may have facts as different as day and night, share a common rationale.
This can be observed in the earliest recorded case of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens wherein necessity was used as a defence.
The trial of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, or more famously known as the ‘Mignonette’ trial is one which involves the same principle of necessity with not much difference from the trolley problem. The trial follows the aftermath of four shipwreck stranded individuals who, in order to sustain themselves resorted to cannibalism by killing one of their party members.
This case formed two principles that make necessity inapplicable as a defence for murder. The main principle which formed the cornerstone for the same was the presence of an urgent and immediate threat to life, only following which it could be considered appropriate to carry out an action which might break the law. The second is medical necessity. Similar to the above, any activity may be justified as appropriate or legal if it conforms to the clinical standards of care, provided, that it is proven. The court in this trial found the accused guilty of murder and ruled that cannibalising the person was not urgent. Though there was a threat of starvation, at any moment a ship could have sailed over the horizon to save them, as that was indeed the case. They were originally sentenced to death which was later reduced to just six months in prison. Though the decision in this case is a highly debated one; to decide whether or not it was appropriate, one must examine all factors before forming an opinion.
From a legal standpoint, the decision to punish the group, was the correct one. The rationale of the court, though not entirely convincing did raise some important issues. If the three were to be exempted from punishment merely because their actions were necessary to avoid starvation, it would lead to anarchy and disorder. If people were allowed to feign innocence simply because of the rule that any actions are acceptable as long as one feels that without it they would suffer, it would allow anyone to escape punishment and disregard the severity of their crime. According to this reasoning a poor person could steal without any consequences, simply because they felt they would suffer from malnutrition.
From a moral standpoint however, this decision was incorrect. In order to pass a just ruling, courts must approach the case from a psychological perspective as well. To be fair in their judgment, one must imagine themselves in the other’s place and understand the situation from their viewpoint. Though the three were fortunate enough to survive a shipwreck, what lay before them was only uncertainty. This uncertainty transformed into a fear of death which was constantly looming over their heads. Desperation was only a matter of time.
This desperation to survive is enough for anyone to take impulsive decisions and the decision to kill the fourth member was a result of this impulse to survive. One could argue that they did what they believed was necessary to survive, after all they were not aware when or if they were going to be rescued.
What makes us human?
Many have pondered over this question and have arrived at various conclusions. Some believe that it is our intellect which is the reason humanity was able to flourish. The ability to communicate by creating languages and thus, being able to express our needs allowing us to evolve, much like an infant that uses crying to signal that it is hungry.
Some believe it is the ability to work. Work being the activity around which our life revolves, something which gives us a purpose, without which living would be meaningless. And so, while there are all sorts of conclusions that have been drawn over the decades, there is something that differentiates us from other sentient beings such as apes. It is something incredibly complex, yet, it is something that can be understood even by children.
That is— our morality
As opposed to animals, humans are driven not just by their instincts. All humans are imbued with the gift known as ‘conscience’, allowing them to think for themselves. The small voice at the back of our heads that berates us when we cheat our diet is what separates us from other living organisms. So, if this amazing ability is the reason why we are able to maintain our humanity, is it really worth giving up just to be legally correct?
This question can actually be answered from both points of view.
Law is something that is created by the people and for the people, as such it is not without reason that a particular law exists. The only purpose for its existence is the protection of the rights of the people. It is implemented solely for our benefit. When persons are due reparation for the crimes committed by them, it is the law which acts as an instrument for the aggrieved, allowing them to seek justice. The opinion that laws are exaggerated and often unnecessary is biased. From the point of view of a recalcitrant person, such a statement would be rather appealing. However, laws are a direct reflection of the society and by not acting in accordance there with, we do not hold true to the ideals created by us.
That being said, it is not as though all laws are perfect creations. What is created by the majority may not always be correct. Especially, with the passage of time as a society evolves it becomes more accustomed to accept change. Laws too as a result, need to be amended.
Section 24 of the Hindu Succession Act 2005, where originally the female heir of a coparcener was not entitled to the property in the same manner as the male coparcener; Section 377 of the IPC originally criminalised sexual acts between people of the same gender; are examples of evolution of laws as both of these were eventually amended to meet the changing societal norms.
Therefore, for laws to remain relevant, the process of law making has to be a dynamic one. The principle of dynamism is even reflected in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution recognized that for drawing up a document that can withstand the changes brought by time, making provisions for constitutional amendments would be desirable even though the same may be made only when absolutely necessary.
Thus, laws that are dynamic as opposed to the those that remain static are able to serve the society well. In this world of ours, where most of the people have been infected by the “fast lane” mentality, if one is not able to keep up they most definitely are left behind, with no one bothering to spare even a single look. In the absence of the ability to amend them, laws risk becoming obsolete and so to avoid such an outcome the need of review by the legislature every decade is of utmost importance.
To conclude…
An effective way for one to improve is to learn from past mistakes and keep evolving. Mistakes, often considered signs of incapability are in actuality, a chance for anyone or anything to bolster their capabilities. As such, it is an especially important tool to assess the interactions between people and the laws that govern them. Our current knowledge is the culmination of centuries worth of trials and errors which have led us to instill in ourselves value for life.
Thus, the moral of the story can be explained in the simplest way possible as, the need to value life in all its forms, more particularly human life. For, it is something that has no equal in worth and must be protected at all costs.
By Anand Kumar Rai
April 23, 2022
NFT stands for non-fungible token. An NFT is a digital cryptoasset that represents real-world objects, for example, artwork like music, painting, crafts, videos, game items, etc. They are sold and purchased online, frequently like cryptocurrencies, and they are generally encoded with the same underlying software as many cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies and physical money are “fungible,” which means they can be exchanged or traded for one another. They’re also equal in value—one dollar is always worth another dollar; one Bitcoin is always equal to another Bitcoin. But, NFTs are different, each NFT has a unique digital signature that makes it impossible for NFTs to be exchanged for each other or equal to one another (hence, non-fungible). For example, two persons A and B having different denominations of notes but having equal value could exchange their money the way we exchange when we need change. But both of them having two different art pieces with different digital signatures cannot exchange the same as both are two different digital tokens having different digital signatures.
Need for NFT:
The next question that arises is – what is the need for NFT?Anyone can view the bulk of images online for free. So why spend millions on something that could easily screenshot or downloaded? The answer is whenever we download or take screenshots, we don’t own the artwork. We don’t have rights over the artwork. NFT allows the buyer to purchase or sellthe ownership of the original item. It contains built-in authentication, which serves as proof of ownership. Collectors value these “digital bragging rights” more than the item itself.So, if we buy an oil painting via NFT, instead of getting an actual oil painting to hang on the wall, we will get a digital file instead.
Regulation and legal position of NFTs in India:
Transactions of NFT is risky business. An NFT’s value is entirely based on what someone else is willing to pay for it. Therefore, demand in the digital market will drive the price rather than the fundamental value of the asset, technical or economic indicators, which typically influence stock pricesover stock exchanges, and at least generally form the basis for investor demand. So, it is not guaranteed that if for example,we buy a piece of artwork for Rs 1000 having a perception that in future we will be able to sell it for a higher price, we will be able to do so, as there is a possibility that we will lose all of our money in case nobody wants to buy that particular artwork.
Since it is a new form of digital trading like cryptocurrency,there is no specific regulation or law that bans the trading ofNFTs in India. Also, there is no explicit definition that classifies NFTs as a type of cryptocurrency or a type of derivative. However, the government is planning to introducea law that will ban private trading of cryptocurrencies which is more focused towards criminalising the possession, issuance, mining, trading and transferring of crypto-assets. India is further planning to build a structure for introducing official digital currency, but it is a long way to go. But, as of now, there is no definition of crypto-assets in Indian legislation, so it’s intricate to decide whether NFTs fit into this category of an asset or not and will be banned along with other cryptocurrencies.
1. NFTs under Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956:
In a parallel opinion, it is suggested that NFTs will be categorised as derivatives under the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 (“SCRA“).
Section 2(a)(ac) of SCRA defines derivatives as:
(ac)] “derivative” includes–
(A) a security derived from a debt instrument, share, loan, whether secured or unsecured, risk instrument or contract for differences or any other form of security;
(B) a contract which derives its value from the prices, or index of prices, of underlying securities]]
[(C) commodity derivatives; and]
[(D) such other instruments as may be declared by the Central Government to be derivatives;]
Section 18A of SCRA defines the condition for a derivative trading to be legal as:
18A. Contracts in derivatives
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, contracts in derivative shall be legal and valid if such contracts are
(a) traded on a recognised stock exchange;
(b) settled on the clearinghouse of the recognised [stock exchange; or] in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of such stock exchange.]
[(c) between such parties and on such terms as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify,]
Looking into both the sections, the relevant information we take out is that contracts in derivatives will be valid and legal only if such contracts are traded on a recognised stock exchange and settled on the clearinghouse of the recognised stock exchange, in accordance with the bye-laws of such stock exchange. But in the case of NFT right now these two conditions are not being fulfilled. So, if NFTtrading is deemed to be a contract in derivative for the purposes of SCRA, then it would make the sale and purchase of NFTs in private illegal.
So, if government include the NFTs in the category of Derivatives without having any alternative platform like a recognized exchange or indexes that regulate NFT’s pricing on that particular exchange, then It will become Illegal.
The government has also prepared a draft to regulate the cryptocurrency and is likely to adopt, the ‘Banning of Cryptocurrency & Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill’ of 2019 in 2021
The draft defines the cryptocurrency under section 2(1)(a) as:
“Cryptocurrency, by whatever name called, means any information or code or number or token not being part of any Official Digital Currency, generated through cryptographic means or otherwise, providing a digital representation of value which is exchanged with or without consideration, with the promise or representation of having inherent value in any business activity which may involve risk of loss or an expectation of profits or income, or functions as a store of value or a unit of account and includes its use in any financial transaction or investment, but not limited to, investment schemes;”
Under the above mentioned definition, it can be analysed that NFTs could be considered to be of the following value:1. Representation of value, which is exchanged with the inherent value in any business activity, for example, a proprietary code could be sold as an NFT to a business.2. As a store of value, for example, buying any artwork/art pieces.
However, there is an exemption to this under Section 3(3) of the bill, as per Section 3(3) – Nothing in this Act shall apply to the use of Distributed Ledger Technology for creating a network to enable the delivery of any financial or other services or for creating value, without involving any use of cryptocurrency, in any form whatsoever, for making or receiving payment.
The only problem here with the above section is that it is unable to explicitly define whether NFTs would fall under the scope of services as laid down under the above exemption or not.
2. NFTs under Sale of Goods Act, 1930:
Unless the government doesn’t come up with an explicit definition and regulations defining NFTs, they can be considered as “goods” under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
Section 2(7) of the Act defines the Goods as:
(7 ) “goods” means every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale;
The definition of goods provided under the sales of goods act doesn’t explicitly exclude NFT from its scope. With appropriate regulation from the side legislature in its very right, can include this term under the provisions of this Act.
3. NFTs under FEMA:
Currently, the marketplaces over which NFT transactions are performed are operated by entities established outside India. As the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”)governs cross-border economic transactions in India, but there are no explicit regulatory guidelines from RBI for crypto-assets or NFTs. If we consider existing provisions of FEMA, crypto-assets and NFTs could be considered as intangible assets like software and intellectual property under FEMA. However, determining the location of an NFT is an open question, the location where its owner resides or where the asset is physically present?
