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In absence of prejudice having been caused to appellant, no fault could be laid at the doors of respondent, says Top Court while affirming order of remand made to CESTAT by Madras HC
Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha & Aravind Kumar [25-04-2024]

Read Order: M/S MADURA COATS PRIVATE LIMITED v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND ANR [DEL HC-CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5347-5348 of 2024]


 

LE Correspondent

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: In a case alleging a fabric company's involvement in clearance of stock without payment of duty, the Supreme Court has confirmed the order of the Madras High Court remanding the matter back to the CESTAT. The Top Court agreed with the High Court's view that the letter, which was claimed by the appellant as not having been furnished, was only a ruse for not replying to the show cause notices.

 

In this case the appellant Company has been engaged in the manufacture of cotton yarn, polyester yarn and other materials. Based on an information received that it had indulged in clearance of certain goods manufactured by it without payment of duty resulted in the preventive unit of the respondent visiting the unit and conducting a stock challenge of the finished fabrics stocked in the bonded warehouse. 

 

Based on a prima facie and reasonable belief that excess quantities of stock were stored for illicit removal, the department seized the excess stock under mahazar and it was provisionally released on execution of general bond. It also resulted in the issuance of two show cause notices (SCNs) which resulted in two orders being passed by the respondent. Being aggrieved by the same, appeals came to be filed before CESTAT whereunder the tribunal set aside the orders in original with a direction to the respondent to provide a copy of the letter referred to in the SCNs to the appellant and to decide the matter afresh.

 

In the teeth of direction issued by the tribunal, first respondent adjudicated the show cause notices afresh and by separate orders raised the demand for payment of duty which resulted in both the orders being challenged by filing two appeals before CESTAT. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and directed the respondent to pass fresh orders. The respondent filed an application under section 35C (2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for rectification of the order contending that the letter which was ordered to be furnished by the department was not available and sought permission to adjudicate the SCNs afresh. The said application came to be dismissed.

 

The respondent herein filed two miscellaneous petitions before CESTAT for modification of the earlier orders resulting in modification of the order dated 05.05.2009 whereby the respondent was directed to adjudicate the show cause notices without relying upon the letter. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed two appeals before the Madras High Court whereby the matter was remanded back. Hence, appeals were filed before the Top Court.

 

It was the case of the appellant that the High Court erred in not appreciating the fact that in the absence of document containing detailed explanation the adjudicating authority cannot appreciate and adjudicate the SCNs and the order of remand to the tribunal was erroneous.

 

The respondent contended that the appellant had been successfully dodging the adjudication process on one pretext or the other and the so-called letter dated 20.01.2001 which had been directed by the CESTAT by Order dated 06.09.2006 to be furnished to the appellant was the letter of the appellant itself, which undisputedly was an explanation offered by the appellant with reference to alleged shortfall and excess storage of fabrics.

 

The Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Aravind Kumar was of the opinion that the High Court had rightly opined that the said letter which was claimed by the appellant as not having been furnished was only a ruse for not replying to the show cause notices and it would in no way prejudice the appellants claim, particularly in the background of reliance not having been placed by the respondent- authority for adjudicating the SCNs.

 

It was observed that in the absence of prejudice having been caused to the appellant no fault could be laid at the doors of the respondent. 

 

The Bench further observed that the High Court had also rightly not remitted the matter to the adjudicating authority for considering the matter afresh. 

 

Though the Court agreed with the contention that order of review or modification which came to be passed on 08.03.2010 was without sanctity of law deserved to be accepted, yet for the reason that matter had been remanded back to the tribunal for adjudicating the SCNs afresh, it dissuaded the Court from setting aside the impugned order.

 

The Top Court reserved the liberty to the appellant to urge all contentions before the tribunal including the one urged before this Court namely to demonstrate as to how prejudice had been caused to the appellant by non- furnishing of the said letter dated 20.01.2001 (with enclosures). The order of remand made to the tribunal by the High Court under the impugned order also stood affirmed. 

‘EVMs are simple, secure and user-friendly’: Apex Court dismisses demand for 100% VVPAT slips verification; issues directives for sealing symbol loading units & verification of micro controllers
Justices Dipankar Datta & Sanjiv Khanna [26-04-2024]

Read Order: ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS v. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [SC- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 434 OF 2023]


 

Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: The Supreme Court has rejected the pleas to revert to paper ballot voting system and initiate 100% verification of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) against the EVM outcomes. The Top Court has also directed that on completion of the symbol loading process in the VVPATs undertaken on or after May 1, 2024, the symbol loading units shall be sealed and secured in a container. The Top Court has also directed that the burnt memory/microcontroller be verified post the announcement of the results.

 

The Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sanjiv Khanna penned down separate but concurring judgments. 

 

Due to the possibility of manipulating the EVMs, the petitioners approached the Top Court to instil confidence in the voters. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner – Association for 

Democratic Reforms, that the Court should direct return to the paper ballot system or the printed slip from the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail machine be given to the voter to verify, and put in the ballot box, for counting. It was also urged before the Court that direction be issued mandating that there should be 100% counting of the VVPAT slips in addition to electronic counting by the control unit.

 

Justice Khanna noted that time and again use of EVMs has been objected to and questioned, not by one but by all political parties and others. There have been several litigations in this Court and the High Courts, albeit the challenge to the use of EVMs has been rejected recording good grounds and reasons.

 

Penning down the many advantages of the EVM-VVPAT mechanism, he said, “Thus, it is clear that till the symbol loading into the VVPAT is done by using the symbol loading unit, the EVM is blank and has no data/particulars of political parties or candidates. One cannot ascertain and know which button/key in the ballot unit will be allocated to a particular candidate or a political party.”

 

The Bench did point out that in the 2019 Lok Sabha Elections, 20,687 VVPAT slips were physically counted, and except in one case, no discrepancy or mismatch was noticed. On verification, it was found that the discrepancy had arisen on account of failure of the presiding officer to delete the mock poll data. “While it is not possible to rule out human errors, paragraph 14.5 of Chapter 14 of the Manual on EVM and VVPATs deals with such situations and lays down the protocol which is to be followed”, it added.

