Read Order: Kajod Mal V. Commissioner of GST and Anr
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 12, 2023: The Delhi High Court has quashed an order cancelling the GST registration of a petitioner for violating the principles of natural justice.
In the matter at hand, the petitioner had challenged an order dated 17.01.2023 that cancelled their GST registration. The cancellation was based on a show-cause notice dated 22.12.2012, where the proper officer proposed the cancellation on the grounds that the taxpayer was non-existent. The final decision to cancel the petitioner's GST registration was made on 17.01.2023. However, this decision was based on the petitioner's failure to file the mandatory GST returns as required under the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (CGST Act).
The division bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan observed that it was evident that the ground for cancellation, i.e., the petitioner's failure to file mandatory GST returns, was not the reason originally stated in the show-cause notice dated 22.12.2012, which had proposed the cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that following the issuance of the impugned order, the petitioner had requested the authorities to reevaluate the status of their principal place of business. Subsequently, a physical verification of the principal place of business was conducted, and during this verification, it was established that the petitioner was indeed existent.
Considering the circumstances described, the bench concluded that the impugned order, which cancelled the petitioner's GST registration, could not be upheld. It was determined that the order had been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. Notably, the petitioner had not been served with any show-cause notice proposing the cancellation of their GST registration on any grounds other than non-existence at the principal place of business.
Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.01.2023 was set aside. The court directed the revenue to promptly reinstate the petitioner's GST registration.
Read Order: M/s Baghel Trading Co v. State of U.P. and 2 Others
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 12, 2023: The Allahabad High Court has stayed coercive action against M/s Baghel Trading Co. (petitioner), in a GST case. The Court also issued notice to the state government and sought its response on how and under what manner the deeming service as per clauses (c) & (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 can be said to be deemed service as per sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the Goods and Services Tax Act (GST Act).
The writ petition in question was filed to challenge the orders dated 19.8.2023 and 23.10.2021. The petitioner contended that the impugned order was neither communicated nor served to them. The petitioner further argued that the department had failed to understand the distinction between the terms ‘communicated’ used in Section 107 of the GST Act and ‘served’ used in Section 169 of the GST Act. According to the petitioner, while the order dated 23.10.2021 may have been served by making it available on the portal, as provided under Section 169 of the GST Act, this did not amount to the communication of the order. The petitioner also highlighted that sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the GST Act specifies various modes of service, such as registered post, speed post, email, portal availability, publication in newspapers, or affixation. However, as per sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the GST Act, the order is only deemed to be served if it is done through tendering, publication, or affixation as provided in sub-section (1). The petitioner further argued that the statute does not indicate that an order made available on the common portal is deemed to be served, and clauses (c) & (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 are not covered by sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the GST Act.
The single judge bench of Justice Piyush Agrawal acknowledged that this matter required further consideration and directed the state government to submit a counter affidavit.
In addition, the court ordered the petitioner to deposit 50% of the disputed tax amount in accordance with the law, while also ensuring that no coercive actions are taken against them during this time.
Read Order: Commissioner of Income Tax 14 V. Jasjit Singh
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 12, 2023: In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court has held that the 6-year period for filing income tax returns by third parties commences from the date of receipt of materials by the Assessing Officer (AO), and not from the date of the search and seizure operation conducted on the premises of the main assessee.
In the present batch of appeals, the revenue had questioned four sets of orders of the Delhi High Court, which had dismissed its appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The brief facts of the case were that a search and seizure operation had been conducted at the premises of M/s KOUTON Group on 19.02.2009. During the scrutiny process, the AO had issued a notice under Section 154 A of the Income Tax Act, to the searched party. The AO believed that certain documents and materials belonging to the respondent assesses were relevant to the case, and accordingly, notices were sent to the said assesses. The assesses contended that the period during which they were required to file their returns should commence from the date when the materials were forwarded to their respective AOs. On the other hand, the revenue argued that the relevant date for the six-year return filing period should be from the date when the search and seizure proceedings were conducted concerning the main assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act. The impugned order upheld the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which, in turn, supported the arguments made by the assesses.
On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the impugned order was erroneous because the date referred to in the proviso to Section 153(1) is only related to the second proviso to Section 153A, specifically in relation to matters concerning abatement.
The division bench comprising of Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar observed that a straightforward interpretation of Section 153C (1) made it evident that the legislative intent behind the proviso was not limited to addressing the issue of abatement alone. Instead, it also pertained to determining the date from which the six-year period should commence for filing returns by the third party, whose premises were not subject to a search and for whom the specific provision under Section 153-C was enacted.
The bench rejected the revenue's argument, deeming it to be unsubstantiated. It pointed out that it was entirely plausible for the AO in charge of the seized materials from the search party under Section 132 to take a considerable amount of time to transfer the documents and materials belonging to the third party to the relevant AO. In such a scenario, if the date were to be linked back to the date of seizure, as contended by the revenue, it would result in disproportionate prejudice to the third party. They might unwittingly be drawn into proceedings, even in cases where they have no real connection to the matter at all.
The bench provided an example to illustrate its point, highlighting that if the papers were indeed assigned under Section 153-C after a span of four years, it would place a substantial burden on the third-party assesses. They would essentially need to maintain their records for a period of at least 10 years, which is not a legal requirement. Such severe and unjust consequences could not be attributed to the intent of the Parliament.
For the foregoing reasons, the court determined that there was no merit in these appeals, and consequently, dismissed the same.
Read Order: State of Rajasthan v. Gautam s/o Mohanlal
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 12, 2023: In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has set aside the lenient sentence awarded by the Rajasthan High Court to a man convicted of raping a five-year-old girl. The Court observed that the offense was so gruesome and heinous that it had a lasting impact on the victim, which would affect her for her entire life.
At the outset, the division bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Pankaj Mithal expressed that this was a case that “shocked the conscience of the court”.
In this case, the victim's father had filed a police report, stating that he and his wife were tenants in a house owned by Chittar Lal and Gautam Harizan (respondent-accused) was also a tenant in the same house. It was stated that on 08.05.2014, the victim's mother had found the victim in a pool of blood upon returning from work. It was alleged that the respondent-accused had raped the victim.
In the Trial Court, the respondent-accused was convicted for offenses under Sections 363, 342, clauses (i) and (m) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The respondent-accused was also found guilty of offenses under Section 8 and Section 10 of the POCSO Act. However, in the appeal filed by the respondent-accused, while confirming the conviction, the High Court had shown leniency by reducing the sentence for the offenses under clauses (i) and (m) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of IPC to rigorous imprisonment for twelve years.
The division bench noted that the High Court had provided several reasons for showing leniency in this case. These reasons included the fact that the respondent-accused was twenty-two years old at the time of the offense, belonged to a financially poor scheduled caste family, had no history of being a habitual offender, and had been in incarceration since May 8, 2014.
The bench remarked that the childhood of the victim had been destroyed, and her life had been irreparably damaged due to the trauma and the lasting psychological impact on her mind. The incident had likely turned the victim into a psychological wreck.
The bench made it clear that, regarding the serious offenses under Section 376 of IPC and the POCSO Act, the fact that the respondent-accused was not a habitual offender was entirely irrelevant. Additionally, the fact that the respondent-accused had been in incarceration since May 8, 2014, did not carry much weight because the law prescribes a minimum sentence. Moreover, the caste of the accused should not be considered as a valid reason for showing leniency in cases of such offenses.
The bench further observed that in cases of such a serious offense against a girl aged five to six, the financial condition of the accused should not typically be a significant factor for the court to consider. In this particular case, it was noted that the victim's family belonged to the same economic strata as the respondent-accused.
The bench emphasized that this case had a significant impact on society as a whole. It stated that if undue leniency were shown to the respondent in light of the facts of the case, it would erode the confidence of the common man in the justice delivery system. The punishment must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.
Based on the observations mentioned above, the bench noted that only two factors prevented them from restoring the life sentence. The first factor was the accused's young age and the second factor was that he had already served the sentence imposed by the High Court. Therefore, the bench concluded that, in this case, a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years would be appropriate. However, it was also specified that while serving the remaining sentence, the respondent-accused would not be entitled to any remission.
In their conclusion, the bench made a remark, stating that an accused has no caste or religion when the court deals with such cases. They expressed confusion as to why the caste of the accused had been mentioned in the cause title of the judgments of both the High Court and the Trial Court. The bench emphasized that the caste or religion of a litigant should never be mentioned in the cause title of a judgment,
The bench also added that it is the responsibility of the State to ensure that children who are victims of such offenses can continue with their education. The bench emphasized that true rehabilitation goes beyond mere compensation. It was stated that perhaps, the rehabilitation of girl victims in their lives should be integrated into the ‘Beti Bachao Beti Padhao’ campaign of the Central Government. As a welfare state, it is the duty of the government to take proactive steps in this regard.
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Rajasthan High Court has ruled in favour of the M/s Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd. (petitioner-assessee), holding that ‘Kurkure’ and ‘Cheetos’ are classifiable as ‘namkeen’ under Entry 131 of Schedule IV to the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (RVAT Act).
The issue in these revision/references pertained to the Tax Board's classification of ‘Kurkure’ and ‘Cheetos’, determining whether they should be categorized as Namkeen under Entry 131 of Schedule IV or if they should be placed under Schedule V (Residual Rate) of the VAT Act. This classification was influenced by a previous decision that had rejected a similar contention under a different entry in the erstwhile Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (RVAT Act).
The brief background of the issue involved in the present case was that the petitioner-assessee, a private limited company with its registered office in Gurugram and principal place of business in Jaipur, Rajasthan, was a registered dealer under the RVAT Act. The company primarily dealt with the sale of various food products, including 'Kurkure' and 'Cheetos.' They also sold branded potato chips under the brand names 'Lays' and 'Uncle Chips.' The petitioner-assessee classified 'Kurkure' and 'Cheetos' along with branded potato chips under Entry 131 [Sweetmeat Deshi (including Gajak&Revri), bhujiya, branded and unbranded namkeens.] of Schedule IV to the RVAT Act, and consequently paid tax at the rate of 4% / 5%. However, after a survey conducted at the petitioner-assessee's business premises, the revenue reclassified the goods in question, including the branded potato chips, under the Residual Entry in Schedule V to the RVAT Act. This reclassification subjected the goods to a higher tax rate of 12.5% / 14%. The petitioner-assessee contested the revenue's classification of the goods in question under the residual entry.