Since most of the NFT’s buyers and sellers as well as the operators of marketplaces are located outside India, Indian participants in the NFT purchase or selling could be seen as performing cross-border transactions. This will put a questionunder FEMA, that whether in these transactions there is an export or import of an intangible asset. Also, for a transaction to fall under the ambit of FEMA the transaction has to have a corresponding remittance of fiat currency done through authorised banking channels. Therefore NFT transactions are in an ambiguous position under FEMA.
4. NFT under Finance Act, 2020:
The Finance Act, 2020 expanded the ambit equalization levy (“EL”) and ensures its applicability on e-commerce operators at a rate of 2 per cent on the consideration received by such e-commerce operators from ‘e-commerce supply or services’ made. Accordingly, the NFT marketplaces may be subject to EL at a rate of 2% on consideration received by them fromtransactions made, if they are also considered as ‘e-commerce supply or services’ made to a person resident in India, a person using an Indian internet protocol (“IP”) address, or a non-resident in certain specified circumstances
But, applying this provision to the purchase of NFTs would lead to certain complications. 1. The definition of an e-commerce operator under the EL provision is very wide and may extend to any electronic service which may facilitate a buyer and a seller to carry out an NFT transaction, including the blockchain operators and not just the NFT marketplace. 2. At no point during the transaction does the NFT marketplace have access to the sale consideration of the NFT. This non-custodial feature results in a situation of impossibility where the marketplace would have to pay 2% of the entire consideration, even when it does not have access to the consideration amount. 3. It is unclear whether the gas fees, which goes neither to the seller nor the e-commerce operator but directly to blockchain miners, would be considered to be part of the tax base for levy of EL in the hands of the NFT marketplace. 4. It may be impractical or unfeasible for the e-commerce operator to keep track of the IP address or the location or residency of each buyer or seller for determining the applicability of EL.
5.NFT under GST:
Having no explicit definition of NFTs under the Indian legislation makes it difficult to levy GST on NFT transactions. Under the Goods and Services Tax (“GST”) regime, the NFT classification is very important to impose GST, it should be clearly classified into intangible assets and goods, as typically, the tax treatment under GST should generally follow from the nature of the underlying asset. For example, whether a digital art as NFT will be treated as an intangible asset or good for levying income tax and Goods and Services Tax (GST). GST applicability will also depend on whether the NFT platform is located in India or outside of India.
The GST regime also obligates an electronic commerce operator to collect tax at source at a specified rate of the net value taxable supplies made through it by other suppliers where the consideration with respect to such supplies is to be collected by the operator (Section 52 of the CGST Act, 2017).In this regard, while the Tax Collected at Source (TCS)obligation under GST may apply to a normal marketplace wherein the consideration for the supply is collected by the marketplace. In the case of an NFT marketplace, the TCS obligation under GST should not apply, as the consideration for the supply is not collected by the NFT marketplace but, directly transferred between the parties through an automated contract.
Way forward:
In India, it is in the developing phase. It is up to the government how they have been regulated, the government has been trying to regulated cryptocurrencies also, similarly,NFTs would also expect to be regulated in a similar fashion. It is yet to see how government will react such instruments. Also, there are no guidelines from RBI for regulating NFTs and their transactions.
As of now NFTs are billed as digital art pieces and there is no particular regulation defining the position of NFTs, so we might have to rely on regular principles of the Indian Contract Act and the Sales of Goods Act, for the sale/purchase of NFTs.
Anand Rai is an associate at Sarvaank Associates. He advises and acts on transactions and corporate commercial work, with a special focus on corporate finance and policy. I
By Vikrant Shetty
May 23, 2022
On the last day of Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.J. Kathawalla’s tenure as judge of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, the Division Bench comprising of him and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Milind N. Jadhav, provided a huge relief to crew members who remain on abandoned vessels that are under arrest, by providing guidelines that would have to be followed by the owner, arresting party, Sheriff of Mumbai and the concerned P&I Club. In the matter of The Swedish Club vs V8 Pool Inc &Ors. and Pradeep &Ors. Vs. M.T. GP ASPHALT the Hon’ble Court considered the following questions:
Brief Background of Facts:
The subject Vessel M.T. GP ASPHALT I was arrested on 22nd December, 2020, by V8 Pool Inc.
Swedish Club was the Protection and Indemnity Club (“P&I Club”) with which the vessel was entered.On 22nd December, 2020, after receipt of emails from the crew informing that the vessel supplies were running low, FTI Consulting, the company undertaking restructuring of the owner of the Defendant vessel, arranged for enough supplies to last a month.
On 7th January, 2021, the Crew addressed an email to the Swedish Club informing them that the salaries for the month of November and December 2020 were overdue and that arrangements would have to be made for food and water. The Swedish Club, on 21st January, 2021 filed an Interim Application,seeking leave of the Ld. Single Judge to make certain payments in respect of maintenance of the vessel and well-being of the crew and that the same be treated as “Sheriff’s Expenses”, which would allow the amounts to be reimbursed as a first charge from the eventual sale of proceeds from the Vessel. The Ld. Single Judge disallowed the application and held that the Swedish Club was obligated under the Maritime Labour Convention (“MLC”) to make the payment of the wages and was not a Volunteer. The Ld. Judge held that if the Swedish Club makes payment for the expenses post arrest (including wages), it will not be treated as Sheriff’s expenses. The Swedish Club would have to file a suit, for the recovery of the same.
Both the Swedish Club and the Crew Members appealed from the respective orders which were allowed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court[1].
Guidelineslaid down:
For the benefit of the crew the Hon’ble Court found it necessary to frame some guidelines to be followed in the case of abandoned vessels that are under arrest. However, the Hon’ble Court clarified that these are only guidelines, and the Admiralty Court is at its liberty to use its discretion in any given case.
1. A vessel under arrest / its crew will be considered abandoned if:
a. After the arrest of the vessel, the crew addresses a communication to the owner with a copy to the P&I club, the demise/bareboat charterer (if any), the arresting party and the Sheriff of Mumbai stating that the vessel requires supplies (food/ provisions/ bunkers/ other necessaries)and/ or one or more of the crew’s wages remain unpaid for at least 2 months, with details of when the supplies are expected to run out and of the outstanding wages; and
b. The owner and the demise/bareboat charterer (if any) fails to make the necessary supplies to the vessel and make payment of the said outstanding wages within 10 days or responds stating its inability to maintain the vessel and crew.
2. The arresting party shall bring the crew’s communication to the attention of the Admiralty Court within 4 days of such communication.
a. If the owner of arrested vessel has not entered appearance in the suit, the Admiralty Court shall pass an order calling upon the owner and such demise/bareboat charterer (both) to remain present in court within 3 days. The order shall be communicated to the owner by the arresting party. If the owner remains absent, the Admiralty Court shall record that the vessel and crew have been abandoned.
b. If the owner or demise/bareboat charterer (if any) of the arrested vessel has entered appearance in the suit or appears pursuant to the order above specified, the Admiralty Court shall direct the owner and such demise/bareboat charterer (both) to make the necessary supplies to the vessel and make payment of the said outstanding wages within a further 3 days, failing which the vessel and crew shall be considered abandoned.
3. If the owner or demise/bareboat charterer (if any) of the arrested vessel has entered appearance in the suit or appears pursuant to the order above specified, the Admiralty Court shall direct the owner and such demise/bareboat charterer (both) to make the necessary supplies to the vessel and make payment of the said outstanding wages within a further 3 days, failing which the vessel and crew shall be considered abandoned.
4. If a vessel is so abandoned, and pending the sale of the vessel, any party (including a P&I club which has humanitarian obligations to the crew on board the vessel at the time of abandonment) is desirous of rendering supplies or funding expenses for the safety and/or preservation of such vessel and/or subsistence of the crew and/or payment of wages and/ or repatriation of crew and/ or reducing the crew on board to a skeleton crew and claiming the same as Sheriff’s expenses is required to do either of the following:
a. Approach the office of the Sheriff of Mumbai to urgently file a report to seek directions from the Admiralty Court for such steps to be taken as may be required and for leave of the Admiralty Court to permit that party to put the office of the Sheriff in funds for such steps and for such expenses to be Sheriff’s expenses. The office of the Sheriff shall immediately file a report before the Admiralty Court. All expenses and payments shall be routed through the Sheriff’s office.
b. Approach the Admiralty Court directly with prior notice to the arresting party concerned as well as the office of the Sheriff of Mumbai seeking leave to do any of the above for the safety and/or preservation of the vessel and/or subsistence of the crew and/or payment of wages. In such case all expenses and payments shall be routed through the office of the Sheriff of Mumbai.
c. If such an application is made, the Admiralty Court shall hear the same on an urgent basis and pass necessary orders. Unless there are serious doubts about the expenses, in the interests of the well-being of the abandoned crew members on board the arrested vessel, leave shall generally be granted for such expenses to be Sheriff’s Expenses and recoverable from the sale proceeds on an immediate basis.
d. If such an application is made, the Admiralty Court shall hear the same on an urgent basis and pass necessary orders. Unless there are serious doubts about the expenses, in the interests of the well-being of the abandoned crew members on board the arrested vessel, leave shall generally be granted for such expenses to be Sheriff’s Expenses and recoverable from the sale proceeds on an immediate basis.
5. In case of an emergent situation where the situation on board the vessel is precarious, any party may after giving at least 24 hours’ prior notice in writing to the parties to the suit as well as the office of the Sheriff may render the supplies/ incur expenses for a limited period of time i.e. 7 days. Such party must thereafter at the earliest make an application to the Admiralty Court to declare such payments made as Sheriff’s Expenses and for any further expenses it desires to incur as per the procedure laid out above.
a. Any party seeking reimbursement of such payments made, shall file an application with all relevant documents in support including proof of payments.
b. The Admiralty Court shall refer the claim of such party to the Commissioner for taking accounts or such other officer of the Court to examine and scrutinize the claims. The officer so appointed shall give a hearing to the parties and examine and scrutinize the documentation and shall prepare a Report for the Admiralty Court.
6. In the event, crew on board an arrested vessel have not been paid their wages, all such crew members shall also be entitled to approach the Admiralty Court to treat their wages accrued post arrest as Sheriff’s Expenses. The Admiralty Court shall refer the crew’s claim to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts or such other officer of the Court to examine and scrutinize the crew’s claims. The Commissioner for Taking Accounts or such other officer so appointed shall give a hearing to the parties and shall prepare a Report for the Admiralty Court.
7. There may be situations where the vessel and crew have already been abandoned prior to the arrest. A vessel/ crew will be considered to have already been abandoned before the time of arrest if the crew has addressed a communication to the owner with a copy to the P&I club stating that the vessel requires supplies (food/ provisions/ bunkers/ other necessaries) and/ or one or more of the crew’s wages remain unpaid for at least 2 months, with details of when the supplies are expected to run out and of the outstanding wages and the owner has failed to supply the vessel or make payment of the outstanding wages within ten days thereof or has responded stating its inability to maintain the vessel and crew. If an abandoned vessel is arrested, for all expenses post the arrest, the procedure above said shall be followed.