 

It was also highlighted that the EVMs have been subjected to test by technical experts committee from time to time. These committees have approved and did not find any fault with the EVMs. The ‘M3’ EVMs currently in use are designed by engineers of BHEL and ECIL. These designs are vetted by the technical experts committee.

 

Further, acknowledging the right of voters to question the working of EVMs, which are but an electronic device that has a direct impact on election results, Justice Khanna stated that it is also necessary to exercise care and caution when aspersions are raised on the integrity of the electoral process. 

 

“While we acknowledge the fundamental right of voters to ensure their vote is accurately recorded and counted, the same cannot be equated with the right to 100% counting of VVPAT slips, or a right to physical access to the VVPAT slips, which the voter should be permitted to put in the drop box”, he said.

 

As per the Top Court, giving physical access to VVPAT slips to voters is problematic and impractical. It will lead to misuse, malpractices and disputes. The Court was also not inclined to modify the directions to increase the number of VVPAT undergoing slip count as it would increase the time for counting and delay declaration of results. The manpower required would have to be doubled. The data and the results do not indicate 

any need to increase the number of VVPAT units subjected to manual counting.

 

Furthermore, EVMs reduce paper usage and alleviate logistical challenges. They also provide administrative convenience by 

expediting the counting process and minimizing errors.

 

In view of the fact that Rule 49MA of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, permits the elector to raise a complaint if she/he is of the view that the VVPAT paper slip did not depict the correct candidate/political party she/he voted, the Court rejected the argument that any elector should be liberally permitted as a routine to ask for verification of vote. 

 

Thus, to only further strengthen the integrity of the election process, the Bench issued the following directions:

  • On completion of the symbol loading process in the VVPATs undertaken on or after 01.05.2024, the symbol loading units shall be sealed and secured in a container. The candidates or their representatives shall sign the seal. The sealed containers, containing the symbol loading units, shall be kept in the strong room along with the EVMs at least for a period of 45 days post the declaration of results. They shall be opened, examined and dealt with as in the case of EVMs.
  • The burnt memory/microcontroller in 5% of the EVMs, that is, the control unit, ballot unit and the VVPAT, per assembly constituency/assembly segment of a parliamentary constituency shall be checked and verified by the team of engineers from the manufacturers of the EVMs, post the announcement of the results, for any tampering or modification, on a written request made by candidates who are at SI.No.2 or Sl.No.3, behind the highest polled candidate. Such candidates or their representatives shall identify the EVMs by the polling station or serial number. All the candidates and their representatives shall have an option to remain present at the time of verification. Such a request should be made within a period of 7 days from the date of declaration of the result. The District Election Officer, in consultation with the team of engineers, shall certify the authenticity/intactness of the burnt memory/ microcontroller after the verification process is conducted. The actual cost or expenses for the said verification will be notified by the ECI, and the candidate making the said request will pay for such expenses. The expenses will be refunded, in case the EVM is found to be tampered.

 

In his concurring opinion, Justice Datta mentioned that the petitioners’ apprehensions were misplaced as reverting to the paper ballot system, rejecting the inevitable march of technological advancement, and burdening the ECI with the onerous task of 100% VVPAT slips tallying would be a folly when the challenges faced in conducting the elections are of such gargantuan scale.

 

He also emphasized on the fact that the mere suspicion that there may be a mismatch in votes cast through EVMs, thereby giving rise to a demand for a 100% VVPAT slips verification, is not a sufficient ground for the present set of writ petitions to be considered maintainable.

 

“I also wish to observe that while maintaining a balanced perspective is crucial in evaluating systems or institutions, blindly distrusting any aspect of the system can breed unwarranted scepticism and impede progress”, Justice Datta asserted while further adding,“ I conclude with the hope and trust that the system in vogue shall not fail the electorate and the mandate of the voting public shall be truly reflected in the votes cast and counted.”

Incident occurred without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel: Top Court reduces murder convict's life sentence to 8 years rigorous imprisonment
Justices B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar & Sandeep Mehta [25-04-2024]

Read Order: MOHD. AHSAN v. STATE OF HARYANA [SC- CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2265 OF 2024]

 

LE Correspondent

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: The Supreme Court has altered the conviction of the accused-Appellant under Section 302 of the IPC to one under Part I of Section 304 after noting that the incident leading to the death of a man occurred without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel.

 

The facts of the case were that on August 18, 2005, the SHO of Jagadhri Police Station City, namely, Jai Singh (PW-13), received telephonic information about the death of one Vikrant @ Chintu (deceased) who had been admitted in Civil Hospital in an injured state. The medico-legal report of the deceased was obtained from the hospital and the statement of the de-facto complainant (PW-10) was recorded. FIR was registered under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the present Appellant. Subsequently, the post mortem of the deceased was conducted wherein it was concluded that the cause of death was shock due to massive haemorrhage which was sufficient to cause death under normal circumstances.

 

The prosecution case was that on August 17, 2005 the de-facto complainant (PW-10) had been taking food at a Dhaba in the company of PW- 12 when another group of four men including PW11 and the deceased arrived at the same place. To attract the attention of the waiter, the deceased called the waiter by use of the word hello and this gesture irked another customer i.e. the present Appellant who was seated in a corner of the Dhaba, smoking a cigarette. The Appellant initially abused the deceased and a quarrel took place. The Appellant rushed to his car and pulled out a glass bottle which he broke on the bonnet of his car and thereafter proceeded to inflict five injuries on the body of the deceased, due to which the deceased fell to the ground bleeding, after which the Appellant fled from the scene. 

 

Subsequently, PW-11 and the others rushed the deceased to the hospital where he eventually succumbed to his injuries. The appeal before the Top Court was filed by the appellant accused challenging the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the Criminal Appeal preferred by the Appellant and upholding the order of conviction and sentence as recorded by the Sessions Judge.