The single-judge bench of Justice Sameer Jain observed that, in accordance with the settled position of the law, a specific entry would always take precedence over a general entry. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the revenue to demonstrate that the goods in question should be classified under the general entry rather than the specific entry.
The bench opined that the Tax Board had misinterpreted the ruling in Pepsico India Holdings Private Limited v. Cto, Special Circle Rajasthan, Jaipur and Others [LQ/RajHC/2016/2239]. It was observed that this judgment, aside from being under the previous regime of the RST Act, related to the classification within two specific competing entries. In contrast, in the present case, the specific entry was in competition with the general or residual entry.
Furthermore, the bench ruled that the use of the residual entry can only be a last resort, and the residuary clause should only be invoked if the department can demonstrate that, by no conceivable process of reasoning, the goods in question can be placed under any of the tariff items.
The bench observed that the revenue did not seek any technical or expert opinion, nor did they present any evidence to support their argument. It appeared that the Tax Board relied solely on a basic Google search result that described the goods in question as snacks.
The bench also took note of the reliance placed by the Tax Board on the description of Cheetos as snacks on the global website of the petitioner-assessee. However, it was clarified that since the petitioner-assesseewas part of a global conglomerate with international presence, the description of Cheetos as a snack on their global website would not necessarily preclude its categorization as ‘namkeen’ in India. This was especially relevant as namkeen, in essence, was also a type of snack. However, the court emphasized that not all snacks would be considered as namkeen.
The bench also observed that the Tax Board arrived at the conclusion that the goods in question were snacks based solely on a reading of the ingredients. This decision, which relied solely on the ingredients, was deemed to be erroneous and lacking in proper reasoning by the bench.
Thus, the court held that the revenue had failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that the goods in question should be classified under the general, residual, or orphan entry rather than the specific entry. The court found that no compelling reason had been provided to categorize the goods in question as ‘snacks’, especially considering that the FSSAI license had classified them as namkeen.
Accordingly, all the revisions/references were allowed in favour of the petitioner-assessee and against the respondent-revenue, resulting in the quashing of the challenged order of the Tax Board.
Read Order:Sheela and Ors V. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Delhi High Court has dismissed the bail pleas of two accused persons, arrested in a case involving the possession of commercial quantities of ganja.
In that matter at hand, the applicants had sought regular bail in a case registered under Sections 20/29/61/85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
The case as set up by the prosecution was that they had received secret information at Police Station Sarita Vihar about an illegal supply of Ganja. In response, a raiding party was constituted, and a raid was conducted. During the raid, three individuals - Vinod, Iqbal, and Sheela - were apprehended while traveling in a three-wheeler. Vinod and Sheela were seated in the back seat, each with a bag between their legs. Both bags were seized, sealed, and taken into possession, and all the accused individuals were subsequently arrested. Samples from the bags were drawn and sent for testing, which confirmed the presence of Ganja. After the investigation was completed, a chargesheet was filed, and the FSL report was submitted through a supplementary chargesheet. On August 29, 2023, charges were framed against all three accused persons under Section 20(C) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act, which pertains to commercial quantity.
On behalf of Sheela, the argument was presented that she was apprehended with a bag containing 14.13 kg of Ganja, which falls into the category of an intermediate quantity. In contrast, her co-accused, Vinod, had a handbag containing 24.20 kg of Ganja, which qualifies as a commercial quantity. The defence contended that the quantity recovered from Vinod should not be aggregated with the quantity recovered from Sheela.
Additionally, the other applicant, Iqbal, sought bail on the grounds that no contraband was recovered from him, and he was simply the driver of the auto. It was emphasized that a search in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act had not been conducted on him, and for that reason, he sought bail.
The single-judge bench of Justice Amit Bansal reviewed the decision rendered in Union of India Through Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow v. Md. Nawaz Khan [LQ/SC/2021/3058], wherein a car in which the co-accused were traveling was intercepted, and the search of the car revealed two polythene packets hidden within it. The first packet contained 1.740 kg, and the second packet contained 1.750 kg samples. These samples were subsequently sent for testing, and they tested positive for heroin. One of the co-accused sought bail on the grounds that he was merely a companion in the vehicle and was not in conscious possession of the contraband. Furthermore, he argued that the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act were not complied with. However, the Supreme Court rejected the bail application, noting that the accused was not an unknown passenger in the vehicle but was someone in close contact with the other co-accused.
The bench emphasized that in the present case, all the accused persons were traveling together in the same vehicle, and the total quantity of Ganja seized was 14.13 kg and 24.20 kg in two separate bags. It was noted that simply because the bag containing 24.20 kg of Ganja was found between the legs of the co-accused Vinod and the bag containing 14.13 kg of Ganja was located between the legs of Sheela, it could not be asserted that the recovery from Sheela was limited to 14.13 kg.
The bench further took into consideration the information provided in the Status Report submitted by the State. This report indicated that there were 287 phone calls between Sheela and Iqbal, as well as 19 calls between Iqbal and co-accused Vinod. This information suggested that all the accused individuals were acting collectively and were in conscious possession of the entire quantity of 38.33 kg of Ganja.
In response to the submission made on behalf of Iqbal concerning non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the bench ruled that the provisions of Section 50 do not apply in cases where the seizure of contraband has been made from a motor vehicle. In this case, no seizure was made from Iqbal's person, and therefore, Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not applicable.
Thus, taking into account the facts and circumstances, including the fact that the accused persons were traveling together in a vehicle and that large commercial quantities of Ganja were recovered from their possession, the bench concluded that the twin conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. As a result, bail could not be granted to the applicants at this stage, and their bail applications were dismissed.
Read Order:M/s Ram Kamal Healthcare Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and 3 Others
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Allahabad High Court has recently quashed a letter issued by Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA), which required M/s Ram Kamal Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner) to pay GST on the upfront fee for an institutional plot allotment. The Court held that the exemption under Section 11 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) was unconditional, and YEIDA had no basis to demand GST from the hospital.
The present petition had been filed to quash the letter/communication dated 24.08.2018, issued behalf of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA). This communication demanded that the petitioner deposit a GST of 18% on the premium of Rs. 3.80 crores, charged by the YEIDA against an institutional plot, allotted to the petitioner.
The division bench of Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh and Justice Vinod Diwakar took note of the specific query raised by YEIDA, which sought a clarification from the Authority for Advance Ruling regarding the applicability of GST on premium and lease rent for plots allocated to hospitals under leases extending beyond 30 years. Subsequently, the Authority for Advance Ruling had concluded that GST was not applicable, i.e., it was exempted on the upfront amount, provided the conditions specified under Serial Number 41 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, as amended by Notification No. 32/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 13.10.2017, were met.
The bench determined that since no party had contested the aforementioned order and it had consequently achieved finality, it was perplexing to observe that YEIDA, which is not the revenue authority, opted to issue the communication dated 24.08.2018, to the petitioner.
Consequently, the bench concluded that the Authority for Advance Ruling had provided a clear and unambiguous response to YEIDA's inquiry. Therefore, with regard to the taxation or exemption of the transaction in question, there should never have been any doubt about its basic applicability.
The bench observed that the legislature had opted to provide an unconditional exemption concerning the payment of upfront amounts. Even when amending Notification No. 32/2017, dated October 13, 2017, various alterations were introduced, including exempting certain activities for which plot allotments were made from taxation, and involving corporations where ownership by the Central Government or the State Government might surpass 50%. However, during the same amendment, no changes were made to the initial Notification to introduce any conditions for grant of that exemption.
As a result, the court ruled that the exemption made available to the petitioner by virtue of the original Notification read with order of the Authority for Advance Ruling, was unconditional. Consequently, the letter dated 24.08.2018 issued on behalf of YEIDA was wholly unfounded in law and also in facts.
Read Order:Prushin Fintech Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: In a recent decision, the Bombay High Court has slammed tax officials for not responding to 20+ representations made by Prushin Fintech Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner) on the issue of GST return filing.
The case revolved the petitioner, which had repeatedly informed the concerned tax officers that it had already filed its GST returns. The company even submitted acknowledgments of the filed returns as part of the record. Despite these efforts to communicate the issue, the state authorities issued a show-cause notice, claiming that the returns had not been filed.
The division bench of Justice G.S. Kulkarni and Justice Jitendra Jain was disturbed by the inaction on the part of the State officers and observed that such an approach was not expected in a regime of ease of doing business.The bench emphasized that revenue officials should not adopt a stance of silence, as it can lead to unwarranted litigation and disrupt the well-planned statutory regime.
The court remarked, “We could have easily disposed of the petition directing that the representations of the Petitioner be considered by the department, however, we cannot overlook the accountability of the officers, not only to the assessee, but also to the Court…”
In response to the petitioner's claims, the state tax officials attempted to cast doubt on the correctness of the return acknowledgments. In light of this, the bench directed the Commissioner of State Tax to verify the portal and the system made available to the petitioner-assessee and to file an affidavit explaining whether the returns were filed and whether there was any justification in issuing the show cause notice.
The case was adjourned until October 10, 2023, when the court will hear both parties on the various issues raised in the case.
Read Order:M/s Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. State of U.P. and 2 Others
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Allahabad High Court has ruled in favour of M/s Shyam Sel and Power Limited (petitioner), by quashing the penalty imposed on them for transporting goods using a cancelled e-way bill. The Court emphasized that the intent to evade tax is an essential prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Sections 129 and 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act (CGST Act).