8. It is expected that the P&I clubs with which such vessels (whether abandoned before or after the arrest) are entered will promptly approach the Admiralty Court for appropriate orders. The same procedure as stated above for reimbursement of payments made above will apply.
9. The Admiralty Court shall, as far as possible, expeditiously pass orders on all applications including for immediate reimbursement of any such payments as above specified first in terms of priority from the sale proceeds of the vessel.
Implication of the Guidelines:
It is yet to be seen whether courts will apply similar principles to those who provide salvage services to arrested vessels. However, the aforesaid guidelines have brought much required clarity with respect to the rights of the crew members of an abandoned vessel under arrest and the steps that can be taken for maintenance of the vessel and its crew, including payment of wages during the period of arrest of such vessel.
The above Article is written by Vikrant Shetty, Partner of DhruveLiladhar& Co. with assistance from Associate Sakina Electricwala.
[1]Order dated 23rd March 2022, passed in Comm. Appeal No. 108 of 2021 and Comm. Appeal No. 111 of 2021
By Pallavi Ghaisas
May 31, 2022
A.Pre-RERA
Prior to commencement of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, (“RERA”), in landmark judgment in Vaidehi Akash Housing Pvt.Ltd. Vs. New D.N. Nagar Co-op.Housing Society Union Ltd. & Ors. [2015(3)ABR270] (“Vaidehi’s Judgement”), decided on 1st December 2014 by Hon’ble Justice S C Gupte of Hon’ble Bombay High Court, inter alia, decided the rights of third party purchasers (“Allottees”) under Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (“MOFA”) vis-à-vis society after termination of development agreement with Developer (“Ex-Developer”). It was observed that the development agreement executed by the Ex-Developer with the society was on principal to principal basis and as per agreement executed by the Allottees with Ex-Developer, the rights of Allottees thereunder were subject to Ex-Developer’s rights and not higher than those. It was held that (i) society was not a co-promoter U/s. 2 (c) of MOFA and was merely in the position of owner vis-à-vis third party purchasers and (ii) the purchasers did not have any enforceable right, under MOFA, against the Society or the New Developer appointed by society, after termination of development agreement with Ex-Developer.
B. RERA- Regime
In the matter of Peter Almeida and Tangerine Almeida vs. M/s. Shubh Enterprises and others [Compliant No. CC006000000055575], filed by complainants therein being allottees, facts are similar to the said Vaidehi matter, the essence being the society terminates the development agreement with Developer (Ex-Developer) and appoints a New Developer for construction on land held by society. The allottees who paid monies to the Ex-Developer for securing flats under allotment letter executed with Ex-Developer sought direction from Regulatory Authority, against the society and the New Developer, for (i) executing agreement for sale and (ii) allotting flat in newly constructed building.
The Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Mumbai (“Regulatory Authority”) by its order dated 5thNovember 2019 directed that registered agreement for sale to be executed with complainants therein (being allottees of Ex-Developer) in accordance with the allotment letter issued by Ex-Developer. The ratio of the Vaidehi’s Judgement was not applied by the Regulatory Authority inter alia for the reason that it was before commencement of RERA and it held that after transfer of development rights in favour of the New Developer, the commitment of Ex-Developer will have to be honoured by the New Developer and society.
By common judgement dated 6th May 2022 in the appeals filed therein, the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal dealt with the question of- “Whether Allottees are entitled to reliefs as claimed in the complaint against the Society and New Developer” while answering the same in negative, it was inter alia reasoned as follows:
i. Since Society is not a party to contract / agreement for sale executed between Allottees and the Ex-Developer, the society cannot be held liable to any obligations that are required to be performed by Ex-Developer towards Allottees;
ii. Society has no privity of contract with the Allottees and the transaction is purely and only between the Allottees and the Ex-Developer as per settled position of law;
iii. Project registered by the New Developer does not involve the circumstances where there is a transfer in its favour as contemplated under Section 15 of RERA
iv. Neither the society nor New Developer appointed by it are under obligation to recognise claims of allottees as prayed for in the complaint therein;
v. In the absence of privity of contract, the Society and New Developer cannot be held liable to Allottees and consequently Allottees are not entitled to reliefs as claimed against the Society and New Developer;
vi. Under these circumstances, since New Developer has already taken over the project, no flat can be made available to Allottees in the project;
vii. The alternative claim of Allottees for refund, if at all, can be considered only against the Ex-Developer who has received the amount of earnest money from Allottees.
The complaint was remanded to the Regulatory Authority for considering and deciding the claim of allottees afresh to the extent of refund of the amount against Ex-Developer after hearing the concerned Parties.
Impact of RERA Judgement on Third-Party Purchasers
There are many projects halted or abandoned by Developers almost everywhere. The Society in such cases usually terminates the Development Agreement and appoints a New Developer. In such circumstances the allottees who have paid monies to Ex-Developer will now have an option to enforce their rights against Ex-Developer, before RERA authorities, for refund of amount paid by them.
Pallavi Ghaisas is a Lawyer specialising in the field of Real Estate. She works at Federal & Company, a Mumbai-based law firm.
By Deo Prakash Singh
June 2, 2022
Disciplinary proceedings are the documented rules that define the relationship and control between a master and a servant. The power of the master to exercise control over the servant is to maintain and sustain the working environment at the workplace to achieve the dedicated goal and objectives. It signifies the obligation of the servant to obey and act in accordance with the code of conduct formulated by the master.
Disciplinary action is imposed by the employer on an employee against an act of misconduct by ordering punishment. The proceedings are perhaps the most vast and litigated branches in India and are full of dilemmas and dogmas. Service matters have the maximum number of commentaries, statutes, rules and regulations. The author here tries to discuss disciplinary proceedings — how they are conducted in public service tribunals, the procedure through which cases filed, and how they are conducted.
The general conception that a government job, in contrast to a private job, is a safe and secure job that ensures uninterrupted pay, perks and other service benefits is a misnomer. The statement may be true to a considerable extent because of the play and importance of natural justice in conducting disciplinary proceedings in public service. But the master in this case is that the mighty state has the capacity to diminish the future prospects of a government delinquent employee. Not only this, in public service the government delinquent employee has no way except to knock the doors of the court which is a time-taking and expensive exercise that sometimes even remains undecided. During the pendency of the litigation the employee may be deprived of service benefits and promotions. It is very difficult to decide between the two — whether justice delayed is justice denied or justice hurried is justice buried. The principle of natural justice sometimes derails from its impregnated objective.
Natural Justice and Disciplinary Proceedings
The principles of natural justice, generally, are taken care of while conducting disciplinary proceedings.
Article 311 of the Constitution of India guarantees the protection of rights of civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. This protection is not available where the employee has been convicted of a criminal charge or the competent authority is satisfied that compliance with the rules of natural justice is not reasonably practicable or the President or the Governor is satisfied that holding of an enquiry is not expedient in the interest of the security of the state. This is one of the express exceptions referred to in Article 310 and not subject to any control by any other provision of the Constitution. This provision in the Constitution aims at providing security of tenure to a government servant. This shield is a security to the extent of providing certain safeguards which have been made conditions precedent for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of a government servant.
It is established that the principle of natural justice mainly comprises of following two rules:
(I) no person is to be condemned without hearing
(II) no person shall be a judge of his own cause
These two are the basic features. It means that fairness in conducting the proceedings shall be the essence of practice and the delinquent employee should be treated fairly which may culminate into punishment. The fairness principle requires a tribunal to proceed and hear the aggrieved employee on the points of law and procedure of fairness to protect the rights ensconced in the law book.
Elements of Disciplinary Proceedings
The proceedings are conducted under the domestic jurisdiction of the employer. To hold an enquiry into the misconduct of the employee is the most important feature and a precondition to the imposition of any punishment on a public servant. It is a universal principle and procedure because of the fact that almost all government servants and employees of statutory corporations or government companies are governed by rules which generally provide for a detailed procedure to be followed before imposing any punishment.
A departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding and hence the enquiry officer’s performance a quasi-judicial function. The articles of charges levelled against the delinquent employee must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer is duty-bound to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The proceeding has to be conducted against any person in a strict adherence to the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice. The charges would be specific, definite and distinct setting out the details of the incident which forms the basis of the charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. The enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively but not subjectively. The findings should not be unreasonable and perverse nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. The court is very a specific on proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent employee cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the findings of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory. Even if the delinquent employee does not take the defence or raise any protest, that does not absolve the inquiring authority from being vitiated for the reason particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 under Rule 11 enumerated major and minor penalties and the procedure to conduct the disciplinary proceedings. It has also provided, under many decisions of the Government of India, the difference and definition of major and minor penalties in which major penalty shall be in case of grave and serious charges.
Administrative Tribunals
The Law provides for the establishment of Administrative Tribunal for the Union and the states specifying the jurisdiction and powers of such tribunals, procedure to be followed by the tribunals and excludes the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court.
The law also provides that the president in case of Union and the Governor in case of a state may make rules and regulations of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the state to such services.
Here it is important to include that only government servants throughout a state can file their respective cases in the tribunal to get their grievances redressed. It means that the tribunals are vested with the authority to hear the grievances of the employees of the state/Union only whereas further the employees working with private companies or organisations which are not owned by the state can only file their cases under industrial disputes in labour courts and industrial tribunals.
Preliminary Enquiry
Normally the disciplinary authority appoints a preliminary enquiry officer to look into the alleged charges against the government servant and if the preliminary enquiry officer is prima facie guilty of the alleged misconduct, he may prepare a charge-sheet of the same and produce it before the disciplinary authority. The proceeding may not be known to the delinquent employee. The disciplinary authority on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the preliminary enquiry officer proceed to initiate departmental enquiry and it may start afresh and may not be from the point where the preliminary enquiry officer left. It is an established rule that the preliminary enquiry officer cannot be appointed as enquiry officer in the full-fledged enquiry as he may be prejudiced to the delinquent employee because he had already framed a charge-sheet against him in the preliminary enquiry.
Procedure To Conduct Enquiry In Case Of Major Penalty
The appointing authority/ disciplinary authority has to issue in order to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the government servant. Sometimes the Governor of the state has to do the same as he is being the appointing authority of the specified government servants. The disciplinary authority may himself enquire into the charges or appoint an officer subordinate to the enquiry officer to enquire into the charges. The charge-sheet shall be approved by the disciplinary authority. The charges should be precise and clear to facilitate the government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The documentary evidences and the names of witnesses proposed should prove the same along with oral evidence.
The delinquent government servant shall be required to submit a written statement of his defence in person within a specified time period mentioned in the book of rules preferably within 15 days from the date of issue/receipt of the order. The government servant shall have to state that whether he desires to cross examine any witness mentioned in the charge-sheet or whether he desires to produce some new or extra evidence. He shall also be informed that in case a written submission is not filed within the specified date it will be presumed that he has none to furnish and the enquiry officer shall proceed to complete the enquiry ex parte.
It has also been decided by a court judgement that after the charge-sheet is given to the employee, an oral enquiry is must and notice should be given to the employee intimating him about the date, time and place of enquiry. It has also been laid down in this case that if an opportunity to the employee to produce witnesses or to rebut the evidence against him is not given then the whole enquiry is liable to be quashed ab initio and the punishment on the basis of such enquiry report shall not be sustainable.