 

It was the appellant's case that even if the prosecution case was taken at its face value, it would reveal that the incident occurred out of a sudden fight and thus, the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC would not be tenable and the offence would be required to be brought under Part I or Part II of Section 304 of the IPC.

 

After extensively going through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the 3-Judge Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Aravind Kumar & Justice Sandeep Mehta opined that there was no premeditation. The incident occurred since the appellant believed that the utterances by deceased Vikrant @ Chintu were aimed at him and, therefore, he retaliated by abusing the deceased. This was followed by a heated exchange between them. They grappled out of the building of the Dhaba. Though the witnesses were successful in separating them, the accused-Appellant rushed to his car, pulled out a bottle from the drivers seat side, broke it on the bumper of the car and attacked the deceased.

 

“It is thus clear that the incident occurred without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel. The evidence would also not show that the accused-Appellant had either taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. We therefore find that the present case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC”, the Bench said.

 

Thus, partly allowing the appeal, the Bench altered the conviction of the accused-Appellant under Section 302 of the IPC to one under Part I of Section 304 of the IPC. The Top Court also sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period 8 years and a fine of Rs 5,000.

Delhi HC quashes FIR registered u/s 409 IPC against police constable who lost pistol along with 5 live cartridges issued to him after finding no dishonest intention on his part
Justice Navin Chawla [22-04-2024]

Read Order: RAJAT KUMAR v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) [DEL HC- CRL.M.C. 4608/2022]

 

LE Correspondent

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: The Delhi High Court has quashed an FIR registered against a police constable with the observation that dishonest intention or wilful conduct on part of the accused is a prerequisite to make out a charge of criminal breach of trust against a public servant under Section 409 read with Section 405 IPC.

 

The Single-Judge Bench of Justice Navin Chawla was considering a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of FIR registered under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and criminal proceedings emanating therefrom.

 

It was the case of the prosecution that on the night of 15.03.2014, a 9mm Pistol with 5 live cartridges, was issued to the petitioner, who is working as a constable with the Delhi Police. Later, he was contacted many times to deposit the weapon and ammunition in the Maalkhana but he failed to do so nor was he able to give a satisfactory reply in this regard. It was further stated that he tried to linger the matter by stating that he would be depositing the same after some time. Efforts for search of the weapon and cartridges were also made, however, it proved futile and no clue regarding the same came to light. As the petitioner failed to deposit the weapon and the cartridges, the present FIR was registered against him.

 

The petitioner, apart from being made an accused in the subject FIR and the consequent trial, also faced a Departmental Inquiry, which resulted in an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Authority had ordered that two years approved service of the Constable be forfeited permanently entailing proportionate reduction in his pay with immediate effect. His suspension period from 21.03.2014 to 06.04.2015 was also decided as period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes.

 

Highlighting the interplay between the adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution, the Bench referred to the judgements in Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal,[LQ/SC/2011/280] and Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. The Deputy Superintendant of Police, EOW, CBI & Anr., [LQ/SC/2020/653].

 

“.... it is apparent that while there can be no dispute with the proposition that mere exoneration or finding to that effect of the Disciplinary Authority may not have a binding effect on the criminal prosecution, at the same time, in the peculiar facts of the present case, it is noticed that both the proceedings, that is, the criminal proceedings as also that of the Disciplinary Authority are premised on the loss of the weapon and the cartridges by the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority, on appreciation of evidence, found that the same was accidental and there was no ill/mala fide intention on the part of the petitioner in the loss of the same”, the Bench said.

 

The High Court also clarified, “Dishonest intention or wilful conduct on part of the accused is, therefore, a prerequisite to make out a charge of criminal breach of trust against a public servant under Section 409 read with Section 405 IPC.”

 

Noting that the Disciplinary Authority had found that there was no dishonest intention on part of the petitioner and he was at best negligent or careless in the loss of the weapon and the cartridges, the Bench held, “In my view, therefore, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would be against the interest of justice and should be liable to be quashed.”

 

 

Placing reliance upon State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.,  the High Court exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR and all the proceedings emanating therefrom.

Supporter of ISIS ideology; arranged illegal weapons: Delhi High Court dismisses appeal of UAPA accused challenging order rejecting his bail plea
Justices Suresh Kumar Kait & Manoj Jain [24-04-2024]

Read Order: JAMSHEED ZAHOOR PAUL v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI [DEL HC- CRL.A. 51/2024]

 

Tulip Kanth 

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: While observing that the appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which was sufficient to give insight into his culpable mind, the Delhi High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by a man booked under provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) challenging the rejection of his bail plea.

 

The incident is of the year 2018 when the Special Cell (New Delhi Range) received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir. The information that they would come to Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort) on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir and if raided, they could be caught with illegal weapons, was found to be correct.

 

The raiding team found the aforesaid named suspects moving towards Lal Qila. They were immediately overpowered. Their names and addresses were ascertained and their search was conducted. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized.

 

Both the accused disclosed that they had procured the recovered weapons, in lieu of money from four persons from UP. When the  police tracked them down, they were found to be juveniles in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, a separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB).During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating the ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Said militant had already been arrested by NIA. FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 of Arms Act as well as Sections 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).

 

The accused approached the Delhi High Court by filing an appeal under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA) praying therein that impugned order whereby his bail plea had been rejected, be set aside and consequently, he may be released on regular bail.

 

The Division Bench of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Manoj Jain firstly explained that Section 18 & 20 UAPA fall under Chapter IV of UAPA which deals with punishment for terrorist activities. The Bench also said, “Though in adversarial system, there is presumption of innocence in favour of accused and, therefore, bail is generally a rule, UAPA contains modified application of certain provisions of Criminal Code of Procedure and thus commands that no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI shall, if in custody, be released on bail if there are reasonable grounds of believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”

 

The High Court was of the view that once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. “Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive”, it added.

 

Noting that the factual situation was not a case of chance recovery, the Bench opined that after the appellant was apprehended, a pistol of 7.65 caliber with five live cartridges loaded in its magazine was recovered from him. When his personal search was conducted, he was found in possession of two mobile phones. 