In summary, the petitioner was involved in the manufacturing and sale of industrial-grade steel components, such as channels and beams. On 17.11.2021, the petitioner transported varying quantities of steel channels and beams to M/s Maa Ambey Steels. The transportation was supported by tax invoices, e-way bills, and GRs. However, during the transit, the goods were intercepted at Maharajpur, Kanpur. Upon verification, it was discovered that one of the e-way bills had been cancelled by the purchasing dealer, leading to the seizure of the goods. The petitioner later responded, asserting that all e-way bills were correctly filled out and that they were unaware of the cancellation. The petitioner maintained that the goods in question were sold by a registered dealer to a registered purchasing dealer and were accompanied by legitimate documentation. Despite the reply, an order was issued under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act, imposing a penalty. Dissatisfied with this decision, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was subsequently dismissed.
The single-judge bench of Justice Piyush Agrawal noted that even though the e-way bill had been cancelled by the purchaser, there was no indication that this cancellation had been communicated to the petitioner.
The bench stated that to initiate proceedings under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act, Section 130 of the CGST Act had to be read together. Section 130 requires the presence of intent to evade tax as a mandatory element. However, in the present case, during the issuance of the notice or when passing orders for detention, seizure, or imposition of penalties or taxes, no such intent to evade payment of tax by the petitioner was evident.
The bench commented that given the dealer had informed about the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the purchasing dealer's e-way bill, it constituted a minor breach. In this situation, the authority had the option to initiate proceedings under Section 122 of the CGST Act rather than invoking Section 129 of the CGST Act.
The court said, “Once the authorities have not observed that there was intent to evade payment of tax, proceedings under section 129 of the CGST Act ought not to have been initiated….”
Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petition was allowed, and the challenged orders were consequently quashed.
Read Order:M/s. Indian Herbal Store Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India &Ors.
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Delhi High Court has provided relief to M/s. Indian Herbal Store Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner) in a case concerning the refund of accumulated Input Tax Credit (ITC) for exports made before the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules(CGSTRules), 2017. The Court determined that the amendment could not be retroactively applied and that ITC should be computed in accordance with the rules that were in effect during the export period.
Briefly stated, in the said case, the petitioner's claim for a refund related to the period from 01.10.2018 to 30.09.2019. The petitioner had filed four separate applications for each of the four quarters, and these applications were rejected through four separate orders. The rejection of the petitioner's refund claim was primarily based on two grounds. First, it was because the petitioner had not produced the relevant Foreign Inward Remittance Certificates (FIRCs) and correlated them with the exports made. Second, it was due to the computation of the eligible export turnover not being compliant with Rule 89(4)(C) of the Rules. The petitioner succeeded in addressing the issue regarding non-submission of the FIRCs. However, the Appellate Authority upheld the refund rejection orders on the grounds that the export turnovers for the relevant tax period were not compliant with Rule 89(4)(C) of the Rules.
The division bench comprising of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan acknowledged that there was no dispute over the fact that the amended Sub-rule (4) of Rule 89 of the Rules had prospective application, beginning from 23.03.2020.
The bench highlighted that it's crucial to recognize that, according to Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of the Explanation to Section 54(1) of the CGST Act, the time limit for applying for a refund related to the export of goods and/or services is calculated from the date when the goods and/or services are exported.
The bench also held that the term 'turnover' should be interpreted in the context of the specific period it pertains to. It should be understood as referring to the period during which the turnover is generated, which is the date of supply. Consequently, it logically follows that the ITC associated with the turnover of a specific period must, unless explicitly or implicitly indicated otherwise, be calculated in accordance with the rules in effect during that specific period.
In light of this perspective, the bench determined that the appellate authority had made a mistake by applying Rule 89(4)(C) of the Rules, as amended with effect from 23.03.2020, to calculate the export turnover for the purpose of determining the petitioner's refund. Therefore, it was decided that the petitioner's request for a refund of the accumulated ITC related to its exports during the period from 01.10.2018 to 30.09.2019, should be granted.
The court additionally emphasized that the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) of the Rules had been struck down by the Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s Tonbo Imaging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [LQ/KarHC/2023/857]. Consequently, as of the present date, the amended provision no longer existed.
Read Order: Kamal Prasad & Ors. V. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Now State of Chhattisgarh)
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, October 11, 2023: The Supreme Court has upheld the convictions of three convicts in a 1988 murder case, dismissing their appeal and holding that the prosecution case was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at hand, three convicts, namely, Kamal Prasad (A-3), Shersingh (A-6), and Bhavdas (A-9), had been convicted of committing an offense punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Sections 4/5 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908. The present appeal was made to question the correctness of a judgment and order passed by the Chhattisgarh High Court, by which the guilt of the accused had been confirmed.
The brief facts of the case were that on 17.04.1988, Chetram was taking his son, Kapildeo, to the hospital for treatment, with Choubisram (PW-3) riding pillion on the vehicle. When they reached the house of the accused, a group of 11 individuals attacked them using homemade bombs, as well as sticks and a tabbal. Chetram sustained multiple injuries during the attack and lost his life. PW-3 managed to escape the assault. Kapildeo, Chetram's son, while receiving medical treatment, also succumbed to his injuries.
In the trial, the court considered the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the accused, with the accused attempting to establish their alibi. After careful examination, the Trial Court found the prosecution's evidence to be reliable, and the witnesses were able to establish the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the witnesses were deemed to be of high quality, and their credibility remained unchallenged. Consequently, the Trial Court convicted nine out of the eleven accused individuals. Subsequently, the convicted individuals filed an appeal challenging their convictions. However, the findings of fact, the reasoning adopted by the court, and the judgment of conviction along with the resulting sentences were affirmed and upheld by the High Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the convict-appellants challenged the impugned judgment on four main fronts: (a) disputing the inordinate delay in filing the First Information Report (F.I.R.), (b) contesting the reliability of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies due to alleged contradictions, (c) suggesting an alternative motive for the crime, given the deceased's history of pending cases, and (d) presenting an alibi, claiming that they were not present at the crime scene.
Regarding the first contention, the division bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol took note of the fact that the FIR had been registered approximately two hours after the incident occurred. The testimony of PW-3, who played a crucial role in having the FIR filed, indicated that due to fear and having suffered multiple injuries, he had fled the scene and hid, only emerging two hours later. The bench concluded that, under these circumstances, the delay in filing the FIR could not be deemed fatal to the prosecution's case, especially given the injuries sustained by the witness, the remote location of the village where the incident took place, and the fact that the police obtained their account of events only after they reached his place of hiding. It was established that this was not a case of prior consultation, discussion, deliberation, or attempts to fabricate the story.
In relation to the plea of alibi, the bench noted that the plea of alibi does not fall under the General Exceptions outlined in the IPC; rather, it is regarded as a rule of evidence as per Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The responsibility to prove the plea lies with the party making such a claim. This burden must be met by presenting compelling and satisfactory evidence, and a 'strict scrutiny' standard is applied when evaluating such pleas.
The bench ruled that the defence witnesses did not definitively prove the plea of alibi, as their statements lacked corroboration from any other supporting evidence, and did not meet the standard of preponderance of probability.
“We find that for the plea of alibi to be established, something other than a mere ocular statement ought to have been present,” said the court.
The bench further concluded that there was no merit in the argument that the testimonies upon which the prosecution relied were inherently contradictory.
Further, the bench emphasized that merely citing the deceased's history of previous run-ins with the law should not automatically benefit those accused of his murder. Such claims, especially when they are unsupported by concrete evidence, are considered presumptuous.
In conclusion, the court determined that the charges brought against the convict-appellants along with the sentences imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court, did not justify any intervention by this court.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the bail previously granted by the court was cancelled. The convict-appellants were instructed to surrender immediately.
Time for judiciary to introspect and see what can be done to restore people’s faith – Justice Lokur
Justice Madan B Lokur, was a Supreme Court judge from June 2012 to December 2018. He is now a judge of the non-resident panel of the Supreme Court of Fiji. He spoke to LegitQuest on January 25, 2020.
Q: You were a Supreme Court judge for more than 6 years. Do SC judges have their own ups and downs, in the sense that do you have any frustrations about cases, things not working out, the kind of issues that come to you?
A: There are no ups and downs in that sense but sometimes you do get a little upset at the pace of justice delivery. I felt that there were occasions when justice could have been delivered much faster, a case could have been decided much faster than it actually was. (When there is) resistance in that regard normally from the state, from the establishment, then you kind of feel what’s happening, what can I do about it.
Q: So you have had the feeling that the establishment is trying to interfere in the matters?
A: No, not interfering in matters but not giving the necessary importance to some cases. So if something has to be done in four weeks, for example if reply has to be filed within four weeks and they don’t file it in four weeks just because they feel that it doesn’t matter, and it’s ok if we file it within six weeks how does it make a difference. But it does make a difference.
Q: Do you think this attitude is merely a lax attitude or is it an infrastructure related problem?
A: I don’t know. Sometimes on some issues the government or the establishment takes it easy. They don’t realise the urgency. So that’s one. Sometimes there are systemic issues, for example, you may have a case that takes much longer than anticipated and therefore you can’t take up some other case. Then that necessarily has to be adjourned. So these things have to be planned very carefully.
Q: Are there any cases that you have special memories of in terms of your personal experiences while dealing with the case? It might have moved you or it may have made you feel that this case is really important though it may not be considered important by the government or may have escaped the media glare?
A: All the cases that I did with regard to social justice, cases which concern social justice and which concern the environment, I think all of them were important. They gave me some satisfaction, some frustration also, in the sense of time, but I would certainly remember all these cases.
Q: Even though you were at the Supreme Court as a jurist, were there any learning experiences for you that may have surprised you?
A: There were learning experiences, yes. And plenty of them. Every case is a learning experience because you tend to look at the same case with two different perspectives. So every case is a great learning experience. You know how society functions, how the state functions, what is going on in the minds of the people, what is it that has prompted them to come the court. There is a great learning, not only in terms of people and institutions but also in terms of law.
Q: You are a Judge of the Supreme Court of Fiji, though a Non-Resident Judge. How different is it in comparison to being a Judge in India?