It is settled law that the documents relied in support of the charges have to be proved in departmental enquiry by the enquiry officer in the presence of the delinquent employee. The government servant is also at liberty to ask for documents in case they are mentioned in the charge-sheet. But is the same have not been annexed with the charge-sheet, then opportunity of inspection has to provided.
Per contra if the charged government employee admits the charges, the enquiry officer shall submit his report to the disciplinary authority without further proceedings in enquiry but where the charged government servant denies the charges, the enquiry officer shall proceed with the enquiry to call on the witnesses as per the rules framed under the law in the presence of the government employee who shall be given the opportunity to cross examine such witnesses. After recording the aforesaid evidence, the enquiry officer records oral evidence if the charged government servant desired so in his written defence submission. The enquiry officer may ask what he pleases at any time from any witness or from the person charged with a view to discover the truth or to obtain proof. The disciplinary authority may appoint a presenting officer to present the facts of charges from the government side whereas the charged government servant too can take help of a retired government employee or legal practitioner if the enquiry officer gives his consent for it.
When the enquiry is complete, the enquiry officer shall submit its enquiry report to the disciplinary authority along with all records. The report shall consist of sufficient record of brief facts, the evidence and statement of findings on each charge with reasons thereof but the enquiry officer shall not make any recommendation about the penalty. The enquiry officer shall have to submit his final report within six months from the date of issuance of the order by the disciplinary authority and he is bound to adhere to the time-limit. In any case the total time-limit to complete a disciplinary proceeding should not exceed 18 months from the date of initiation of the proceedings, i.e., from the date of issuance of the framing of charges letter.
If there is vigilance angle, the advice of CVC shall be sought and the time limit for the advice shall be maximum 30 days. For the second advice from the CVC, the same time-limit of 30 days shall be available. Similarly the time limit for concurrence from the UPSC shall be 30 days.
Stage of Tribunal
The cause of action arises due to the impugned punishment order by the disciplinary authority against the delinquent employee and here the role of lawyers come into play to represent the petitioner/the applicant under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Before bringing a case of disciplinary proceeding to the tribunal, the aggrieved employee against whom an adverse order has been passed has to make representation to the appellate authority against the order. It is only after the representations remain unanswered by the authorities or if the delinquent employee has not been satisfied then he can bring his case to the tribunal. The government servant challenges an adverse order as bad order in the tribunal.
The aggrieved employee says in his submissions in the court that the proceeding conducted against him were unjust, unwarranted, malicious and/or arbitrary and the charges levelled against him are unjustified and against the principles of natural justice. The petitioner prays to quash the impugned order as if it had never been passed so that he may be entitled to all consequential service benefits to which he is entitled.
The petitioner may pray for interim relief but the interim relief sought should be different from the final relief. It is prayed in the court that if the impugned order is left to stand it will do irreparable loss to the petitioner.
Conclusion
Disciplinary action cannot be based on breach of statutory rules or administrative actions which do not supplement rules or are inconsistent with them. Before initiating any disciplinary proceeding the master must be prima facie satisfied that the employee has committed some misconduct. The misconduct must be committed during the tenure of the service. An allegation of misconduct against an officer in relation to his quasi-judicial functions cannot be made merely on the basis that he made a mistake of judgement while passing the order. This is because the administrative adjudication also requires to perform their functions without fear or favour which may be defeated by the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings.
Disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated only on the basis of suspicion. There must be a reasonable basis. Those disciplinary proceedings shall be quashed if the exercise of power was not bona fide, e.g. anonymous complaints, biased preliminary enquiry and disregard to the directions of the Chief Justice by the full court. Similarly, if an employee is allowed to retire on attaining the age of superannuation even after initiation of disciplinary proceedings, major management cannot be imposed on him thereafter except under rare circumstances since retirement results in severance of relationship of master and servant.
Deo Prakash Singh an Advocate practicing at the Patna High Court.
Time for judiciary to introspect and see what can be done to restore people’s faith – Justice Lokur
Justice Madan B Lokur, was a Supreme Court judge from June 2012 to December 2018. He is now a judge of the non-resident panel of the Supreme Court of Fiji. He spoke to LegitQuest on January 25, 2020.
Q: You were a Supreme Court judge for more than 6 years. Do SC judges have their own ups and downs, in the sense that do you have any frustrations about cases, things not working out, the kind of issues that come to you?
A: There are no ups and downs in that sense but sometimes you do get a little upset at the pace of justice delivery. I felt that there were occasions when justice could have been delivered much faster, a case could have been decided much faster than it actually was. (When there is) resistance in that regard normally from the state, from the establishment, then you kind of feel what’s happening, what can I do about it.
Q: So you have had the feeling that the establishment is trying to interfere in the matters?
A: No, not interfering in matters but not giving the necessary importance to some cases. So if something has to be done in four weeks, for example if reply has to be filed within four weeks and they don’t file it in four weeks just because they feel that it doesn’t matter, and it’s ok if we file it within six weeks how does it make a difference. But it does make a difference.
Q: Do you think this attitude is merely a lax attitude or is it an infrastructure related problem?
A: I don’t know. Sometimes on some issues the government or the establishment takes it easy. They don’t realise the urgency. So that’s one. Sometimes there are systemic issues, for example, you may have a case that takes much longer than anticipated and therefore you can’t take up some other case. Then that necessarily has to be adjourned. So these things have to be planned very carefully.
Q: Are there any cases that you have special memories of in terms of your personal experiences while dealing with the case? It might have moved you or it may have made you feel that this case is really important though it may not be considered important by the government or may have escaped the media glare?
A: All the cases that I did with regard to social justice, cases which concern social justice and which concern the environment, I think all of them were important. They gave me some satisfaction, some frustration also, in the sense of time, but I would certainly remember all these cases.
Q: Even though you were at the Supreme Court as a jurist, were there any learning experiences for you that may have surprised you?
A: There were learning experiences, yes. And plenty of them. Every case is a learning experience because you tend to look at the same case with two different perspectives. So every case is a great learning experience. You know how society functions, how the state functions, what is going on in the minds of the people, what is it that has prompted them to come the court. There is a great learning, not only in terms of people and institutions but also in terms of law.
Q: You are a Judge of the Supreme Court of Fiji, though a Non-Resident Judge. How different is it in comparison to being a Judge in India?
A: There are some procedural distinctions. For example, there is a great reliance in Fiji on written submissions and for the oral submissions they give 45 minutes to a side. So the case is over within 1 1/2 hours maximum. That’s not the situation here in India. The number of cases in Fiji are very few. Yes, it’s a small country, with a small number of cases. Cases are very few so it’s only when they have an adequate number of cases that they will have a session and as far as I am aware they do not have more than two or three sessions in a year and the session lasts for maybe about three weeks. So it’s not that the court sits every day or that I have to shift to Fiji. When it is necessary and there are a good number of cases then they will have a session, unlike here. It is then that I am required to go to Fiji for three weeks. The other difference is that in every case that comes to the (Fiji) Supreme Court, even if special leave is not granted, you have to give a detailed judgement which is not the practice here.
Q: There is a lot of backlog in the lower courts in India which creates a problem for the justice delivery system. One reason is definitely shortage of judges. What are the other reasons as to why there is so much backlog of cases in the trial courts?
A: I think case management is absolutely necessary and unless we introduce case management and alternative methods of dispute resolution, we will not be able to solve the problem. I will give you a very recent example about the Muzaffarpur children’s home case (in Bihar) where about 34 girls were systematically raped. There were about 17 or 18 accused persons but the entire trial finished within six months. Now that was only because of the management and the efforts of the trial judge and I think that needs to be studied how he could do it. If he could do such a complex case with so many eyewitnesses and so many accused persons in a short frame of time, I don’t see why other cases cannot be decided within a specified time frame. That’s case management. The second thing is so far as other methods of disposal of cases are concerned, we have had a very good experience in trial courts in Delhi where more than one lakh cases have been disposed of through mediation. So, mediation must be encouraged at the trial level because if you can dispose so many cases you can reduce the workload. For criminal cases, you have Plea Bargaining that has been introduced in 2009 but not put into practice. We did make an attempt in the Tis Hazari Courts. It worked to some extent but after that it fell into disuse. So, plea bargaining can take care of a lot of cases. And there will be certain categories of cases which we need to look at carefully. For example, you have cases of compoundable offences, you have cases where fine is the punishment and not necessarily imprisonment, or maybe it’s imprisonment say one month or two month’s imprisonment. Do we need to actually go through a regular trial for these kind of cases? Can they not be resolved or adjudicated through Plea Bargaining? This will help the system, it will help in Prison Reforms, (prevent) overcrowding in prisons. So there are a lot of avenues available for reducing the backlog. But I think an effort has to be made to resolve all that.
Q: Do you think there are any systemic flaws in the country’s justice system, or the way trial courts work?
A: I don’t think there are any major systemic flaws. It’s just that case management has not been given importance. If case management is given importance, then whatever systematic flaws are existing, they will certainly come down.
Q; And what about technology. Do you think technology can play a role in improving the functioning of the justice delivery system?
I think technology is very important. You are aware of the e-courts project. Now I have been told by many judges and many judicial academies that the e-courts project has brought about sort of a revolution in the trial courts. There is a lot of information that is available for the litigants, judges, lawyers and researchers and if it is put to optimum use or even semi optimum use, it can make a huge difference. Today there are many judges who are using technology and particularly the benefits of the e-courts project is an adjunct to their work. Some studies on how technology can be used or the e-courts project can be used to improve the system will make a huge difference.
Q: What kind of technology would you recommend that courts should have?
A: The work that was assigned to the e-committee I think has been taken care of, if not fully, then largely to the maximum possible extent. Now having done the work you have to try and take advantage of the work that’s been done, find out all the flaws and see how you can rectify it or remove those flaws. For example, we came across a case where 94 adjournments were given in a criminal case. Now why were 94 adjournments given? Somebody needs to study that, so that information is available. And unless you process that information, things will just continue, you will just be collecting information. So as far as I am concerned, the task of collecting information is over. We now need to improve information collection and process available information and that is something I think should be done.
Q: There is a debate going on about the rights of death row convicts. CJI Justice Bobde recently objected to death row convicts filing lot of petitions, making use of every legal remedy available to them. He said the rights of the victim should be given more importance over the rights of the accused. But a lot of legal experts have said that these remedies are available to correct the anomalies, if any, in the justice delivery. Even the Centre has urged the court to adopt a more victim-centric approach. What is your opinion on that?
You see so far as procedures are concerned, when a person knows that s/he is going to die in a few days or a few months, s/he will do everything possible to live. Now you can’t tell a person who has got terminal cancer that there is no point in undergoing chemotherapy because you are going to die anyway. A person is going to fight for her/his life to the maximum extent. So if a person is on death row s/he will do everything possible to survive. You have very exceptional people like Bhagat Singh who are ready to face (the gallows) but that’s why they are exceptional. So an ordinary person will do everything possible (to survive). So if the law permits them to do all this, they will do it.
Q: Do you think law should permit this to death row convicts?
A: That is for the Parliament to decide. The law is there, the Constitution is there. Now if the Parliament chooses not to enact a law which takes into consideration the rights of the victims and the people who are on death row, what can anyone do? You can’t tell a person on death row that listen, if you don’t file a review petition within one week, I will hang you. If you do not file a curative petition within three days, then I will hang you. You also have to look at the frame of mind of a person facing death. Victims certainly, but also the convict.