 

As per respondent, appellant admitted that he was in contact with ISIS- JK Umar Iban Nazir (no more alive now) and Adil Thokar (absconding and untraceable) over Black Berry Messenger (BBM), a safe chat application and at their directions, he along with his co-accused had collected weapons from UP for their outfit. He also admitted that he had met Abdullah Basith (cadre of ISIS-JK) at Jama Masjid in Delhi in connection with supply of arms and ammunition for Tanjeem. He revealed that he was following cadres of ISIS (JK Module) through social media, BBM and Facebook and that his BBM account was with the name of PEHRAAN CHUN. Forensic analysis had also verified the same.

 

The involvement of co-accused was held to be much deeper as BBM Chat retrieved from his mobile contained discussion about Army movement in Kashmir. Both the accused had procured weapons from UP. They both had come to Delhi together and were planning to go to Kashmir together. “Therefore, at this initial juncture, it cannot be said that there was no agreement or tacit understanding or meeting of minds between them. They seemed to know each other very well and despite being fully conversant about their respective antecedents, they chose to stick together”, the Bench said.

 

The appellant was in touch with militants as well and he met one of them in Delhi. As per prosecution, weapons were being arranged for perpetuating terror and, therefore it was opined that there was material to show that there was a prima facie true case against the appellant.

 

The Bench asserted, “Thus, appellant, being supporter of ideology of ISIS, arranged illegal weapons and was involved in providing other logistic support to its cadres. It is also quite obvious that appellant had not only personally met Abdullah Basith but was communicating with Umar Iban Nazir and Adil Thokar. Merely because some of the incriminating BBM chats were found on the mobile of his co-accused would not mean that at this point of time, the said fact cannot be taken as a circumstance against the appellant…Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of co-conspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy.”

 

Noticing that there were clear-cut allegations indicating that accusation against the appellant was prima facie true, the Bench said, “The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind.” Reliance was also placed upon Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam [LQ/SC/2023/329] wherein it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act.

 

It was further stated by the Bench that in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there was nothing which might indicate that prosecution was acting in a manner which was detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was held at this juncture, merely because of the incarceration period of more than 5 years, the accused would not become entitled to bail.

 

Thus, noting that the High was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates, the Bench dismissed the appeal.

 

Custodial interrogation may prove more useful to unearth entire gamut of conspiracy: Delhi High Court cancels anticipatory bail granted to wife of AAP volunteer Late Ashok Mann in Kishangarh shooting case
Justice Navin Chawla [23-04-2024]

Read Order: SOMRAJ @ DHAMI v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR [DEL HC- CRL.M.C. 2180/2022]

 

Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: In a recent development in the Kishangarh shooting case where there was a daylight attack on the petitioner Somaraj @ Dhami, who is accused of having killed AAP volunteer Late Ashok Mann, the Delhi High Court has cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to Mann’s wife.

 

The Single-Judge Bench of Justice Navin Chawla was considering a petition filed under Section 439(2) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the respondent no.2.

 

It was the case of the Prosecution that on 18.10.2021, the petitioner  was travelling in his Fortuner car, being driven by his driver while returning from the court to his house. At about 12.40 PM, when he reached near Kishangarh, 4-5 assailants fired on him. One of the shots struck his driver, who was then rushed to the Fortis Hospital. He raised a suspicion of the said attack on Sanjay Mehlawat and Harender Mann, as he suspected that they had attacked him to take revenge as he was accused of having killed Ashok Maan, uncle of Harender Maan, in February, 2020 and was facing trial for the same along with his brothers Davender @ Dev and Dharmbir @ Kalu.

 

It was the case of the prosecution that four of the accused were arrested in connection with the FIR registered under Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959, and two pistols and one Desi Katta along with 50 live cartridges were recovered from them. They disclosed their involvement in the present case. Further co-accused were also arrested in the said case.

 

The prosecution further alleged that the respondent no.2, wife of Late Ashok Maan, wanted to take revenge for the murder of her husband, and was involved in the conspiracy for the attack in question since the beginning. She had met the accused persons in her house and provided them rooms and shelter before the incident. The Status Report filed by the Station House Officer (SHO),complains that after being granted anticipatory bail, the respondent no.2 was not cooperating in the investigation.

 

The Bench noticed that there was a daylight attack on the Complainant/Petitioner by the assailants by firing gunshots in which one person was injured. The police/prosecution needed the licensed weapon to determine if it was used in the attack.

 

Respondent no.2 had not denied the fact that her husband did hold a licenced pistol. She alleged that she did not know the whereabouts of that licenced weapon and also admitted that no complaint of the weapon being missing had been lodged so far in spite of the police repeatedly seeking the recovery of the said weapon.

 

The Bench was of the view that the respondent no.2 was in clear breach of the condition that she would cooperate with the police officials.

 

The High Court asserted, “What the police needs from the respondent no.2 is not her confessional statement, but recovery of the weapon for which the respondent no.2’s husband was holding a licence. It cannot be said to be an attempt to obtain a confessional statement or self-incriminating statement. It is also settled law that custodial interrogation may sometimes prove more useful to unearth the entire gamut of conspiracy.”

 

Accordingly, the Bench cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondent no.2. However, on the request of the respondent’s Counsel, the Bench ordered no coercive steps to be taken against respondent no.2 for a period of two weeks.

No one can take advantage of his own wrongful conduct: Delhi HC dismisses petition seeking quashing of detention order filed by deceased detenu's wife in COFEPOSA case involving smuggling of diesel oil
Justices Suresh Kumar Kait & Manoj Jain [23-04-2024]

Read Order: FAZILA SAYYED v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [DELHI HC- W.P.(CRL) 889/2023]

 

LE Correspondent

 

New Delhi, April 26, 2024: The Delhi High Court has dismissed a petition seeking quashing of a detention order passed under COFEPOSA Act filed by the deceased detenu's wife. The High Court observed that there was no material to portray that the time lapse, between the detention order and its execution, would lead to the inference that the live-link between the prejudicial activity of the detenu and the object of detention stood snapped.