A: There are some procedural distinctions. For example, there is a great reliance in Fiji on written submissions and for the oral submissions they give 45 minutes to a side. So the case is over within 1 1/2 hours maximum. That’s not the situation here in India. The number of cases in Fiji are very few. Yes, it’s a small country, with a small number of cases. Cases are very few so it’s only when they have an adequate number of cases that they will have a session and as far as I am aware they do not have more than two or three sessions in a year and the session lasts for maybe about three weeks. So it’s not that the court sits every day or that I have to shift to Fiji. When it is necessary and there are a good number of cases then they will have a session, unlike here. It is then that I am required to go to Fiji for three weeks. The other difference is that in every case that comes to the (Fiji) Supreme Court, even if special leave is not granted, you have to give a detailed judgement which is not the practice here.
Q: There is a lot of backlog in the lower courts in India which creates a problem for the justice delivery system. One reason is definitely shortage of judges. What are the other reasons as to why there is so much backlog of cases in the trial courts?
A: I think case management is absolutely necessary and unless we introduce case management and alternative methods of dispute resolution, we will not be able to solve the problem. I will give you a very recent example about the Muzaffarpur children’s home case (in Bihar) where about 34 girls were systematically raped. There were about 17 or 18 accused persons but the entire trial finished within six months. Now that was only because of the management and the efforts of the trial judge and I think that needs to be studied how he could do it. If he could do such a complex case with so many eyewitnesses and so many accused persons in a short frame of time, I don’t see why other cases cannot be decided within a specified time frame. That’s case management. The second thing is so far as other methods of disposal of cases are concerned, we have had a very good experience in trial courts in Delhi where more than one lakh cases have been disposed of through mediation. So, mediation must be encouraged at the trial level because if you can dispose so many cases you can reduce the workload. For criminal cases, you have Plea Bargaining that has been introduced in 2009 but not put into practice. We did make an attempt in the Tis Hazari Courts. It worked to some extent but after that it fell into disuse. So, plea bargaining can take care of a lot of cases. And there will be certain categories of cases which we need to look at carefully. For example, you have cases of compoundable offences, you have cases where fine is the punishment and not necessarily imprisonment, or maybe it’s imprisonment say one month or two month’s imprisonment. Do we need to actually go through a regular trial for these kind of cases? Can they not be resolved or adjudicated through Plea Bargaining? This will help the system, it will help in Prison Reforms, (prevent) overcrowding in prisons. So there are a lot of avenues available for reducing the backlog. But I think an effort has to be made to resolve all that.
Q: Do you think there are any systemic flaws in the country’s justice system, or the way trial courts work?
A: I don’t think there are any major systemic flaws. It’s just that case management has not been given importance. If case management is given importance, then whatever systematic flaws are existing, they will certainly come down.
Q; And what about technology. Do you think technology can play a role in improving the functioning of the justice delivery system?
I think technology is very important. You are aware of the e-courts project. Now I have been told by many judges and many judicial academies that the e-courts project has brought about sort of a revolution in the trial courts. There is a lot of information that is available for the litigants, judges, lawyers and researchers and if it is put to optimum use or even semi optimum use, it can make a huge difference. Today there are many judges who are using technology and particularly the benefits of the e-courts project is an adjunct to their work. Some studies on how technology can be used or the e-courts project can be used to improve the system will make a huge difference.
Q: What kind of technology would you recommend that courts should have?
A: The work that was assigned to the e-committee I think has been taken care of, if not fully, then largely to the maximum possible extent. Now having done the work you have to try and take advantage of the work that’s been done, find out all the flaws and see how you can rectify it or remove those flaws. For example, we came across a case where 94 adjournments were given in a criminal case. Now why were 94 adjournments given? Somebody needs to study that, so that information is available. And unless you process that information, things will just continue, you will just be collecting information. So as far as I am concerned, the task of collecting information is over. We now need to improve information collection and process available information and that is something I think should be done.
Q: There is a debate going on about the rights of death row convicts. CJI Justice Bobde recently objected to death row convicts filing lot of petitions, making use of every legal remedy available to them. He said the rights of the victim should be given more importance over the rights of the accused. But a lot of legal experts have said that these remedies are available to correct the anomalies, if any, in the justice delivery. Even the Centre has urged the court to adopt a more victim-centric approach. What is your opinion on that?
You see so far as procedures are concerned, when a person knows that s/he is going to die in a few days or a few months, s/he will do everything possible to live. Now you can’t tell a person who has got terminal cancer that there is no point in undergoing chemotherapy because you are going to die anyway. A person is going to fight for her/his life to the maximum extent. So if a person is on death row s/he will do everything possible to survive. You have very exceptional people like Bhagat Singh who are ready to face (the gallows) but that’s why they are exceptional. So an ordinary person will do everything possible (to survive). So if the law permits them to do all this, they will do it.
Q: Do you think law should permit this to death row convicts?
A: That is for the Parliament to decide. The law is there, the Constitution is there. Now if the Parliament chooses not to enact a law which takes into consideration the rights of the victims and the people who are on death row, what can anyone do? You can’t tell a person on death row that listen, if you don’t file a review petition within one week, I will hang you. If you do not file a curative petition within three days, then I will hang you. You also have to look at the frame of mind of a person facing death. Victims certainly, but also the convict.
Q: From the point of jurisprudence, do you think death row convicts’ rights are essential? Or can their rights be done away with?
A: I don’t know you can take away the right of a person fighting for his life but you have to strike a balance somewhere. To say that you must file a review or curative or mercy petition in one week, it’s very difficult. You tell somebody else who is not on a death row that you can file a review petition within 30 days but a person who is on death row you tell him that I will give you only one week, it doesn’t make any sense to me. In fact it should probably be the other way round.
Q: What about capital punishment as a means of punishment itself?
A: There has been a lot of debate and discussion about capital punishment but I think that world over it has now been accepted, more or less, that death penalty has not served the purpose for which it was intended. So, there are very few countries that are executing people. The United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan also, but it hasn’t brought down the crime rate. And India has been very conservative in imposing the death penalty. I think the last 3-4 executions have happened for the persons who were terrorists. And apart from that there was one from Calcutta who was hanged for rape and murder. But the fact that he was hanged for rape and murder has not deterred people (from committing rape and murder). So the accepted view is that death penalty has not served the purpose. We certainly need to rethink the continuance of capital punishment. On the other hand, if capital punishment is abolished, there might be fake encounter killings or extra judicial killings.
Q: These days there is the psyche among people of ‘instant justice’, like we saw in the case of the Hyderabad vet who was raped and murdered. The four accused in the case were killed in an encounter and the public at large and even politicians hailed it as justice being delivery. Do you think this ‘lynch mob mentality’ reflects people’s lack of faith in the justice system?
A: I think in this particular case about what happened in Telangana, investigation was still going on. About what actually happened there, an enquiry is going on. So no definite conclusions have come out. According to the police these people tried to snatch weapons so they had to be shot. Now it is very difficult to believe, as far as I am concerned, that 10 armed policeman could not overpower four unarmed accused persons. This is very difficult to believe. And assuming one of them happened to have snatched a (cop’s) weapon, maybe he could have been incapacitated but why the other three? So there are a lot of questions that are unanswered. So far as the celebrations are concerned, the people who are celebrating, do they know for certain that they (those killed in the encounter) were the ones who did the crime? How can they be so sure about it? They were not eye witnesses. Even witnesses sometimes make mistakes. This is really not a cause for celebration. Certainly not.
Q: It seems some people are losing their faith in the country’s justice delivery system. How to repose people’s faith in the legal process?
A: You see we again come back to case management and speedy justice. Suppose the Nirbhaya case would have been decided within two or three years, would this (Telangana) incident have happened? One can’t say. The attack on Parliament case was decided in two or three years but that has not wiped out terrorism. There are a lot of factors that go into all this, so there is a need to find ways of improving justice delivery so that you don’t have any extremes – where a case takes 10 years or another extreme where there is instant justice. There has to be something in between, some balance has to be drawn. Now you have that case where Phoolan Devi was gangraped followed by the Behmai massacre. Now this is a case of 1981, it has been 40 years and the trial court has still not delivered a judgement. It’s due any day now, (but) whose fault is that. You have another case in Maharashtra that has been transferred to National Investigating Agency two years after the incident, the Bhima-Koregaon case. Investigation is supposedly not complete after two years also. Whose fault is that? So you have to look at the entire system in a holistic manner. There are many players – the investigation agency is one player, the prosecution is one player, the defence is one player, the justice delivery system is one player. So unless all of them are in a position to coordinate… you cannot blame only the justice delivery system. If the Telangana police was so sure that the persons they have caught are guilty, why did they not file the charge sheet immediately? If they were so sure the charge sheet should have been filed within one day. Why didn’t they do it?
Q: At the trial level, there are many instances of flaws in evidence collection. Do you think the police or whoever the investigators are, do they lack training?
A: Yes they do! The police lacks training. I think there is a recent report that has come out last week which says very few people (in the police) have been trained (to collect evidence).
Q: You think giving proper training to police to prepare a case will make a difference?
A: Yes, it will make a difference.
Q: You have a keen interest in juvenile justice. Unfortunately, a lot of heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. How can we correct that?
A: You see it depends upon what perspective we are looking at. Now these heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. Heinous crimes are committed by adults also, so why pick upon juveniles alone and say something should be done because juveniles are committing heinous crimes. Why is it that people are not saying that something should be done when adults are committing heinous crimes? That’s one perspective. There are a lot of heinous crimes that are committed against juveniles. The number of crimes committed against juveniles or children are much more than the crimes committed by juveniles. How come nobody is talking about that? And the people committing heinous crimes against children are adults. So is it okay to say that the State has imposed death penalty for an offence against the child? So that’s good enough, nothing more needs to be done? I don’t think that’s a valid answer. The establishment must keep in mind the fact that the number of heinous crimes against children are much more than those committed by juveniles. We must shift focus.
Q: Coming to NRC and CAA. Protests have been happening since December last year, the SC is waiting for the Centre’s reply, the Delhi HC has refused to directly intervene. Neither the protesters nor the government is budging. How do we achieve a breakthrough?