Q: From the point of jurisprudence, do you think death row convicts’ rights are essential? Or can their rights be done away with?
A: I don’t know you can take away the right of a person fighting for his life but you have to strike a balance somewhere. To say that you must file a review or curative or mercy petition in one week, it’s very difficult. You tell somebody else who is not on a death row that you can file a review petition within 30 days but a person who is on death row you tell him that I will give you only one week, it doesn’t make any sense to me. In fact it should probably be the other way round.
Q: What about capital punishment as a means of punishment itself?
A: There has been a lot of debate and discussion about capital punishment but I think that world over it has now been accepted, more or less, that death penalty has not served the purpose for which it was intended. So, there are very few countries that are executing people. The United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan also, but it hasn’t brought down the crime rate. And India has been very conservative in imposing the death penalty. I think the last 3-4 executions have happened for the persons who were terrorists. And apart from that there was one from Calcutta who was hanged for rape and murder. But the fact that he was hanged for rape and murder has not deterred people (from committing rape and murder). So the accepted view is that death penalty has not served the purpose. We certainly need to rethink the continuance of capital punishment. On the other hand, if capital punishment is abolished, there might be fake encounter killings or extra judicial killings.
Q: These days there is the psyche among people of ‘instant justice’, like we saw in the case of the Hyderabad vet who was raped and murdered. The four accused in the case were killed in an encounter and the public at large and even politicians hailed it as justice being delivery. Do you think this ‘lynch mob mentality’ reflects people’s lack of faith in the justice system?
A: I think in this particular case about what happened in Telangana, investigation was still going on. About what actually happened there, an enquiry is going on. So no definite conclusions have come out. According to the police these people tried to snatch weapons so they had to be shot. Now it is very difficult to believe, as far as I am concerned, that 10 armed policeman could not overpower four unarmed accused persons. This is very difficult to believe. And assuming one of them happened to have snatched a (cop’s) weapon, maybe he could have been incapacitated but why the other three? So there are a lot of questions that are unanswered. So far as the celebrations are concerned, the people who are celebrating, do they know for certain that they (those killed in the encounter) were the ones who did the crime? How can they be so sure about it? They were not eye witnesses. Even witnesses sometimes make mistakes. This is really not a cause for celebration. Certainly not.
Q: It seems some people are losing their faith in the country’s justice delivery system. How to repose people’s faith in the legal process?
A: You see we again come back to case management and speedy justice. Suppose the Nirbhaya case would have been decided within two or three years, would this (Telangana) incident have happened? One can’t say. The attack on Parliament case was decided in two or three years but that has not wiped out terrorism. There are a lot of factors that go into all this, so there is a need to find ways of improving justice delivery so that you don’t have any extremes – where a case takes 10 years or another extreme where there is instant justice. There has to be something in between, some balance has to be drawn. Now you have that case where Phoolan Devi was gangraped followed by the Behmai massacre. Now this is a case of 1981, it has been 40 years and the trial court has still not delivered a judgement. It’s due any day now, (but) whose fault is that. You have another case in Maharashtra that has been transferred to National Investigating Agency two years after the incident, the Bhima-Koregaon case. Investigation is supposedly not complete after two years also. Whose fault is that? So you have to look at the entire system in a holistic manner. There are many players – the investigation agency is one player, the prosecution is one player, the defence is one player, the justice delivery system is one player. So unless all of them are in a position to coordinate… you cannot blame only the justice delivery system. If the Telangana police was so sure that the persons they have caught are guilty, why did they not file the charge sheet immediately? If they were so sure the charge sheet should have been filed within one day. Why didn’t they do it?
Q: At the trial level, there are many instances of flaws in evidence collection. Do you think the police or whoever the investigators are, do they lack training?
A: Yes they do! The police lacks training. I think there is a recent report that has come out last week which says very few people (in the police) have been trained (to collect evidence).
Q: You think giving proper training to police to prepare a case will make a difference?
A: Yes, it will make a difference.
Q: You have a keen interest in juvenile justice. Unfortunately, a lot of heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. How can we correct that?
A: You see it depends upon what perspective we are looking at. Now these heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. Heinous crimes are committed by adults also, so why pick upon juveniles alone and say something should be done because juveniles are committing heinous crimes. Why is it that people are not saying that something should be done when adults are committing heinous crimes? That’s one perspective. There are a lot of heinous crimes that are committed against juveniles. The number of crimes committed against juveniles or children are much more than the crimes committed by juveniles. How come nobody is talking about that? And the people committing heinous crimes against children are adults. So is it okay to say that the State has imposed death penalty for an offence against the child? So that’s good enough, nothing more needs to be done? I don’t think that’s a valid answer. The establishment must keep in mind the fact that the number of heinous crimes against children are much more than those committed by juveniles. We must shift focus.
Q: Coming to NRC and CAA. Protests have been happening since December last year, the SC is waiting for the Centre’s reply, the Delhi HC has refused to directly intervene. Neither the protesters nor the government is budging. How do we achieve a breakthrough?
A: It is for the government to decide what they want to do. If the government says it is not going to budge, and the people say they are not going to budge, the stalemate could continue forever.
Q: Do you think the CAA and the NRC will have an impact on civil liberties, personal liberties and people’s rights?
A: Yes, and that is one of the reasons why there is protest all over the country. And people have realised that it is going to happen, it is going to have an impact on their lives, on their rights and that’s why they are protesting. So the answer to your question is yes.
Q: Across the world and in India, we are seeing an erosion of the value system upholding rights and liberties. How important is it for the healthy functioning of a country that social justice, people’s liberties, people’s rights are maintained?
A: I think social justice issues, fundamental rights are of prime importance in our country, in any democracy, and the preamble to our Constitution makes it absolutely clear and the judgement of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati and many other subsequent judgments also make it clear that you cannot change the basic structure of the Constitution. If you cannot do that then obviously you cannot take away some basic democratic rights like freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, you cannot take them away. So if you have to live in a democracy, we have to accept the fact that these rights cannot be taken away. Otherwise there are many countries where there is no democracy. I don’t know whether those people are happy or not happy.
Q: What will happen if in a democracy these rights are controlled by hook or by crook?
A: It depends upon how much they are controlled. If the control is excessive then that is wrong. The Constitution says there must be a reasonable restriction. So reasonable restriction by law is very important.
Q: The way in which the sexual harassment case against Justice Gogoi was handled was pretty controversial. The woman has now been reinstated in the Supreme Court as a staffer. Does this action of the Supreme Court sort of vindicate her?
A: I find this very confusing you know. There is an old joke among lawyers: Lawyer for the petitioner argued before the judge and the judge said you are right; then the lawyer for the respondent argued before the judge and the judge said you’re right; then a third person sitting over there says how can both of them be right and the judge says you’re also right. So this is what has happened in this case. It was found (by the SC committee) that what she said had no substance. And therefore, she was wrong and the accused was right. Now she has been reinstated with back wages and all. I don’t know, I find it very confusing.
Q: Do you think the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges should be raised to 70 years and there should be a fixed tenure?
A: I haven’t thought about it as yet. There are some advantages, there are some disadvantages. (When) You have extended age or life tenure as in the United States, and the Supreme Court has a particular point of view, it will continue for a long time. So in the United States you have liberal judges and conservative judges, so if the number of conservative judges is high then the court will always be conservative. If the number of liberal judges is high, the court will always be liberal. There is this disadvantage but there is also an advantage that if it’s a liberal court and if it is a liberal democracy then it will work for the benefit of the people. But I have not given any serious thought onthis.
Q: Is there any other thing you would like to say?
A: I think the time has come for the judiciary to sit down, introspect and see what can be done, because people have faith in the judiciary. A lot of that faith has been eroded in the last couple of years. So one has to restore that faith and then increase that faith. I think the judiciary definitely needs to introspect.
‘A major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013.’- Aakash Parihar
Aakash Parihar is Partner at Triumvir Law, a firm specializing in M&A, PE/VC, startup advisory, international commercial arbitration, and corporate disputes. He is an alumnus of the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
How did you come across law as a career? Tell us about what made you decide law as an option.
Growing up in a small town in Madhya Pradesh, wedid not have many options.There you either study to become a doctor or an engineer. As the sheep follows the herd, I too jumped into 11th grade with PCM (Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics).However, shortly after, I came across the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) and the prospect of law as a career. Being a law aspirant without any background of legal field, I hardly knew anything about the legal profession leave alone the niche areas of corporate lawor dispute resolution. Thereafter, I interacted with students from various law schools in India to understand law as a career and I opted to sit for CLAT. Fortunately, my hard work paid off and I made it to the hallowed National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NSLIU). Joining NLSIU and moving to Bangalorewas an overwhelming experience. However, after a few months, I settled in and became accustomed to the rigorous academic curriculum. Needless to mention that it was an absolute pleasure to study with and from someof the brightest minds in legal academia. NLSIU, Bangalore broadened my perspective about law and provided me with a new set of lenses to comprehend the world around me. Through this newly acquired perspective and a great amount of hard work (which is of course irreplaceable), I was able to procure a job in my fourth year at law school and thus began my journey.
As a lawyer carving a niche for himself, tell us about your professional journey so far. What are the challenges that new lawyers face while starting out in the legal field?
I started my professional journey as an Associate at Samvad Partners, Bangalore, where I primarily worked in the corporate team. Prior to Samvad Partners, through my internship, I had developed an interest towards corporate law,especially the PE/VC and M&A practice area. In the initial years as an associate at Samvad Partners and later at AZB & Partners, Mumbai, I had the opportunity to work on various aspects of corporate law, i.e., from PE/VC and M&A with respect to listed as well as unlisted companies. My work experience at these firms equipped and provided me the know-how to deal with cutting edge transactional lawyering. At this point, it is important to mention that I always had aspirations to join and develop a boutique firm. While I was working at AZB, sometime around March 2019, I got a call from Anubhab, Founder of Triumvir Law, who told me about the great work Triumvir Law was doing in the start-up and emerging companies’ ecosystem in Bangalore. The ambition of the firm aligned with mine,so I took a leap of faith to move to Bangalore to join Triumvir Law.
Anyone who is a first-generation lawyer in the legal industry will agree with my statement that it is never easy to build a firm, that too so early in your career. However, that is precisely the notion that Triumvir Law wanted to disrupt. To provide quality corporate and dispute resolution advisory to clients across India and abroad at an affordable price point.
Once you start your professional journey, you need to apply everything that you learnt in law schoolwith a practical perspective. Therefore, in my opinion, in addition to learning the practical aspects of law, a young lawyer needs to be accustomed with various practices of law before choosing one specific field to practice.
India has been doing reallywell in the field of M&A and PE/VC. Since you specialize in M&A and PE/VC dealmaking, what according to you has been working well for the country in this sphere? What does the future look like?
India is a developing economy, andM&A and PE/VC transactions form the backbone of the same. Since liberalization, there has been an influx of foreign investment in India, and we have seen an exponential rise in PC/VA and M&A deals. Indian investment market growth especially M&A and PE/VC aspects can be attributed to the advent of startup culture in India. The increase in M&A and PE/VC deals require corporate lawyersto handle the legal aspects of these deals.