 

The incident is of the year 2004 when the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had information that one sea-faring vessel would be entering into Indian customs waters carrying approximately 700 metric tonnes of smuggled diesel oil of foreign origin, which would be offloaded in several barges and then would be carried to the coast. Pursuant thereto, the DRI officials spotted a vessel by the name of M.T. AL SHAHABA which was found carrying High Speed Diesel (HSD)/Marine Gas Oil being brought from Muscat, Sultanate of Oman into Indian waters, illegally. Sayyed Hussain Madar @ Chand (Detenu) was also found present on said vessel. It was learnt that he was the one who had also arranged for the barges and tow boats for the purposes of smuggling of said oil. Thus, it came to fore that a huge quantity of the diesel oil was being smuggled with no import documents.

 

The quantity of diesel totalling 770.00 C.MTR weighing 635.556 metric tonnes, valued at more than Rs. 2.30 crores, was seized on 21.12.2004 under the provision of Customs Act 1962.

 

Statement of detenu was also recorded under Section 108. All the crew members of the barges and two tow boats and officers/crew members of said Vessel AI Shahaba, in their voluntary statements also confirmed the activity of unloading the diesel oil from the mother vessel AI Shahaba into the barges. In connection with the aforesaid seizure, residential premises of one Bobby Chully as well as of detenu were raided. On the basis of said seizure and the material collected during the investigation, it came to fore that the detenu was involved in activities which amounted to smuggling as defined under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962. Detenu was arrested under Section 104.A Detention order under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (COFEPOSA) was passed against him. Detenu, unfortunately, expired on 16.09.2010 i.e. during the pendency of his writ petition.

 

The Division Bench of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Manoj Jain was considering a writ petition filed by the detenue's widow praying that such detention order be quashed.

 

After going through the facts of the case, the Bench noted that despite repeated attempts made by the concerned agencies and despite publication, detenu did not come forward. The Central Government prepared a report under Section 7(1)(a) of COFEPOSA which was placed before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai with request that Court may initiate further proceedings against him under Section 82 to 85 Cr.P.C.

 

One more factor which persuaded the Bench to hold that the detenu was in the thick of the things was that the sponsoring authority and executing authority made constant efforts to serve and execute the detention order but detenu, very conveniently, avoided the same. “We rather feel that detenu has acted smart and is trying to reap fruits of his own wrongs. If delay is attributed on account of the conduct of the detenu, concerned authorities cannot be blamed at all”, it said.

 

Moreover, there was nothing on record which might have indicated that activity of the detenu did not fall under 3(1)(i) of COFEPOSA. As per the investigation conducted by DRI, detenu was found to be the person who was directly involved in the smuggling and for organizing the finances as well as logistic and, therefore, detention order passed under Section 3(1)(i) of COFEPOSA was fully justified. 

 

“We may also reiterate that detenu, when he was alive, could have easily prayed this Court for disposal of his writ petition on merit but he himself submitted that it be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to raise all the issues in case of initiation of any proceedings under SAFEMA. Petitioner is not justified in asserting that the earlier writ petition was withdrawn on 16.08.2007, with liberty as sought for, as it could not reach for final hearing”, the Bench added.

 

The orders available on website rather indicated that at one earlier point of time the final arguments were heard on merits and the matter was even reserved for judgment. There was also nothing on record to infer that the detenu had withdrawn the petition as it could not reach final hearing. On the contrary, he himself had sought withdrawal.

 

“Indubitably, no one can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongful conduct”, the Bench said.

 

Furthermore, on account of issuance of notice dated 01.01.2009, detenu was compelled to file Criminal Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court which was disposed of as the counsel for respondents had submitted that petitioner had merely been called upon to furnish certain information and no proceedings had been initiated under Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976.

 

After the demise of detenu, fresh summons and Notice in connection with proceedings under SAFEMA had been issued to his legal heirs where detenu has been referred as affected person no. 1 (AP-1) and his wife as affected person no. 2 (AP-2) and according to such notice, there are two immovable properties in possession of AP-2. His wife has, merely, been called upon to indicate the source of income or the means through which said two properties had been acquired. “In case, affected person is in a position to satisfactorily explain about the manner in which the properties were acquired, naturally, there might not be any adverse action of any kind under SAFEMA. Thus, the petitioner can always respond to such notice appropriately”, it said.

 

There was there was no material which would portray that the time lapse, between detention order and its execution, was as such as would lead to the inference that the live-link between the prejudicial activity of the detenu and the object of detention, namely, to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activity, stood snapped.

 

“Before parting, we may sate that SAFEMA was enacted to provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto…The petitioner herein is always at liberty to agitate all contentions in such proceedings under SAFEMA and she would also be at liberty to agitate about the delay in initiation of such proceedings. We, however, wish to clarify that it may not be understood as if we have expressed any opinion, either way, on said aspect”, the Bench held while dismissing the petition.

Appellant had no motive to hurt the deceased: Top Court alters conviction of man accused of killing his second wife, directs his release in view of 17-year-long incarceration
Justices B.R. Gavai & Sandeep Mehta [22-04-2024]

Read Order: KARIMAN v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH [SC- CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 2193 OF 2024]

 

 Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 25, 2024: While observing that the appellant accused of killing his second wife had no motive to hurt her, the Supreme Court has modified his conviction from section 302 IPC to that under Part II of Sec.304. 

The Division Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta also expressed appreciation for able assistance provided by Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria, acting as a free legal aid counsel on behalf of the appellant.

The Top Court took note of the fact that the special leave petition filed on behalf of the accused petitioner was delayed by 2461 days. 

It was brought to the Court’s attention that the accused petitioner was prevented from filing the special leave petition in time because he was not aware regarding the legal procedure/ While being incarcerated in jail, the petitioner came to know about legal aid being provided by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and accordingly, a request was made on behalf of the petitioner to the Committee. In view of such facts, the Top Court condoned the delay.