A: It is for the government to decide what they want to do. If the government says it is not going to budge, and the people say they are not going to budge, the stalemate could continue forever.
Q: Do you think the CAA and the NRC will have an impact on civil liberties, personal liberties and people’s rights?
A: Yes, and that is one of the reasons why there is protest all over the country. And people have realised that it is going to happen, it is going to have an impact on their lives, on their rights and that’s why they are protesting. So the answer to your question is yes.
Q: Across the world and in India, we are seeing an erosion of the value system upholding rights and liberties. How important is it for the healthy functioning of a country that social justice, people’s liberties, people’s rights are maintained?
A: I think social justice issues, fundamental rights are of prime importance in our country, in any democracy, and the preamble to our Constitution makes it absolutely clear and the judgement of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati and many other subsequent judgments also make it clear that you cannot change the basic structure of the Constitution. If you cannot do that then obviously you cannot take away some basic democratic rights like freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, you cannot take them away. So if you have to live in a democracy, we have to accept the fact that these rights cannot be taken away. Otherwise there are many countries where there is no democracy. I don’t know whether those people are happy or not happy.
Q: What will happen if in a democracy these rights are controlled by hook or by crook?
A: It depends upon how much they are controlled. If the control is excessive then that is wrong. The Constitution says there must be a reasonable restriction. So reasonable restriction by law is very important.
Q: The way in which the sexual harassment case against Justice Gogoi was handled was pretty controversial. The woman has now been reinstated in the Supreme Court as a staffer. Does this action of the Supreme Court sort of vindicate her?
A: I find this very confusing you know. There is an old joke among lawyers: Lawyer for the petitioner argued before the judge and the judge said you are right; then the lawyer for the respondent argued before the judge and the judge said you’re right; then a third person sitting over there says how can both of them be right and the judge says you’re also right. So this is what has happened in this case. It was found (by the SC committee) that what she said had no substance. And therefore, she was wrong and the accused was right. Now she has been reinstated with back wages and all. I don’t know, I find it very confusing.
Q: Do you think the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges should be raised to 70 years and there should be a fixed tenure?
A: I haven’t thought about it as yet. There are some advantages, there are some disadvantages. (When) You have extended age or life tenure as in the United States, and the Supreme Court has a particular point of view, it will continue for a long time. So in the United States you have liberal judges and conservative judges, so if the number of conservative judges is high then the court will always be conservative. If the number of liberal judges is high, the court will always be liberal. There is this disadvantage but there is also an advantage that if it’s a liberal court and if it is a liberal democracy then it will work for the benefit of the people. But I have not given any serious thought onthis.
Q: Is there any other thing you would like to say?
A: I think the time has come for the judiciary to sit down, introspect and see what can be done, because people have faith in the judiciary. A lot of that faith has been eroded in the last couple of years. So one has to restore that faith and then increase that faith. I think the judiciary definitely needs to introspect.
‘A major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013.’- Aakash Parihar
Aakash Parihar is Partner at Triumvir Law, a firm specializing in M&A, PE/VC, startup advisory, international commercial arbitration, and corporate disputes. He is an alumnus of the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
How did you come across law as a career? Tell us about what made you decide law as an option.
Growing up in a small town in Madhya Pradesh, wedid not have many options.There you either study to become a doctor or an engineer. As the sheep follows the herd, I too jumped into 11th grade with PCM (Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics).However, shortly after, I came across the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) and the prospect of law as a career. Being a law aspirant without any background of legal field, I hardly knew anything about the legal profession leave alone the niche areas of corporate lawor dispute resolution. Thereafter, I interacted with students from various law schools in India to understand law as a career and I opted to sit for CLAT. Fortunately, my hard work paid off and I made it to the hallowed National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NSLIU). Joining NLSIU and moving to Bangalorewas an overwhelming experience. However, after a few months, I settled in and became accustomed to the rigorous academic curriculum. Needless to mention that it was an absolute pleasure to study with and from someof the brightest minds in legal academia. NLSIU, Bangalore broadened my perspective about law and provided me with a new set of lenses to comprehend the world around me. Through this newly acquired perspective and a great amount of hard work (which is of course irreplaceable), I was able to procure a job in my fourth year at law school and thus began my journey.
As a lawyer carving a niche for himself, tell us about your professional journey so far. What are the challenges that new lawyers face while starting out in the legal field?
I started my professional journey as an Associate at Samvad Partners, Bangalore, where I primarily worked in the corporate team. Prior to Samvad Partners, through my internship, I had developed an interest towards corporate law,especially the PE/VC and M&A practice area. In the initial years as an associate at Samvad Partners and later at AZB & Partners, Mumbai, I had the opportunity to work on various aspects of corporate law, i.e., from PE/VC and M&A with respect to listed as well as unlisted companies. My work experience at these firms equipped and provided me the know-how to deal with cutting edge transactional lawyering. At this point, it is important to mention that I always had aspirations to join and develop a boutique firm. While I was working at AZB, sometime around March 2019, I got a call from Anubhab, Founder of Triumvir Law, who told me about the great work Triumvir Law was doing in the start-up and emerging companies’ ecosystem in Bangalore. The ambition of the firm aligned with mine,so I took a leap of faith to move to Bangalore to join Triumvir Law.
Anyone who is a first-generation lawyer in the legal industry will agree with my statement that it is never easy to build a firm, that too so early in your career. However, that is precisely the notion that Triumvir Law wanted to disrupt. To provide quality corporate and dispute resolution advisory to clients across India and abroad at an affordable price point.
Once you start your professional journey, you need to apply everything that you learnt in law schoolwith a practical perspective. Therefore, in my opinion, in addition to learning the practical aspects of law, a young lawyer needs to be accustomed with various practices of law before choosing one specific field to practice.
India has been doing reallywell in the field of M&A and PE/VC. Since you specialize in M&A and PE/VC dealmaking, what according to you has been working well for the country in this sphere? What does the future look like?
India is a developing economy, andM&A and PE/VC transactions form the backbone of the same. Since liberalization, there has been an influx of foreign investment in India, and we have seen an exponential rise in PC/VA and M&A deals. Indian investment market growth especially M&A and PE/VC aspects can be attributed to the advent of startup culture in India. The increase in M&A and PE/VC deals require corporate lawyersto handle the legal aspects of these deals.
As a corporate lawyer working in M&A and PE/VC space, my work ranges from drafting term-sheets to the transaction documents (SPA, SSA, SHA, BTA, etc.). TheM&A and PE/VC deal space experienced a slump during the first few months of the pandemic, but since June 2021, there has been a significant growth in M&A and PE/VC deal space in India. The growth and consistence of the M&A and PE/VC deal space in India can be attributed to several factors such as foreign investment, uncapped demands in the Indian market and exceptional performance of Indian startups.
During the pandemic many businesses were shut down but surprisingly many new businesses started, which adapted to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Since we are in the recovery mode, I think the M&A and PE/VC deal space will reach bigger heights in the comingyears. We as a firm look forward to being part of this recovery mode by being part of the more M&A and PE/VC deals in future.
You also advice start-ups. What are the legal issues or challenges that the start-ups usually face specifically in India? Do these issues/challenges have long-term consequences?
We do a considerable amount of work with startupswhich range from day-to-day legal advisory to transaction documentation during a funding round. In India, we have noticed that a sizeable amount of clientele approach counsels only when there is a default or breach, more often than not in a state of panic. The same principle applies to startups in India, they normally approach us at a stage when they are about to receive investment or are undergoing due diligence. At that point of time, we need to understand their legal issues as well as manage the demands of the investor’s legal team. The majornon-compliances by startups usually involve not maintaining proper agreements, delaying regulatory filings and secretarial compliances, and not focusing on proper corporate governance.
Another major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013. Keeping up with these requirements can be time-consuming for even seasoned lawyers, and we can only imagine how difficult it would be for startups. Startups spend their initial years focusing on fund-raising, marketing, minimum viable products, and scaling their businesses. Legal advice does not usually factor in as a necessity. Our firm aims to help startups even before they get off the ground, and through their initial years of growth. We wanted to be the ones bringing in that change in the legal sector, and we hope to help many more such startups in the future.
In your opinion, are there any specific India-related problems that corporate/ commercial firms face as far as the company laws are concerned? Is there scope for improvement on this front?
The Indian legal system which corporate/commercial firms deal with is a living breathing organism, evolving each year. Due to this evolving nature, we lawyers are always on our toes.From a minor amendment to the Companies Act to the overhaul of the foreign exchange regime by the Reserve Bank of India, each of these changes affect the compliance and regulatory regime of corporates. For instance, when India changed the investment route for countries sharing land border with India,whereby any country sharing land border with India including Hong Kong cannot invest in India without approval of the RBI in consultation with the central government,it impacted a lot of ongoing transactions and we as lawyers had to be the first ones to inform our clients about such a change in the country’s foreign investment policy. In my opinion, there is huge scope of improvement in legal regime in India, I think a stable regulatory and tax regime is the need for the hour so far as the Indian system is concerned. The biggest example of such a market with stable regulatory and tax regime is Singapore, and we must work towards emulating the same.
Your boutique law firm has offices in three different cities — Delhi NCR, Mumbai and Bangalore. Have the Covid-induced restrictions such as WFH affected your firm’s operations? How has your firm adapted to the professional challenges imposed by the pandemic-related lifestyle changes?
We have offices in New Delhi NCR and Mumbai, and our main office is in Bangalore. Before the pandemic, our work schedule involved a fair bit of travelling across these cities. But post the lockdowns we shifted to a hybrid model, and unless absolutely necessary, we usually work from home.
In relation to the professional challenges during the pandemic, I think it was a difficult time for most young professionals. We do acknowledge the fact that our firm survived the pandemic. Our work as lawyers/ law firms also involves client outreach and getting new clients, which was difficult during the lockdowns. We expanded our client outreach through digital means and by conducting webinars, including one with King’s College London on International Treaty Arbitration. Further, we also focused on client outreach and knowledge management during the pandemic to educate and create legal awareness among our clients.