As a corporate lawyer working in M&A and PE/VC space, my work ranges from drafting term-sheets to the transaction documents (SPA, SSA, SHA, BTA, etc.). TheM&A and PE/VC deal space experienced a slump during the first few months of the pandemic, but since June 2021, there has been a significant growth in M&A and PE/VC deal space in India. The growth and consistence of the M&A and PE/VC deal space in India can be attributed to several factors such as foreign investment, uncapped demands in the Indian market and exceptional performance of Indian startups.
During the pandemic many businesses were shut down but surprisingly many new businesses started, which adapted to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Since we are in the recovery mode, I think the M&A and PE/VC deal space will reach bigger heights in the comingyears. We as a firm look forward to being part of this recovery mode by being part of the more M&A and PE/VC deals in future.
You also advice start-ups. What are the legal issues or challenges that the start-ups usually face specifically in India? Do these issues/challenges have long-term consequences?
We do a considerable amount of work with startupswhich range from day-to-day legal advisory to transaction documentation during a funding round. In India, we have noticed that a sizeable amount of clientele approach counsels only when there is a default or breach, more often than not in a state of panic. The same principle applies to startups in India, they normally approach us at a stage when they are about to receive investment or are undergoing due diligence. At that point of time, we need to understand their legal issues as well as manage the demands of the investor’s legal team. The majornon-compliances by startups usually involve not maintaining proper agreements, delaying regulatory filings and secretarial compliances, and not focusing on proper corporate governance.
Another major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013. Keeping up with these requirements can be time-consuming for even seasoned lawyers, and we can only imagine how difficult it would be for startups. Startups spend their initial years focusing on fund-raising, marketing, minimum viable products, and scaling their businesses. Legal advice does not usually factor in as a necessity. Our firm aims to help startups even before they get off the ground, and through their initial years of growth. We wanted to be the ones bringing in that change in the legal sector, and we hope to help many more such startups in the future.
In your opinion, are there any specific India-related problems that corporate/ commercial firms face as far as the company laws are concerned? Is there scope for improvement on this front?
The Indian legal system which corporate/commercial firms deal with is a living breathing organism, evolving each year. Due to this evolving nature, we lawyers are always on our toes.From a minor amendment to the Companies Act to the overhaul of the foreign exchange regime by the Reserve Bank of India, each of these changes affect the compliance and regulatory regime of corporates. For instance, when India changed the investment route for countries sharing land border with India,whereby any country sharing land border with India including Hong Kong cannot invest in India without approval of the RBI in consultation with the central government,it impacted a lot of ongoing transactions and we as lawyers had to be the first ones to inform our clients about such a change in the country’s foreign investment policy. In my opinion, there is huge scope of improvement in legal regime in India, I think a stable regulatory and tax regime is the need for the hour so far as the Indian system is concerned. The biggest example of such a market with stable regulatory and tax regime is Singapore, and we must work towards emulating the same.
Your boutique law firm has offices in three different cities — Delhi NCR, Mumbai and Bangalore. Have the Covid-induced restrictions such as WFH affected your firm’s operations? How has your firm adapted to the professional challenges imposed by the pandemic-related lifestyle changes?
We have offices in New Delhi NCR and Mumbai, and our main office is in Bangalore. Before the pandemic, our work schedule involved a fair bit of travelling across these cities. But post the lockdowns we shifted to a hybrid model, and unless absolutely necessary, we usually work from home.
In relation to the professional challenges during the pandemic, I think it was a difficult time for most young professionals. We do acknowledge the fact that our firm survived the pandemic. Our work as lawyers/ law firms also involves client outreach and getting new clients, which was difficult during the lockdowns. We expanded our client outreach through digital means and by conducting webinars, including one with King’s College London on International Treaty Arbitration. Further, we also focused on client outreach and knowledge management during the pandemic to educate and create legal awareness among our clients.
‘It’s a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.’ – Archana Balasubramanian
Archana Balasubramanian is the founding partner of Agama Law Associates, a Mumbai-based corporate law firm which she started in 2014. She specialises in general corporate commercial transaction and advisory as well as deep sectoral expertise across manufacturing, logistics, media, pharmaceuticals, financial services, shipping, real estate, technology, engineering, infrastructure and health.
August 13, 2021:
Lawyers see companies ill-prepared for conflict, often, in India. When large corporates take a remedial instead of mitigative approach to legal issues – an approach utterly incoherent to both their size and the compliance ecosystem in their sector – it is there where the concept of costs on legal becomes problematic. Pre-dispute management strategy is much more rationalized on the business’ pocket than the costs of going in the red on conflict and compliances.
Corporates often focus on business and let go of backend maintenance of paperwork, raising issues as and when they arise and resolving conflicts / client queries in a manner that will promote dispute avoidance.
Corporate risk and compliance management is yet another elephant in India, which in addition to commercial disputes can be a drain on a company’s resources. It can be clubbed under four major heads – labour, industrial, financial and corporate laws. There are around 20 Central Acts and then specific state-laws by which corporates are governed under these four categories.
Risk and compliance management is also significantly dependent on the sector, size, scale and nature of the business and the activities being carried out.
The woes of a large number of promoters from the ecommerce ecosystem are to do with streamlining systems to navigate legal. India has certain heavily regulated sectors and, like I mentioned earlier, an intricate web of corporate risk and compliance legislation that can result in prohibitive costs in the remedial phase. To tackle the web in the preventive or mitigative phase, start-ups end up lacking the arsenal due to sheer intimidation from legal. Promoters face sectoral risks in sectors which are heavily regulated, risks of heavy penalties and fines under company law or foreign exchange laws, if fund raise is not done in a compliant manner.
It is a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. Promoters are quick to sign on the dotted line and approach lawyers with a tick the box approach. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.
Investment contracts, large celebrity endorsement contracts and CXO contracts are some key areas where legal advice should be obtained. Online contracts is also emerging as an important area of concern.
When we talk of scope, arbitration is pretty much a default mechanism at this stage for adjudicating commercial disputes in India, especially given the fixation of timelines for closure of arbitration proceedings in India. The autonomy it allows the parties in dispute to pick a neutral and flexible forum for resolution is substantial. Lower courts being what they are in India, arbitration emerges as the only viable mode of dispute resolution in the Indian commercial context.
The arbitrability of disputes has evolved significantly in the last 10 years. The courts are essentially pro-arbitration when it comes to judging the arbitrability of subject matter and sending matters to arbitration quickly.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Vidya Drolia case has significantly clarified the position in respect of tenancy disputes, frauds and consumer disputes. It reflects upon the progressive approach of the court and aims to enable an efficient, autonomous and effective arbitration environment in India.
Law firms stand for ensuring that the law works for business and not against it. Whatever the scope of our mandate, the bottom line is to ensure a risk-free, conflict-free, compliant and prepared enterprise for our client, in a manner that does not intimidate the client or bog them down, regardless of the intricacy of the legal and regulatory web it takes to navigate to get to that end result. Lawyers need to dissect the business of law from the work.
This really involves meticulous, detail-oriented, sheer hard work on the facts, figures, dates and all other countless coordinates of each mandate, repetitively and even to a, so-called, “dull” routine rhythm – with consistent single-mindedness and unflinching resolve.
As a firm, multiply that effort into volumes, most of it against-the-clock given the compliance heavy ecosystem often riddled with uncertainties in a number of jurisdictions. So the same meticulous streamlining of mandate deliverables has to be extrapolated by the management of the firm to the junior most staff.
Further, the process of streamlining itself has to be more dynamic than ever now given the pace at which the new economy, tech-ecosystem, business climate as well as business development processes turn a new leaf.
Finally, but above all, we need to find a way to feel happy, positive and energized together as a team while chasing all of the aforesaid dreams. The competitive timelines and volumes at which a law firm works, this too is a real challenge. But we are happy to face it and evolve as we grow.
We always as a firm operated on the work from anywhere principle. We believed in it and inculcated this through document management processes to the last trainee. This helped us shut shop one day and continue from wherever we are operating.
The team has been regularly meeting online (at least once a day). We have been able to channel the time spent in travelling to and attending meetings in developing our internal knowledge banks further, streamline our processes, and work on integrating various tech to make the practice more cost-effective for our clients.
Right to Disclosure – Importance & Challenges in Criminal Justice System – By Manu Sharma
Personal liberty is the most cherished value of human life which thrives on the anvil of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India (“the Constitution”). Once a person is named an accused, he faces the spectre of deprivation of his personal liberty and criminal trial. This threat is balanced by Constitutional safeguards which mandate adherence to the rule of law by the investigating agencies as well as the Court. Thus, any procedure which seeks to impinge on personal liberty must also be fair and reasonable. The right to life and personal liberty enshrined under article 21 of the Constitution, expanded in scope post Maneka Gandhi[1], yields the right to a fair trial and fair investigation. Fairness demands disclosure of anything relevant that may be of benefit to an accused. Further, the all-pervading principles of natural justice envisage the right to a fair hearing, which entails the right to a full defence. The right to a fair defence stems from full disclosure. Therefore, the right of an accused to disclosure emanates from this Constitutional philosophy embellished by the principles of natural justice and is codified under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”).
Under English jurisprudence, the duty of disclosure is delineated in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, which provides that the prosecutor must disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, except if such disclosure undermines public interest.[2] Fairness ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution which weakens its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on as part of its formal case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence.[3] The duty of disclosure under common law contemplates disclosure of anything which might assist the defence[4], even if such material was not to be used as evidence[5]. Under Indian criminal jurisprudence, which has borrowed liberally from common law, the duty of disclosure is embodied in sections 170(2), 173, 207 and 208 of the Code, which entail the forwarding of material to the Court and supply of copies thereof to the accused, subject to statutory exceptions.
II. Challenges in Enforcement
The right to disclosure is a salient feature of criminal justice, but its provenance and significance appear to be lost on the Indian criminal justice system. The woes of investigative bias and prosecutorial misconduct threaten to render this right otiose. That is not to say that the right of an accused to disclosure is indefeasible, as certain exceptions are cast in the Code itself, chief among them being public interest immunity under section 173(6). However, it is the mischief of the concept of ‘relied upon’ emerging from section 173(5) of the Code, which is wreaking havoc on the right to disclosure and is the central focus of this article. The rampant misuse of the words “on which the prosecution proposes to rely’ appearing in section 173(5) of the Code, to suppress material favourable to the accused or unfavourable to the prosecution in the garb of ‘un-relied documents’ has clogged criminal courts with avoidable litigation at the very nascent stage of supply of copies of documents under section 207 of the Code. The erosion of the right of an accused to disclosure through such subterfuge is exacerbated by the limited and restrictive validation of this right by criminal Courts. The dominant issues highlighted in the article, which stifle the right to disclosure are; tainted investigation, unscrupulous withholding of material beneficial to the accused by the prosecution, narrow interpretation by Courts of section 207 of the Code, and denial of the right to an accused to bring material on record in the pre-charge stage.