The facts of this case were that the deceased Dasmet Bai was living with the appellant as his second wife. It was alleged that on September 11, 1999, the appellant assaulted Dasmet Bai by fists and stones and thereby caused her death. Budhram(PW-2), the uncle of the deceased Dasmet Bai lodged a report of the incident at the Kusmi Police Station on the very same day on the basis of which an FIR came to be registered against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The usual process of investigation was started. 

Charge sheet was filed against the appellant after conclusion of investigation and the case upon committal was sent to the Court of Third Additional Sessions Judge on transfer. The accused was charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 

Before the Top Court, the accused appellant challenged the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court whereby the order convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing him to imprisonment for life, was affirmed.

It was the appellant’s case that the Medical Jurist did not state in his evidence that the injury caused to Dasmet Bai(deceased) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was further urged that it was a case of a single injury being inflicted by the accused to the deceased during the course of a sudden quarrel without acting in a cruel manner and thus the charge, if any, against the accused couldn’t travel beyond Section 304 Part II of IPC.

It was also submitted that the appellant had already remained in custody for a period of almost 17 years and hence, while toning down the offence, suitable reduction in the sentence might be directed.

On the contrary, the State Counsel submitted that both knowledge as well as intention to cause death of the victim could be attributed to the accused-appellant.

The Bench opined that Budhram(PW-2), uncle of the deceased, did not utter a single word in his evidence that his niece who was living with the appellant was ever treated with cruelty by the accused. It was admitted by the witness in cross examination that both the accused as well as Dasmet Bai(deceased) used to consume liquor. It was thus apparent that the appellant had no motive to hurt the deceased and some sudden quarrel had flared up between the accused and Dasmet Bai(deceased) which led to the incident.

 

It was stated in the evidence of the eyewitnesses(PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6) that when the accused was chasing Dasmet Bai(deceased), he was unarmed. It was only after Dasmet Bai(deceased) had fallen down, that the accused picked up a stone lying nearby and gave a blow thereof to the deceased.  PW-6 also admitted in her cross examination that Dasmet Bai(deceased) fell on the road with boulders and sustained injuries due to the fall on the ground.

As per the Medical Jurist, the cause of death was opined as shock due to internal bleeding. The Jurist did not express the opinion that the single injury caused to the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.“Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can be it accepted that the accused had the intention to cause injury/injuries to the victim with the intention or knowledge that the same would result into her death”, the Bench said while adding that the act of the accused was not covered by any of the four clauses contained in Section 300 IPC.

It was observed that the act of the accused was covered under Part II of Section 304 IPC as the accused could at best be attributed with the knowledge that the injury of the nature which he inflicted upon Dasmet Bai(deceased) was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

Thus, altering the conviction of appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that under Part II of Section 304 IPC, the Bench ordered that the appellant would undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part II of IPC. However, considering the fact that the appellant had already undergone sentence for about 17 years, the Bench ordered that the appellant, who was in custody, be released forthwith, if his detention was not required in any other case.

‘Divorce, majorly, in Indian society is still considered a stigma’: Apex Court provides relief to 50-yr-old woman in case of matrimonial dispute, asks husband to pay Rs 25 lakh
Justices Sanjiv Khanna & Dipankar Datta [24-04-2024]

Read Order: MAYA GOPINATHAN v. ANOOP S.B. & ANR [SC- CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5296 OF 2024]

 

Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 25, 2024: In the absence of any binding precedent regarding the aspect that for claim of return of stridhan articles or money equivalent thereof to succeed, the wife has to prove the manner of such acquisition, the Supreme Court has awarded Rs 25 lakh as financial re-compensation to a 50-year-old woman in a case of matrimonial dispute which was initiated in the year 2009.

 

The factual background of this case was such that the marriage of the appellant and the first respondent was solemnized according to Hindu customs in the year 2003. For both of them, it was their second marriage. While the appellant was a widow, the first respondent was a divorcee. According to the appellant, 89 sovereigns of gold were gifted to her by her family at the time of marriage. Additionally, after the wedding, the appellant’s father (P.W.2) made to the first respondent a sum of Rs 2 lakh through a demand draft. According to the appellant, on the first night of marriage, the first respondent took custody of all her jewellery and entrusted the same to the second respondent under the garb of safekeeping. It was also the case of the appellant that all such jewellery stood misappropriated by the respondents to discharge their pre-existing financial liabilities.

 

In course of time, owing to inter-se disputes and differences, the spouses drifted apart. In 2009, the appellant filed an original petition before the Family Court for the recovery of the value of jewellery, and the amount of Rs 2 lakh which was paid by P.W.2 to the first respondent. The appellant also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The respondents filed a counterclaim for Rs. 70,000 as the value of a gold ring and gold chain which the first respondent customarily gifted to the appellant during the wedding ceremony.

 

The Family Court while allowing the appellant to recover Rs 8,90,000 as the value of 89 sovereigns of gold from the respondents, also directed the first respondent to recompense to the appellant Rs 2 lakh with 6% interest per annum from the date of institution of the proceedings till realization within 3 months. The marriage between the parties was also dissolved and the counterclaim of the respondents as well.

 

When the matter reached the High court, while partly setting aside the relief granted by the Family Court, the High Court held that the appellant had not been able to establish misappropriation of gold jewellery by the respondents. However, the direction whereby the first respondent was asked to return Rs 2 lakh to the Appellant was upheld. The appellant had taken exception to this judgment in the present appeal before the Top Court. 

 

At the outset, the Division Bench of Justice Sanjiv Khanna & Justice Dipankar Datta opined, “Having taken a close look at the materials on record and the conclusions drawn by the High Court on the basis thereof, we have little doubt in our mind that the impugned judgment is legally unsustainable.”

 

It was further explained by the Bench that in civil cases including matrimonial disputes of a civil nature, the standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt ‘but’ the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. It was noticed that the appellant did not lodge any complaint of criminal breach of trust but by initiating civil proceedings, sought return of money equivalent to her stridhan property which stood lost forever.