‘It’s a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.’ – Archana Balasubramanian
Archana Balasubramanian is the founding partner of Agama Law Associates, a Mumbai-based corporate law firm which she started in 2014. She specialises in general corporate commercial transaction and advisory as well as deep sectoral expertise across manufacturing, logistics, media, pharmaceuticals, financial services, shipping, real estate, technology, engineering, infrastructure and health.
August 13, 2021:
Lawyers see companies ill-prepared for conflict, often, in India. When large corporates take a remedial instead of mitigative approach to legal issues – an approach utterly incoherent to both their size and the compliance ecosystem in their sector – it is there where the concept of costs on legal becomes problematic. Pre-dispute management strategy is much more rationalized on the business’ pocket than the costs of going in the red on conflict and compliances.
Corporates often focus on business and let go of backend maintenance of paperwork, raising issues as and when they arise and resolving conflicts / client queries in a manner that will promote dispute avoidance.
Corporate risk and compliance management is yet another elephant in India, which in addition to commercial disputes can be a drain on a company’s resources. It can be clubbed under four major heads – labour, industrial, financial and corporate laws. There are around 20 Central Acts and then specific state-laws by which corporates are governed under these four categories.
Risk and compliance management is also significantly dependent on the sector, size, scale and nature of the business and the activities being carried out.
The woes of a large number of promoters from the ecommerce ecosystem are to do with streamlining systems to navigate legal. India has certain heavily regulated sectors and, like I mentioned earlier, an intricate web of corporate risk and compliance legislation that can result in prohibitive costs in the remedial phase. To tackle the web in the preventive or mitigative phase, start-ups end up lacking the arsenal due to sheer intimidation from legal. Promoters face sectoral risks in sectors which are heavily regulated, risks of heavy penalties and fines under company law or foreign exchange laws, if fund raise is not done in a compliant manner.
It is a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. Promoters are quick to sign on the dotted line and approach lawyers with a tick the box approach. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.
Investment contracts, large celebrity endorsement contracts and CXO contracts are some key areas where legal advice should be obtained. Online contracts is also emerging as an important area of concern.
When we talk of scope, arbitration is pretty much a default mechanism at this stage for adjudicating commercial disputes in India, especially given the fixation of timelines for closure of arbitration proceedings in India. The autonomy it allows the parties in dispute to pick a neutral and flexible forum for resolution is substantial. Lower courts being what they are in India, arbitration emerges as the only viable mode of dispute resolution in the Indian commercial context.
The arbitrability of disputes has evolved significantly in the last 10 years. The courts are essentially pro-arbitration when it comes to judging the arbitrability of subject matter and sending matters to arbitration quickly.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Vidya Drolia case has significantly clarified the position in respect of tenancy disputes, frauds and consumer disputes. It reflects upon the progressive approach of the court and aims to enable an efficient, autonomous and effective arbitration environment in India.
Law firms stand for ensuring that the law works for business and not against it. Whatever the scope of our mandate, the bottom line is to ensure a risk-free, conflict-free, compliant and prepared enterprise for our client, in a manner that does not intimidate the client or bog them down, regardless of the intricacy of the legal and regulatory web it takes to navigate to get to that end result. Lawyers need to dissect the business of law from the work.
This really involves meticulous, detail-oriented, sheer hard work on the facts, figures, dates and all other countless coordinates of each mandate, repetitively and even to a, so-called, “dull” routine rhythm – with consistent single-mindedness and unflinching resolve.
As a firm, multiply that effort into volumes, most of it against-the-clock given the compliance heavy ecosystem often riddled with uncertainties in a number of jurisdictions. So the same meticulous streamlining of mandate deliverables has to be extrapolated by the management of the firm to the junior most staff.
Further, the process of streamlining itself has to be more dynamic than ever now given the pace at which the new economy, tech-ecosystem, business climate as well as business development processes turn a new leaf.
Finally, but above all, we need to find a way to feel happy, positive and energized together as a team while chasing all of the aforesaid dreams. The competitive timelines and volumes at which a law firm works, this too is a real challenge. But we are happy to face it and evolve as we grow.
We always as a firm operated on the work from anywhere principle. We believed in it and inculcated this through document management processes to the last trainee. This helped us shut shop one day and continue from wherever we are operating.
The team has been regularly meeting online (at least once a day). We have been able to channel the time spent in travelling to and attending meetings in developing our internal knowledge banks further, streamline our processes, and work on integrating various tech to make the practice more cost-effective for our clients.
Right to Disclosure – Importance & Challenges in Criminal Justice System – By Manu Sharma
Personal liberty is the most cherished value of human life which thrives on the anvil of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India (“the Constitution”). Once a person is named an accused, he faces the spectre of deprivation of his personal liberty and criminal trial. This threat is balanced by Constitutional safeguards which mandate adherence to the rule of law by the investigating agencies as well as the Court. Thus, any procedure which seeks to impinge on personal liberty must also be fair and reasonable. The right to life and personal liberty enshrined under article 21 of the Constitution, expanded in scope post Maneka Gandhi[1], yields the right to a fair trial and fair investigation. Fairness demands disclosure of anything relevant that may be of benefit to an accused. Further, the all-pervading principles of natural justice envisage the right to a fair hearing, which entails the right to a full defence. The right to a fair defence stems from full disclosure. Therefore, the right of an accused to disclosure emanates from this Constitutional philosophy embellished by the principles of natural justice and is codified under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”).
Under English jurisprudence, the duty of disclosure is delineated in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, which provides that the prosecutor must disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, except if such disclosure undermines public interest.[2] Fairness ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution which weakens its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on as part of its formal case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence.[3] The duty of disclosure under common law contemplates disclosure of anything which might assist the defence[4], even if such material was not to be used as evidence[5]. Under Indian criminal jurisprudence, which has borrowed liberally from common law, the duty of disclosure is embodied in sections 170(2), 173, 207 and 208 of the Code, which entail the forwarding of material to the Court and supply of copies thereof to the accused, subject to statutory exceptions.
II. Challenges in Enforcement
The right to disclosure is a salient feature of criminal justice, but its provenance and significance appear to be lost on the Indian criminal justice system. The woes of investigative bias and prosecutorial misconduct threaten to render this right otiose. That is not to say that the right of an accused to disclosure is indefeasible, as certain exceptions are cast in the Code itself, chief among them being public interest immunity under section 173(6). However, it is the mischief of the concept of ‘relied upon’ emerging from section 173(5) of the Code, which is wreaking havoc on the right to disclosure and is the central focus of this article. The rampant misuse of the words “on which the prosecution proposes to rely’ appearing in section 173(5) of the Code, to suppress material favourable to the accused or unfavourable to the prosecution in the garb of ‘un-relied documents’ has clogged criminal courts with avoidable litigation at the very nascent stage of supply of copies of documents under section 207 of the Code. The erosion of the right of an accused to disclosure through such subterfuge is exacerbated by the limited and restrictive validation of this right by criminal Courts. The dominant issues highlighted in the article, which stifle the right to disclosure are; tainted investigation, unscrupulous withholding of material beneficial to the accused by the prosecution, narrow interpretation by Courts of section 207 of the Code, and denial of the right to an accused to bring material on record in the pre-charge stage.
A. Tainted Investigation
Fair investigation is concomitant to the preservation of the right to fair disclosure and fair trial. It envisages collection of all material, irrespective of its inculpatory or exculpatory nature. However, investigation is often vitiated by the tendencies of overzealous investigating officers who detract from the ultimate objective of unearthing truth, with the aim of establishing guilt. Such proclivities result in collecting only incriminating material during investigation or ignoring the material favourable to the accused. This leads to suppression of material and scuttles the right of the accused to disclosure at the very inception. A tainted investigation leads to miscarriage of justice. Fortunately, the Courts are not bereft of power to supervise investigation and ensure that the right of an accused to fair disclosure remains protected. The Magistrate is conferred with wide amplitude of powers under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation, and inheres all such powers which are incidental or implied to ensure proper investigation. This power can be exercised suo moto by the Magistrate at all stages of a criminal proceeding prior to the commencement of trial, so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned or a prima facie guilty person is not left out.[6]
B. Suppression of Material
Indian courts commonly witness that the prosecution is partisan while conducting the trial and is invariably driven by the lust for concluding in conviction. Such predisposition impels the prosecution to take advantage by selectively picking up words from the Code and excluding material favouring the accused or negating the prosecution case, with the aid of the concept of ‘relied upon’ within section 173(5) of the Code. However, the power of the prosecution to withhold material is not unbridled as the Constitutional mandate and statutory rights given to an accused place an implied obligation on the prosecution to make fair disclosure.[7] If the prosecution withholds vital evidence from the Court, it is liable to adverse inference flowing from section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act). The prosecutor is expected to be guided by the Bar Council of India Rules which prescribe that an advocate appearing for the prosecution of a criminal trial shall so conduct the prosecution that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent. The suppression of material capable of establishment of the innocence of the accused shall be scrupulously avoided. [8]
C. Scope of S. 207
The scope of disclosure under section 207 has been the subject of fierce challenge in Indian Courts on account of the prosecution selectively supplying documents under the garb of ‘relied upon’ documents, to the prejudice of the defence of an accused. The earlier judicial trend had been to limit the supply of documents under section 207 of the Code to only those documents which were proposed to be relied upon by the prosecution. This view acquiesced the exclusion of documents which were seized during investigation, but not filed before the Court along with the charge sheet, rendering the right to disclosure a farce. This restrictive sweep fails to reconcile with the objective of a fair trial viz. discovery of truth. The scheme of the code discloses that Courts have been vested with extensive powers inter alia under sections 91, 156(3) and 311 to elicit the truth. Towards the same end, Courts are also empowered under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the principle of harmonious construction warrants a more purposive interpretation of section 207 of the code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court expounded on the scope of Section 207 of the Code in the case of Manu Sharma[9] and held that documents submitted to the Magistrate under section 173(5) would deem to include the documents which have to be sent to the magistrate during the course of investigation under section 170(2). A document which has been obtained bona fide and has a bearing on the case of the prosecution should be disclosed to the accused and furnished to him to enable him to prepare a fair defence, particularly when non production or disclosure would affect administration of justice or prejudice the defence of the accused. It is not for the prosecution or the court to comprehend the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the accused. The perception of prejudice is for the accused to develop on reasonable basis.[10] Manu Sharma’s [supra] case has been relied upon in Sasikala [11] wherein it was held that the Court must concede a right to the accused to have access to the documents which were forwarded to the Court but not exhibited by the prosecution as they favoured the accused. These judgments seem more in consonance with the true spirit of fair disclosure and fair trial. However, despite such clear statements of law, courts are grappling with the judicial propensity of deviating from this expansive interpretation and regressing to the concept of relied upon. The same is evident from a recent pronouncement of the Delhi High Court where the ratios laid down in Manu Sharma & Sasikala [supra] were not followed by erroneously distinguishing from those cases.[12] Such “per incuriam” aberrations by High Court not only undermine the supremacy of the Apex Court, but also adversely impact the functioning of the district courts over which they exercise supervisory jurisdiction. Hopefully in future Judges shall be more circumspect and strictly follow the law declared by the Apex Court.