A. Tainted Investigation
Fair investigation is concomitant to the preservation of the right to fair disclosure and fair trial. It envisages collection of all material, irrespective of its inculpatory or exculpatory nature. However, investigation is often vitiated by the tendencies of overzealous investigating officers who detract from the ultimate objective of unearthing truth, with the aim of establishing guilt. Such proclivities result in collecting only incriminating material during investigation or ignoring the material favourable to the accused. This leads to suppression of material and scuttles the right of the accused to disclosure at the very inception. A tainted investigation leads to miscarriage of justice. Fortunately, the Courts are not bereft of power to supervise investigation and ensure that the right of an accused to fair disclosure remains protected. The Magistrate is conferred with wide amplitude of powers under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation, and inheres all such powers which are incidental or implied to ensure proper investigation. This power can be exercised suo moto by the Magistrate at all stages of a criminal proceeding prior to the commencement of trial, so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned or a prima facie guilty person is not left out.[6]
B. Suppression of Material
Indian courts commonly witness that the prosecution is partisan while conducting the trial and is invariably driven by the lust for concluding in conviction. Such predisposition impels the prosecution to take advantage by selectively picking up words from the Code and excluding material favouring the accused or negating the prosecution case, with the aid of the concept of ‘relied upon’ within section 173(5) of the Code. However, the power of the prosecution to withhold material is not unbridled as the Constitutional mandate and statutory rights given to an accused place an implied obligation on the prosecution to make fair disclosure.[7] If the prosecution withholds vital evidence from the Court, it is liable to adverse inference flowing from section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act). The prosecutor is expected to be guided by the Bar Council of India Rules which prescribe that an advocate appearing for the prosecution of a criminal trial shall so conduct the prosecution that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent. The suppression of material capable of establishment of the innocence of the accused shall be scrupulously avoided. [8]
C. Scope of S. 207
The scope of disclosure under section 207 has been the subject of fierce challenge in Indian Courts on account of the prosecution selectively supplying documents under the garb of ‘relied upon’ documents, to the prejudice of the defence of an accused. The earlier judicial trend had been to limit the supply of documents under section 207 of the Code to only those documents which were proposed to be relied upon by the prosecution. This view acquiesced the exclusion of documents which were seized during investigation, but not filed before the Court along with the charge sheet, rendering the right to disclosure a farce. This restrictive sweep fails to reconcile with the objective of a fair trial viz. discovery of truth. The scheme of the code discloses that Courts have been vested with extensive powers inter alia under sections 91, 156(3) and 311 to elicit the truth. Towards the same end, Courts are also empowered under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the principle of harmonious construction warrants a more purposive interpretation of section 207 of the code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court expounded on the scope of Section 207 of the Code in the case of Manu Sharma[9] and held that documents submitted to the Magistrate under section 173(5) would deem to include the documents which have to be sent to the magistrate during the course of investigation under section 170(2). A document which has been obtained bona fide and has a bearing on the case of the prosecution should be disclosed to the accused and furnished to him to enable him to prepare a fair defence, particularly when non production or disclosure would affect administration of justice or prejudice the defence of the accused. It is not for the prosecution or the court to comprehend the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the accused. The perception of prejudice is for the accused to develop on reasonable basis.[10] Manu Sharma’s [supra] case has been relied upon in Sasikala [11] wherein it was held that the Court must concede a right to the accused to have access to the documents which were forwarded to the Court but not exhibited by the prosecution as they favoured the accused. These judgments seem more in consonance with the true spirit of fair disclosure and fair trial. However, despite such clear statements of law, courts are grappling with the judicial propensity of deviating from this expansive interpretation and regressing to the concept of relied upon. The same is evident from a recent pronouncement of the Delhi High Court where the ratios laid down in Manu Sharma & Sasikala [supra] were not followed by erroneously distinguishing from those cases.[12] Such “per incuriam” aberrations by High Court not only undermine the supremacy of the Apex Court, but also adversely impact the functioning of the district courts over which they exercise supervisory jurisdiction. Hopefully in future Judges shall be more circumspect and strictly follow the law declared by the Apex Court.
D. Pre-Charge Embargo
Another obstacle encountered in the enforcement of the right to disclosure is the earlier judicial approach to stave off production or consideration of any additional documents not filed alongwith the charge sheet at the pre-charge stage, as the right to file such material was available to the accused only upon the commencement of trial after framing of charge.[13] At the pre-charge stage, Court could not direct the prosecution to furnish copies of other documents[14] It was for the accused to do so during trial or at the time of entering his defence. However, the evolution of law has seen that at the stage of framing charge, Courts can rely upon the material which has been withheld by the prosecutor, even if such material is not part of the charge sheet, but is of such sterling quality demolishing the case of the prosecution.[15] Courts are not handicapped to consider relevant material at the stage of framing charge, which is not relied upon by the prosecution. It is no argument that the accused can ask for the documents withheld at the time of entering his defence.[16] The framing of charge is a serious matter in a criminal trial as it ordains an accused to face a long and arduous trial affecting his liberty. Therefore, the Court must have all relevant material before the stage of framing charge to ascertain if grave suspicion is made out or not. Full disclosure at the stage of section 207 of the code, which immediately precedes discharging or charging an accused, enables an accused to seek a discharge, if the documents, including those not relied upon by the prosecution, create an equally possible view in favour of the accused.[17] On the other hand, delaying the reception of documents postpones the vindication of the accused in an unworthy trial and causes injustice by subjecting him to the trauma of trial. There is no gainsaying that justice delayed is justice denied, therefore, such an approach ought not to receive judicial consent. A timely discharge also travels a long way in saving precious time of the judiciary, which is already overburdened by the burgeoning pendency of cases. Thus, delayed or piecemeal disclosure not only prejudices the defence of the accused, but also protracts the trial and occasions travesty of justice.
III. Duties of the stakeholders in criminal justice system
The foregoing analysis reveals that participation of the investigating agency, the prosecution and the Court is inextricably linked to the enforcement of the right to disclosure. The duties cast on these three stakeholders in the criminal justice system, are critical to the protection of this right. It is incumbent upon the investigating agencies to investigate cases fairly and to place on record all the material irrespective of its implication on the case of prosecution case. Investigation must be carried out with equal alacrity and fairness irrespective of status of accused or complainant.[18] An onerous duty is cast on the prosecution as an independent statutory officer, to conduct the trial with the objective of determination of truth and to ensure that material favourable to the defence is supplied to the accused. Ultimately, it is the overarching duty of the Court to ensure a fair trial towards the administration of justice for all parties. The principles of fair trial require the Court to strike a delicate balance between competing interests in a system of adversarial advocacy. Therefore, the court ought to exercise its power under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation and ensure that all material, including that which enures to the benefit of the accused, is brought on record. Even at the stage of supply of copies of police report and documents under section 207 of the Code, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manu Sharma (supra) and Sasikala (supra), and ensure that all such material is supplied to the accused irrespective of whether it is “relied upon” by the prosecution or not.
IV. Alternate Remedy
The conundrum of supply of copies under section 207 of the code abounds criminal trials. Fairness is an evolving concept. There is no doubt that disclosure of all material which goes to establish the innocence of an accused is the sine qua non of a fair trial.[19] Effort is evidently underway to expand the concept in alignment with English jurisprudence. In the meanwhile, does the right of an accused to disclosure have another limb to stand on? Section 91 of the Code comes to the rescue of an accused, which confers wide discretionary powers on the Court, independent of section 173 of the Code, to summon the production of things or documents, relevant for the just adjudication of the case. In case the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has withheld vital, relevant and admissible evidence from the Court, it can legitimately use its power under section 91 of the Code to discover the truth and to do complete justice to the accused.[20]
V. Conclusion
A society’s progress and advancement are judged on many parameters, an important one among them being the manner in which it administers criminal justice. Conversely, the ironic sacrilege of the core virtues of criminal jurisprudence in the temples of justice evinces social decadence. The Indian legislature of the twenty first century has given birth to several draconian statutes which place iron shackles on personal liberty, evoking widespread fear of police abuses and malicious prosecution. These statutes not only entail presumptions which reverse the burden of proof, but also include impediments to the grant of bail. Thus, a very heavy burden to dislodge the prosecution case is imposed on the accused, rendering the right to disclosure of paramount importance. It is the duty of the Court to keep vigil over this Constitutional and statutory right conferred on an accused by repudiating any procedure which prejudices his defence. Notable advancement has been made by the Apex Court in interpreting section 207 of the Code in conformity with the Constitutional mandate, including the right to disclosure. Strict adherence to the afore-noted principles will go a long way in ensuring real and substantial justice. Any departure will not only lead to judicial anarchy, but also further diminish the already dwindling faith of the public in the justice delivery system.
**
Advocate Manu Sharma has been practising at the bar for over sixteen years. He specialises in Criminal Defence. Some of the high profile cases he has represented are – the 2G scam case for former Union minister A Raja; the Religare/Fortis case for Malvinder Singh; Peter Mukerjee in the P Chidambaram/ INX Media case; Devas Multimedia in ISRO corruption act case; Om Prakash Chautala in PMLA case; Aditya Talwar in the aviation scam case; Dilip Ray, former Coal Minister in one of the coal scam cases; Suhaib Illyasi case.
**
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
[1] Maneka Gandhi and Another v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
[2] S. 3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996
[3] R v. H and R v. C, 2004 (1) ALL ER 1269
[4] R v. Ward (Judith), (1993) 1 WLR 619 : (1993) 2 ALL ER 577 (CA)
[5] R v. Preston, (1994) 2 AC 130 : (1993) 3 WLR 891 : (1993) 4 ALL ER 638 (HL), R v. Stinchcome,
(1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
[6] Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2019 SCC Online SC 1346
[7] Sidhartha Vashishth alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1
[8] R. 16, part II, Ch. VI of the Bar Council of India Rules
[9] Manu Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 1
[10] V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[11] Sasikala, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[12] Sala Gupta and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 262 DLT 661
[13] State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi¸(2005) 1 SCC 568
[14] Dharambir v. Central Bureau of Investigation, ILR (2008) 2 Del 842 : (2008) 148 DLT 289
[15] Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin and Another v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93
[16] Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
[17] Dilwar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135, Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394
[18] Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 12 SCC 529
[19] Kanwar Jagat Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr, (2007) 142 DLT 49
[20] Neelesh, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
Validity & Existence of an Arbitration Clause in an Unstamped Agreement
By Kunal Kumar
January 8, 2024
In a recent ruling, a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in its judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, overruled the constitutional bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. and has settled the issue concerning the validity and existence of an arbitration clause in an unstamped agreement. (‘N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III’)
Background to N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
One of the first instances concerning the issue of the validity of an unstamped agreement arose in the case of SMS Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if an instrument/document lacks proper stamping, the exercising Court must preclude itself from acting upon it, including the arbitration clause. It further emphasized that it is imperative for the Court to impound such documents/instruments and must accordingly adhere to the prescribed procedure outlined in the Indian Stamp Act 1899.
With the introduction of the 2015 Amendment, Section 11(6A) was inserted in the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 (A&C Act) which stated whilst appointing an arbitrator under the A&C Act, the Court must confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
In the case of M/s Duro Felguera S.A. v. M/s Gangavaram Port Limited, the Supreme Court of India made a noteworthy observation, affirming that the legislative intent behind the 2015 Amendment to the A&C Act was necessitated to minimise the Court's involvement during the stage of appointing an arbitrator and that the purpose embodied in Section 11(6A) of A&C Act, deserves due acknowledgement & respect.