 

As per the Bench, the High Court had attributed lack of bona fide on the part of the appellant solely on account of the petition being filed in 2009 although cohabitation of the spouses had ended in 2006 itself. In concluding so, the High Court erred to take into consideration the explanation proffered by the appellant and P.W.2 that substantial amount of time after separation was spent to attempt reconciliation and it was with the fervent hopes of such attempts at reconciliation succeeding that legal proceedings were not initiated. 

 

“Matters of matrimony can rarely be said to be simple or straightforward; hence, human reaction as per a mechanical timeline before the sacred bond of marriage is severed is not what one would expect. Divorce, majorly, in Indian society is still considered a stigma, and any delay in commencement of legal proceedings is quite understandable because of the attempts made to have the disputes and differences resolved; more so, in a case of the present nature, when the appellant was faced with the imminent prospect of termination of her second marriage”, it added.

 

The Top Court stated, “…we have neither been shown nor do we know of any binding precedent that for a claim of return of stridhan articles or money equivalent thereof to succeed, the wife has to prove the mode and manner of such acquisition.”

Undisputedly, the appellant had brought to the matrimonial home sufficient quantum of jewellery, which she wore during the marriage and as the same was evidenced from photographs. Therefore, the High Court committed serious error in first doubting and then disbelieving the appellant’s version on the specious ground that documents proving acquisition thereof by P.W.2 had not been produced.

 

It was also observed that the avarice of the first respondent was evidenced by the acceptance of Rs 2 lakh, which would not have occasioned unless a demand were made to the appellant’s family. Acceptance of the said amount more than a year after the marriage, which was admitted by the first respondent, spoke volumes about his conduct.

 

On the issue of demand of the return of the ring and the gold chain, the Bench observed that it was rightly held by the Family Court that the first respondent could lay no claim over the same, since there was nothing to suggest that the jewellery was a gift merely temporary in nature, with its return being expected in future. The first respondent’s rapacious conduct, as glaringly evidenced in the counterclaim filed by him, afforded sufficient ground for the Family Court to draw adverse inference against him and the High Court patently fell in error in interfering with a well-written reasoned decision of the Family Court.

 

Considering that the appellants had established a stronger and more acceptable case, the Bench allowed the appeal. In view of the passage of time, the escalation in cost of living, and in the interest of equity and justice, the Top Court exercised its power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution and asked the first respondent to pay Rs 25 lakh to the appellant within six months.

 

The Bench concluded the matter by saying, “We hope and trust that such financial recompense would provide to the appellant (presently aged 50 years), comfort and security for her future life.”

Where foreign cheque has been deposited for encashment, Indian Courts shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate on complaint case u/s 138 of NI Act, clarifies Delhi High Court
Justice Navin Chawla [22-04-2024]

Read Order: RIGHT CHOICE MARKETING SOLUTIONS JLT & ORS v. STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR [DEL HC- CRL.M.C. 6853/2022]

 

Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 24, 2024: The Delhi High Court has ruled that merely because the payee or holder in due course of a foreign cheque chooses to present the cheque in India out of malafide, the application of the provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 and the jurisdiction of the court where such cheque is deposited for payment, cannot be ousted. 

 

The Single-Judge Bench of Justice Navin Chawla was considering a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying for quashing of the proceedings in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed by respondent no.2 herein.

 

The facts of the case were such that the petitioner no.1, an entity with its office in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the sales and marketing wing of Right Choice Builders Private Limited, was arrayed as accused no.6 in the complaint. It was stated that the accused no. 6 had established various branches and petitioner nos.2 and 3, along with others, who have been arrayed as accused nos. 4 and 5 in the complaint, are the common Directors of the Group. 

 

It was alleged that in 2014, petitioner no.2 representing himself to be the Director of Right Choice Group of Companies, personally approached respondent no.2 for investment in the aforesaid entities, assuring him of high rates of return on investments. It was stated that respondent no.2 succumbed to the repeated follow-ups of the accused, and believing their representation of assured quarterly returns, invested an amount of Emirati Dirham (AED) 600,000 in favour of accused no.6 at its branch office in Dubai, by issuing multiple cheques. The said amount was invested on the assurance of return at the rate of 26.5% per annum.

 

It was asserted that in January 2016, when respondent no.2 called upon the accused at the head office at Pune, the petitioner nos.1 and 3, on express instructions from petitioner no.2, and accused nos.4 and 5, issued ten fresh post-dated cheques towards the repayment of interest to respondent no.2. However, when respondent no.2 presented the said cheques before the bankers, that is, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, and HSBC Bank, Middle East, those were returned dishonoured with the remarks "insufficient funds". 

 

Respondent no.2 initiated criminal complaints against the accused with the Abu Dhabi Police for the dishonour of the ten cheques. The Abu Dhabi Courts of First Instance convicted petitioner no.3 and sentenced him with imprisonment. It was stated that the accused were not traveling to Dubai out of fear of being arrested.

 

Thereafter, respondent no.2 issued a legal notice through his counsel in Abu Dhabi. The said notice was addressed to the accused at its Dubai office as also the India office and was duly served on the India office. Terms of settlement were shared by the counsel for respondent no.2 however, the accused never responded to the same.

 

When respondent no.2 proceeded to present the cheque of the principal amount of AED 600,000 drawn on the bank, namely, Emirates NBD Bank Gold Branch, it was again dishonoured. Respondent no.2 thereafter issued Legal Demand Notice under Section 138 of the NI Act. 

 

The Bench made it clear that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is deemed to have been committed at a place where a cheque is delivered for collection at the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, and the offence shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction, if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated.

 

In the present matter, the cheque was presented for payment by the respondent at Delhi. There was no prohibition of the cheque being deposited by the respondent no.2 for collection in Delhi. “Therefore, in terms of Section 142(2) of the NI Act, the Court at Delhi shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act”, the Bench said.