D. Pre-Charge Embargo
Another obstacle encountered in the enforcement of the right to disclosure is the earlier judicial approach to stave off production or consideration of any additional documents not filed alongwith the charge sheet at the pre-charge stage, as the right to file such material was available to the accused only upon the commencement of trial after framing of charge.[13] At the pre-charge stage, Court could not direct the prosecution to furnish copies of other documents[14] It was for the accused to do so during trial or at the time of entering his defence. However, the evolution of law has seen that at the stage of framing charge, Courts can rely upon the material which has been withheld by the prosecutor, even if such material is not part of the charge sheet, but is of such sterling quality demolishing the case of the prosecution.[15] Courts are not handicapped to consider relevant material at the stage of framing charge, which is not relied upon by the prosecution. It is no argument that the accused can ask for the documents withheld at the time of entering his defence.[16] The framing of charge is a serious matter in a criminal trial as it ordains an accused to face a long and arduous trial affecting his liberty. Therefore, the Court must have all relevant material before the stage of framing charge to ascertain if grave suspicion is made out or not. Full disclosure at the stage of section 207 of the code, which immediately precedes discharging or charging an accused, enables an accused to seek a discharge, if the documents, including those not relied upon by the prosecution, create an equally possible view in favour of the accused.[17] On the other hand, delaying the reception of documents postpones the vindication of the accused in an unworthy trial and causes injustice by subjecting him to the trauma of trial. There is no gainsaying that justice delayed is justice denied, therefore, such an approach ought not to receive judicial consent. A timely discharge also travels a long way in saving precious time of the judiciary, which is already overburdened by the burgeoning pendency of cases. Thus, delayed or piecemeal disclosure not only prejudices the defence of the accused, but also protracts the trial and occasions travesty of justice.
III. Duties of the stakeholders in criminal justice system
The foregoing analysis reveals that participation of the investigating agency, the prosecution and the Court is inextricably linked to the enforcement of the right to disclosure. The duties cast on these three stakeholders in the criminal justice system, are critical to the protection of this right. It is incumbent upon the investigating agencies to investigate cases fairly and to place on record all the material irrespective of its implication on the case of prosecution case. Investigation must be carried out with equal alacrity and fairness irrespective of status of accused or complainant.[18] An onerous duty is cast on the prosecution as an independent statutory officer, to conduct the trial with the objective of determination of truth and to ensure that material favourable to the defence is supplied to the accused. Ultimately, it is the overarching duty of the Court to ensure a fair trial towards the administration of justice for all parties. The principles of fair trial require the Court to strike a delicate balance between competing interests in a system of adversarial advocacy. Therefore, the court ought to exercise its power under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation and ensure that all material, including that which enures to the benefit of the accused, is brought on record. Even at the stage of supply of copies of police report and documents under section 207 of the Code, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manu Sharma (supra) and Sasikala (supra), and ensure that all such material is supplied to the accused irrespective of whether it is “relied upon” by the prosecution or not.
IV. Alternate Remedy
The conundrum of supply of copies under section 207 of the code abounds criminal trials. Fairness is an evolving concept. There is no doubt that disclosure of all material which goes to establish the innocence of an accused is the sine qua non of a fair trial.[19] Effort is evidently underway to expand the concept in alignment with English jurisprudence. In the meanwhile, does the right of an accused to disclosure have another limb to stand on? Section 91 of the Code comes to the rescue of an accused, which confers wide discretionary powers on the Court, independent of section 173 of the Code, to summon the production of things or documents, relevant for the just adjudication of the case. In case the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has withheld vital, relevant and admissible evidence from the Court, it can legitimately use its power under section 91 of the Code to discover the truth and to do complete justice to the accused.[20]
V. Conclusion
A society’s progress and advancement are judged on many parameters, an important one among them being the manner in which it administers criminal justice. Conversely, the ironic sacrilege of the core virtues of criminal jurisprudence in the temples of justice evinces social decadence. The Indian legislature of the twenty first century has given birth to several draconian statutes which place iron shackles on personal liberty, evoking widespread fear of police abuses and malicious prosecution. These statutes not only entail presumptions which reverse the burden of proof, but also include impediments to the grant of bail. Thus, a very heavy burden to dislodge the prosecution case is imposed on the accused, rendering the right to disclosure of paramount importance. It is the duty of the Court to keep vigil over this Constitutional and statutory right conferred on an accused by repudiating any procedure which prejudices his defence. Notable advancement has been made by the Apex Court in interpreting section 207 of the Code in conformity with the Constitutional mandate, including the right to disclosure. Strict adherence to the afore-noted principles will go a long way in ensuring real and substantial justice. Any departure will not only lead to judicial anarchy, but also further diminish the already dwindling faith of the public in the justice delivery system.
**
Advocate Manu Sharma has been practising at the bar for over sixteen years. He specialises in Criminal Defence. Some of the high profile cases he has represented are – the 2G scam case for former Union minister A Raja; the Religare/Fortis case for Malvinder Singh; Peter Mukerjee in the P Chidambaram/ INX Media case; Devas Multimedia in ISRO corruption act case; Om Prakash Chautala in PMLA case; Aditya Talwar in the aviation scam case; Dilip Ray, former Coal Minister in one of the coal scam cases; Suhaib Illyasi case.
**
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
[1] Maneka Gandhi and Another v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
[2] S. 3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996
[3] R v. H and R v. C, 2004 (1) ALL ER 1269
[4] R v. Ward (Judith), (1993) 1 WLR 619 : (1993) 2 ALL ER 577 (CA)
[5] R v. Preston, (1994) 2 AC 130 : (1993) 3 WLR 891 : (1993) 4 ALL ER 638 (HL), R v. Stinchcome,
(1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
[6] Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2019 SCC Online SC 1346
[7] Sidhartha Vashishth alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1
[8] R. 16, part II, Ch. VI of the Bar Council of India Rules
[9] Manu Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 1
[10] V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[11] Sasikala, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[12] Sala Gupta and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 262 DLT 661
[13] State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi¸(2005) 1 SCC 568
[14] Dharambir v. Central Bureau of Investigation, ILR (2008) 2 Del 842 : (2008) 148 DLT 289
[15] Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin and Another v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93
[16] Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
[17] Dilwar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135, Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394
[18] Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 12 SCC 529
[19] Kanwar Jagat Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr, (2007) 142 DLT 49
[20] Neelesh, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
Validity & Existence of an Arbitration Clause in an Unstamped Agreement
By Kunal Kumar
January 8, 2024
In a recent ruling, a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in its judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, overruled the constitutional bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. and has settled the issue concerning the validity and existence of an arbitration clause in an unstamped agreement. (‘N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III’)
Background to N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
One of the first instances concerning the issue of the validity of an unstamped agreement arose in the case of SMS Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if an instrument/document lacks proper stamping, the exercising Court must preclude itself from acting upon it, including the arbitration clause. It further emphasized that it is imperative for the Court to impound such documents/instruments and must accordingly adhere to the prescribed procedure outlined in the Indian Stamp Act 1899.
With the introduction of the 2015 Amendment, Section 11(6A) was inserted in the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 (A&C Act) which stated whilst appointing an arbitrator under the A&C Act, the Court must confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
In the case of M/s Duro Felguera S.A. v. M/s Gangavaram Port Limited, the Supreme Court of India made a noteworthy observation, affirming that the legislative intent behind the 2015 Amendment to the A&C Act was necessitated to minimise the Court's involvement during the stage of appointing an arbitrator and that the purpose embodied in Section 11(6A) of A&C Act, deserves due acknowledgement & respect.
In the case of Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Cosatal Marine Constructions & Engineering Ltd., a divisional bench of the Apex Court reaffirmed its previous decision held in SMS Tea Estates (supra) and concluded that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract assumes significance, emphasizing that the agreement transforms into a contract only when it holds legal enforceability. The Apex Court observed that an agreement fails to attain the status of a contract and would not be legally enforceable unless it bears the requisite stamp as mandated under the Indian Stamp Act 1899. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Section 11(6A) read in conjunction with Section 7(2) of the A&C Act and Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, clarified that the existence of an arbitration clause within an agreement is contingent on its legal enforceability and that the 2015 Amendment of the A&C Act to Section 11(6A) had not altered the principles laid out in SMS Tea Estates (supra).
Brief Factual Matrix – N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.
Indo Unique Flame Ltd. (‘Indo Unique’) was awarded a contract for a coal beneficiation/washing project with Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. (‘KPCL’). In the course of the project, Indo Unique entered into a subcontract in the form of a Work Order with N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. (‘N.N. Global’) for coal transportation, coal handling and loading. Subsequently, certain disputes arose with KPCL, leading to KPCL invoking Bank Guarantees of Indo Unique under the main contract, after which Indo Unique invoked the Bank Guarantee of N. N. Global as supplied under the Work Order.