In the case of Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Cosatal Marine Constructions & Engineering Ltd., a divisional bench of the Apex Court reaffirmed its previous decision held in SMS Tea Estates (supra) and concluded that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract assumes significance, emphasizing that the agreement transforms into a contract only when it holds legal enforceability. The Apex Court observed that an agreement fails to attain the status of a contract and would not be legally enforceable unless it bears the requisite stamp as mandated under the Indian Stamp Act 1899. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Section 11(6A) read in conjunction with Section 7(2) of the A&C Act and Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, clarified that the existence of an arbitration clause within an agreement is contingent on its legal enforceability and that the 2015 Amendment of the A&C Act to Section 11(6A) had not altered the principles laid out in SMS Tea Estates (supra).
Brief Factual Matrix – N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.
Indo Unique Flame Ltd. (‘Indo Unique’) was awarded a contract for a coal beneficiation/washing project with Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. (‘KPCL’). In the course of the project, Indo Unique entered into a subcontract in the form of a Work Order with N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. (‘N.N. Global’) for coal transportation, coal handling and loading. Subsequently, certain disputes arose with KPCL, leading to KPCL invoking Bank Guarantees of Indo Unique under the main contract, after which Indo Unique invoked the Bank Guarantee of N. N. Global as supplied under the Work Order.
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Subsequently, N.N. Global initiated legal proceedings against the cashing of the Bank Guarantee in a Commercial Court. In response thereto, Indo Unique moved an application under Section 8 of the A&C Act, requesting that the Parties to the dispute be referred for arbitration. The Commercial Court dismissed the Section 8 application, citing the unstamped status of the Work Order as one of the grounds. Dissatisfied with the Commercial Court's decision on 18 January 2018, Indo Unique filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Bombay seeking that the Order passed by the Commercial Court be quashed or set aside. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court on 30 September 2020 allowed the Writ Petition filed by Indo Unique, aggrieved by which, N.N. Global filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India.
N. N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – I
The issue in the matter of M/s N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unqiue Flame Ltd. & Ors. came up before a three-bench of the Supreme Court of India i.e. in a situation when an underlying contract is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped, as required under the Indian Stamp Act 1899, would that also render the arbitration clause as non-existent and/or unenforceable (‘N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Flame Ltd. – I’).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India whilst emphasizing the 'Doctrine of Separability' of an arbitration agreement held that the non-payment of stamp duty on the commercial contract would not invalidate, vitiate, or render the arbitration clause as unenforceable, because the arbitration agreement is considered an independent contract from the main contract, and the existence and/or validity of an arbitration clause is not conditional on the stamping of a contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that deficiency in stamp duty of a contract is a curable defect and that the deficiency in stamp duty on the work order, would not affect the validity and/or enforceability of the arbitration clause, thus applying the Doctrine of Separability. The arbitration agreement remains valid and enforceable even if the main contract, within which it is embedded, is not admissible in evidence owing to lack of stamping.
The Hon’ble Apex Court, however, considered it appropriate to refer the issue i.e. whether unstamped instrument/document, would also render an arbitration clause as non-existent, unenforceable, to a constitutional bench of five-bench of the Supreme Court.
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II
On 25 April 2023, a five-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. held that (1) An unstamped instrument containing an arbitration agreement cannot be said to be a contract which is enforceable in law within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 and would be void under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, (2) an unstamped instrument which is not a contract nor enforceable cannot be acted upon unless it is duly stamped, and would not otherwise exist in the eyes of the law, (3) the certified copy of the arbitration agreement produced before a Court, must clearly indicate the stamp duty paid on the instrument, (4) the Court exercising its power in appointing an arbitration under Section 11 of the A&C Act, is required to act in terms of Section 33 and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 (N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II).
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 13 December 2023 in its recent judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, (1) Agreements lacking proper stamping or inadequately stamped are deemed inadmissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. However, such agreements are not automatically rendered void or unenforceable ab initio; (2) non-stamping or insufficient stamping of a contract is a curable defect, (2) the issue of stamping is not subject to determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the A&C Act by a Court. The concerned Court is only required to assess the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, separate from concerns related to stamping, and (3) any objections pertaining to the stamping of the agreement would fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, the decision in N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II and SMS Tea (supra) was overruled, by the seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India.
Kunal is a qualified lawyer with more than nine years of experience and has completed his LL.M. in Dispute Resolution (specialisation in International Commercial Arbitration) from Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University, California.
Kunal currently has his own independent practice and specializes in commercial/construction arbitration as well as civil litigation. He has handled several matters relating to Civil Law and arbitrations (both domestic and international) and has appeared before the Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, District Courts of Delhi and various other tribunals.
No Safe Harbour For Google On Trademark Infringement
By Mayank Grover & Pratibha Vyas
October 9, 2023
Innovation, patience, dedication and uniqueness culminate in establishing a distinct identity. A trademark aids in identifying the source and quality, shaping perceptions about the identity's essence. When values accompany a product or service's trademark, safeguarding against misuse and infringement becomes crucial. A recent pronouncement of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated August 10, 2023 in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. and Google India Private Limited v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. directed that Google’s use of trademarks as keywords for its Google Ads Programme does amount to ‘use’ in advertising under the Trademarks Act and the benefit of safe harbour would not be available to Google if such keywords infringe on the concerned trademark.
Factual Background
Google LLC manages and operates the Google Search Engine and Ads Programme, while, Google India Private Limited is a subsidiary of Google that has been appointed as a non-exclusive reseller of the Ads Programme in India. The Respondents, DRS Logistics and Agarwal Packers and Movers Pvt. Ltd. are leading packaging, moving and logistics service providers in India.
On 22.12.2011, DRS filed a suit against Google and Just Dial Ltd. under provisions of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (‘TM Act’) inter alia seeking a permanent injunction against Google from permitting third parties from infringing, passing off etc. the relevant trademarks of DRS. The core of the dispute revolved around Google’s Ads Programme. DRS claimed that its trade name 'AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS' is widely recognized and a 'well-known' trademark. Use of DRS’s trademark as a keyword diverts internet traffic from its website to that of its competitors and they were entitled to seek restraint against Google for permitting third parties who are not authorized to use the said trademark. DRS further argued that Google benefits from these trademark infringements. This practice involved charging a higher amount for displaying these ads, constituting an infringement of their trademarks. Whereas, Google contended that the use of the keyword in the Ads Programme does not amount to ‘use’ under the TM Act notwithstanding that the keyword is/or similar to a trademark. Thus, the use of a term as a keyword cannot be construed as an infringement of a trademark under the TM Act, and being an intermediary, it claimed a safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. (‘IT Act’).
In essence, the dispute between the parties was rooted in DRS’s grievance concerning the Ads Programme. The Learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 30.10.2021interpreted relevant provisions of the TM Act and drew on multiple legal precedents to arrive at the decision that DRS can seek protection of its trademarks which were registered under Section 28 of the TM Act and issued directions to investigate complaints alleging the use of trademark and/or to ascertain whether a sponsored result has an effect of infringing a trademark or passing off.
Being aggrieved, Google LLC and Google Pvt. Ltd. filed appeals before the Division Bench. Google LLC argued that the Single Judge’s findings were erroneous and the directions issued were liable to be set aside. Google India claimed that it doesn’t control and operate the Search Engine and the Ads Programme making it unable to comply with the directions passed in the impugned judgment.
Analysis & Decision of Court
The Division Bench found Single Judge’s rationale for assessing trademark infringement through keywords and meta-tags valid. Meta-tags are a list of words/code in a website, not readily visible to the naked eye. It serves as a tool for indexing the website by a search engine. If a trademark of a third party is used as a meta-tag, the same would serve as identifying the website as relevant to the search query that includes the trademark as a search term. The use of keywords in the Ads Programme also serves similar purpose. The Division Bench was unable to accept that using a trademark as a keyword, even if not visible, would not be considered trademark use under the TM Act.
Google placed heavy reliance on the decisions rendered by Courts across jurisdictions of United Kingdom, United States of America, European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Canada, Spain, Italy, Japan and China; in the cases of Google France SARL and Google Inc. v. Louis Vitton SA & Ors.[1], Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc.[2], and L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG[3] in support of the contention that the use of trade marks is by the advertiser and not by Google. However, the Division Bench rejected Google’s passive role; highlighting its active involvement in recommending and promoting trademark keywords for higher clicks in its Ads Programme. Division Bench referred to a few judicial decisions rendered in the United States of America that captured the essence of the controversy for perspective, concluding that Google actively promotes and encourages trademarks associated with major goods and services, rather than having a passive role.
It was held that the contention that the use of trademarks as keywords, per se constitutes an infringement of the trademark is unmerited; the assumption that an internet user is merely searching the address of the proprietor of the trademark when he feeds in a search query that may contain a trademark, is erroneous.
The Doctrine of 'Initial Interest Confusion' addresses trademark infringement based on pre-purchase confusion. The doctrine is applied when meta-tags, keywords, or domain names cause initial confusion similar to a registered trademark. If users are misled to access unrelated websites, trademark use in internet advertising may be actionable and reliance was placed on US precedents. Referring to Section 29 of the TM Act, it was directed that Section 29 does not specify the duration for which the confusion lasts but, even if the confusion is for a short duration and an internet user is able to recover from the same, the trade mark would be infringed and would offend Section 29(2) of the TM Act.
It was held that the Ads Programme is a platform for displaying advertisements. Google, being an architect and operator of its own programme makes it an active participant in the use of trademarks and determining the advertisements displayed on search pages. Their use of proprietary software makes them utilize trademarks and control the distribution of information related to potentially infringing links, ultimately leading to revenue maximization. Hence, a substantial link exists between Google LLC and Google India, rendering it impossible for Google India to deny its role in operating the Ads Programme. It was further held that Google sells trademarks as keywords to advertisers and encourages users to use trademarks as keywords for ads. It is contradictory for Google to encourage trademark use while claiming data belongs to third parties for exemption. After 2004, Google changed policies to boost revenue and subsequently, introduced a tool that searches effective terms, including trademarks. Google's active involvement in its advertising business and online nature does not necessarily qualify it for benefits under Section 79 of the IT Act. The Division Bench agreed with the view of the Single Judge that Google would not be eligible for protection of safe harbour under Section 79(1) of the IT Act, if its alleged activities infringe trademarks.
Conclusion
This is a seminal decision governing (and rather, restricting) the operations of intermediaries and redefining the jurisprudence of safe harbour under the IT Act. The decision is well-reasoned and establishes a significant precedent for safeguarding trademarks by uniquely holding Google accountable under its Ads Programme. The same will prevent usage of tradenames as a third-party trademark in keyword search or metatags by advertisers on Google’s search engine. While keywords and meta-tags have different levels of visibility, their purpose is similar i.e. advertising and attracting internet traffic. The use of trademarks as meta-tags by a person who is neither a proprietor of the trademark nor permitted to use the same leads to confusion amongst public at large due to the automated processes of search engines and consequently, constitutes trademark infringement.
About the Authors: Mayank Grover is a Partner and Pratibha Vyas is an Associate at Seraphic Advisors, Advocates & Solicitors
[1] C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2010) [2011] All ER (EC) 41
[2] [2014] EWCA Civ 1403
[3] 2C- 324/09 (2010)
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