Top of FormS
Subsequently, N.N. Global initiated legal proceedings against the cashing of the Bank Guarantee in a Commercial Court. In response thereto, Indo Unique moved an application under Section 8 of the A&C Act, requesting that the Parties to the dispute be referred for arbitration. The Commercial Court dismissed the Section 8 application, citing the unstamped status of the Work Order as one of the grounds. Dissatisfied with the Commercial Court's decision on 18 January 2018, Indo Unique filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Bombay seeking that the Order passed by the Commercial Court be quashed or set aside. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court on 30 September 2020 allowed the Writ Petition filed by Indo Unique, aggrieved by which, N.N. Global filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India.
N. N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – I
The issue in the matter of M/s N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unqiue Flame Ltd. & Ors. came up before a three-bench of the Supreme Court of India i.e. in a situation when an underlying contract is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped, as required under the Indian Stamp Act 1899, would that also render the arbitration clause as non-existent and/or unenforceable (‘N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Flame Ltd. – I’).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India whilst emphasizing the 'Doctrine of Separability' of an arbitration agreement held that the non-payment of stamp duty on the commercial contract would not invalidate, vitiate, or render the arbitration clause as unenforceable, because the arbitration agreement is considered an independent contract from the main contract, and the existence and/or validity of an arbitration clause is not conditional on the stamping of a contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that deficiency in stamp duty of a contract is a curable defect and that the deficiency in stamp duty on the work order, would not affect the validity and/or enforceability of the arbitration clause, thus applying the Doctrine of Separability. The arbitration agreement remains valid and enforceable even if the main contract, within which it is embedded, is not admissible in evidence owing to lack of stamping.
The Hon’ble Apex Court, however, considered it appropriate to refer the issue i.e. whether unstamped instrument/document, would also render an arbitration clause as non-existent, unenforceable, to a constitutional bench of five-bench of the Supreme Court.
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II
On 25 April 2023, a five-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. held that (1) An unstamped instrument containing an arbitration agreement cannot be said to be a contract which is enforceable in law within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 and would be void under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, (2) an unstamped instrument which is not a contract nor enforceable cannot be acted upon unless it is duly stamped, and would not otherwise exist in the eyes of the law, (3) the certified copy of the arbitration agreement produced before a Court, must clearly indicate the stamp duty paid on the instrument, (4) the Court exercising its power in appointing an arbitration under Section 11 of the A&C Act, is required to act in terms of Section 33 and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 (N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II).
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 13 December 2023 in its recent judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, (1) Agreements lacking proper stamping or inadequately stamped are deemed inadmissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. However, such agreements are not automatically rendered void or unenforceable ab initio; (2) non-stamping or insufficient stamping of a contract is a curable defect, (2) the issue of stamping is not subject to determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the A&C Act by a Court. The concerned Court is only required to assess the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, separate from concerns related to stamping, and (3) any objections pertaining to the stamping of the agreement would fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, the decision in N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II and SMS Tea (supra) was overruled, by the seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India.
Kunal is a qualified lawyer with more than nine years of experience and has completed his LL.M. in Dispute Resolution (specialisation in International Commercial Arbitration) from Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University, California.
Kunal currently has his own independent practice and specializes in commercial/construction arbitration as well as civil litigation. He has handled several matters relating to Civil Law and arbitrations (both domestic and international) and has appeared before the Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, District Courts of Delhi and various other tribunals.
No Safe Harbour For Google On Trademark Infringement
By Mayank Grover & Pratibha Vyas
October 9, 2023
Innovation, patience, dedication and uniqueness culminate in establishing a distinct identity. A trademark aids in identifying the source and quality, shaping perceptions about the identity's essence. When values accompany a product or service's trademark, safeguarding against misuse and infringement becomes crucial. A recent pronouncement of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated August 10, 2023 in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. and Google India Private Limited v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. directed that Google’s use of trademarks as keywords for its Google Ads Programme does amount to ‘use’ in advertising under the Trademarks Act and the benefit of safe harbour would not be available to Google if such keywords infringe on the concerned trademark.
Factual Background
Google LLC manages and operates the Google Search Engine and Ads Programme, while, Google India Private Limited is a subsidiary of Google that has been appointed as a non-exclusive reseller of the Ads Programme in India. The Respondents, DRS Logistics and Agarwal Packers and Movers Pvt. Ltd. are leading packaging, moving and logistics service providers in India.
On 22.12.2011, DRS filed a suit against Google and Just Dial Ltd. under provisions of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (‘TM Act’) inter alia seeking a permanent injunction against Google from permitting third parties from infringing, passing off etc. the relevant trademarks of DRS. The core of the dispute revolved around Google’s Ads Programme. DRS claimed that its trade name 'AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS' is widely recognized and a 'well-known' trademark. Use of DRS’s trademark as a keyword diverts internet traffic from its website to that of its competitors and they were entitled to seek restraint against Google for permitting third parties who are not authorized to use the said trademark. DRS further argued that Google benefits from these trademark infringements. This practice involved charging a higher amount for displaying these ads, constituting an infringement of their trademarks. Whereas, Google contended that the use of the keyword in the Ads Programme does not amount to ‘use’ under the TM Act notwithstanding that the keyword is/or similar to a trademark. Thus, the use of a term as a keyword cannot be construed as an infringement of a trademark under the TM Act, and being an intermediary, it claimed a safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. (‘IT Act’).
In essence, the dispute between the parties was rooted in DRS’s grievance concerning the Ads Programme. The Learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 30.10.2021interpreted relevant provisions of the TM Act and drew on multiple legal precedents to arrive at the decision that DRS can seek protection of its trademarks which were registered under Section 28 of the TM Act and issued directions to investigate complaints alleging the use of trademark and/or to ascertain whether a sponsored result has an effect of infringing a trademark or passing off.
Being aggrieved, Google LLC and Google Pvt. Ltd. filed appeals before the Division Bench. Google LLC argued that the Single Judge’s findings were erroneous and the directions issued were liable to be set aside. Google India claimed that it doesn’t control and operate the Search Engine and the Ads Programme making it unable to comply with the directions passed in the impugned judgment.
Analysis & Decision of Court
The Division Bench found Single Judge’s rationale for assessing trademark infringement through keywords and meta-tags valid. Meta-tags are a list of words/code in a website, not readily visible to the naked eye. It serves as a tool for indexing the website by a search engine. If a trademark of a third party is used as a meta-tag, the same would serve as identifying the website as relevant to the search query that includes the trademark as a search term. The use of keywords in the Ads Programme also serves similar purpose. The Division Bench was unable to accept that using a trademark as a keyword, even if not visible, would not be considered trademark use under the TM Act.
Google placed heavy reliance on the decisions rendered by Courts across jurisdictions of United Kingdom, United States of America, European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Canada, Spain, Italy, Japan and China; in the cases of Google France SARL and Google Inc. v. Louis Vitton SA & Ors.[1], Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc.[2], and L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG[3] in support of the contention that the use of trade marks is by the advertiser and not by Google. However, the Division Bench rejected Google’s passive role; highlighting its active involvement in recommending and promoting trademark keywords for higher clicks in its Ads Programme. Division Bench referred to a few judicial decisions rendered in the United States of America that captured the essence of the controversy for perspective, concluding that Google actively promotes and encourages trademarks associated with major goods and services, rather than having a passive role.
It was held that the contention that the use of trademarks as keywords, per se constitutes an infringement of the trademark is unmerited; the assumption that an internet user is merely searching the address of the proprietor of the trademark when he feeds in a search query that may contain a trademark, is erroneous.
The Doctrine of 'Initial Interest Confusion' addresses trademark infringement based on pre-purchase confusion. The doctrine is applied when meta-tags, keywords, or domain names cause initial confusion similar to a registered trademark. If users are misled to access unrelated websites, trademark use in internet advertising may be actionable and reliance was placed on US precedents. Referring to Section 29 of the TM Act, it was directed that Section 29 does not specify the duration for which the confusion lasts but, even if the confusion is for a short duration and an internet user is able to recover from the same, the trade mark would be infringed and would offend Section 29(2) of the TM Act.
It was held that the Ads Programme is a platform for displaying advertisements. Google, being an architect and operator of its own programme makes it an active participant in the use of trademarks and determining the advertisements displayed on search pages. Their use of proprietary software makes them utilize trademarks and control the distribution of information related to potentially infringing links, ultimately leading to revenue maximization. Hence, a substantial link exists between Google LLC and Google India, rendering it impossible for Google India to deny its role in operating the Ads Programme. It was further held that Google sells trademarks as keywords to advertisers and encourages users to use trademarks as keywords for ads. It is contradictory for Google to encourage trademark use while claiming data belongs to third parties for exemption. After 2004, Google changed policies to boost revenue and subsequently, introduced a tool that searches effective terms, including trademarks. Google's active involvement in its advertising business and online nature does not necessarily qualify it for benefits under Section 79 of the IT Act. The Division Bench agreed with the view of the Single Judge that Google would not be eligible for protection of safe harbour under Section 79(1) of the IT Act, if its alleged activities infringe trademarks.
Conclusion
This is a seminal decision governing (and rather, restricting) the operations of intermediaries and redefining the jurisprudence of safe harbour under the IT Act. The decision is well-reasoned and establishes a significant precedent for safeguarding trademarks by uniquely holding Google accountable under its Ads Programme. The same will prevent usage of tradenames as a third-party trademark in keyword search or metatags by advertisers on Google’s search engine. While keywords and meta-tags have different levels of visibility, their purpose is similar i.e. advertising and attracting internet traffic. The use of trademarks as meta-tags by a person who is neither a proprietor of the trademark nor permitted to use the same leads to confusion amongst public at large due to the automated processes of search engines and consequently, constitutes trademark infringement.
About the Authors: Mayank Grover is a Partner and Pratibha Vyas is an Associate at Seraphic Advisors, Advocates & Solicitors
[1] C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2010) [2011] All ER (EC) 41
[2] [2014] EWCA Civ 1403
[3] 2C- 324/09 (2010)
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