 

Moreover, due to the amendment in Section 142 of the NI Act, now the dishonour of the cheque, due to its presentation for payment at the bank of the respondent no.2 at Delhi, would be deemed to have taken place at Delhi. Though, Section 134 of the NI Act states that in absence of a contract to the contrary, the liability of the drawer of a foreign cheque is regulated in all essential matters by the law of the place where he made the cheque, the Bench opined that there is nothing in the said provision which would exclude the application of Section 138 of the NI Act read with Section 142 of the NI Act. 

 

“Merely because the payee or holder in due course of a foreign cheque chooses to present the cheque in India out of malafide, the application of the provision of Section 138 of the NI Act and the jurisdiction of the court where such cheque is deposited for payment, cannot be ousted”, the Bench held.

 

It was the case of the Complainant/respondent no. 2 that the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 escaped from the jurisdiction of the Courts at Dubai and had come to India. It did not therefore, lie in the mouth of the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 to contend that the presentation of the cheque in India by the respondent no. 2 for encashment, was malafide. The petitioner nos.2 and 3 are also citizens of India, presently residing in India.

 

Referring to Section 4 of the CrPC, the Bench observed that offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is to be tried in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C., subject to the provisions of the NI Act itself, including Section 142 of the NI Act. 

 

“Therefore, reading Section 4 of the Cr.P.C. with Section 142 (2) of the NI Act, it must be held that the Courts in India (Delhi) where the cheque has been deposited for encashment, shall have the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, even though it is a foreign cheque”, the Bench Said.

 

Asserting that there was absolutely no reason supplied by the petitioners in the petition for the delay in approaching this Court, the Bench held that the unexplained delay itself is sufficient ground for this Court to refuse to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint at this belated stage. 

 

Thus, finding no merit in the petition, the Bench dismissed the same.

Apex Court upholds order awarding Rs 5 lakh compensation to claimant in medical negligence case, says NCDRC’s order was silent on issue of applicability of Eggshell Skull Rule
Justices Sanjay Karol & Aravind Kumar [23-04-2024]

Read Order: JYOTI DEVI v. SUKET HOSPITAL & ORS [SC- CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5256 OF 2024] 

 

Tulip Kanth

 

New Delhi, April 24, 2024: Observing that the record ought to have been speaking of a pre-existing medical condition because of which the victim may have suffered ‘unusual damage’ in order to establish the applicability of Eggshell Skull Rule, the Supreme Court has upheld the order of the District Forum granting compensation of Rs 5 lakh to the claimant in a medical negligence case.

 

The claimant-appellant,Jyoti Devi, was admitted to Suket Hospital located in Himachal Pradesh on June 28, 2005 and had her appendicitis removed by a Senior Surgeon. Post surgery, she was discharged. However,she suffered continuous pains near the surgical site, as such she was admitted again but was discharged the next day with the assurance that no further pain would be suffered by her. She was further treated by another doctor on the reference of respondent no.2 herein. Yet again, there was no end to her suffering. This process continued for a period of four years.

 

The claimant - appellant eventually landed up for treatment at the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Science, Chandigarh. Upon investigation, it was found that a 2.5 cm foreign body (needle) “is present below the anterior abdominal wall in the region just medial to previous abdominal scar (Appendectomy)” for which a further surgery had to be performed for its removal.

 

Alleging negligence on the part of the respondent - Suket Hospital, a claim was brought for the “huge pain and spent money on treatment” totalling to Rs 19,80,000. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum awarded a compensation for Rs.5,00,000. The respondents approached the H.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission where they were asked to pay Rs 1 lakh to the complainant. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, in revision, applied the egg-skull rule to hold an individual liable for all consequences of their act. The compensation awarded by the State Commission was enhanced to Rs 2 lakh.

 

Hence, the claimant-appellant preferred an appeal before the Top Court seeking enhancement of compensation. The present dispute arose within the contours of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the predecessor legislation to the current Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

 

 

“The factum of negligence on the part of the respondent Hospital as well as respondent No.2 has not been doubted, across fora”, the Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Aravind Kumar asserted.

 

Referring to J.J. Merchant (Dr) v. Shrinath Chaturvedi [LQ/SC/2002/799] and Common Cause v. Union of India [LQ/SC/1993/15], the Bench opined that the Consumer Protection Act is a benevolent, socially orientated legislation, the declared aim of which is aimed at protecting the interests of consumers. Various fora have been formed to save the aggrieved consumer from the hassle of filing a civil suit, i.e., provide for a prompt remedy in the nature of award or where appropriate, compensation, after having duly complied with the principles of natural justice.

 

It was further observed that in determining compensation in cases of medical negligence, a balance has to be struck between the demands of the person claiming compensation, as also the interests of those being made liable to pay

 

The Bench also explained the Eggshell Skull Rule which holds the injurer liable for damages that exceed the amount that would normally be expected to occur. It is a common law doctrine that makes a defendant liable for the plaintiff's unforeseeable and uncommon reactions to the defendant's negligent or intentional tort.

 

 

“In simple terms, a person who has an eggshell skull is one who would be more severely impacted by an act, which an otherwise “normal person” would be able to withstand. Hence the term eggshell to denote this as an eggshell is by its very nature, brittle. It is otherwise termed as “taking the victim as one finds them” and, therefore, a doer of an act would be liable for the otherwise more severe impact that such an act may have on the victim”, it said.

 

On the facts of the case, the Bench found that the manner in which compensation stood reduced by the State Commission as also the NCDRC, vis-à-vis the District Forum to be based on questionable reasoning. “How could such compensation be justified, after observations having been made regarding the service rendered by the Hospital, being deficient, and the continuous pain and suffering on the part of the claimant-appellant, is something we fail to comprehend. Compensation by its very nature, has to be just. For suffering, no part of which was the claimant-appellant’s own fault, she has been awarded a sum which can, at best, be described as ‘paltry’”, it said.

 

The impugned judgment was also silent as to how the Eggshell-Skull Rule applied to the present case.The record ought to have been speaking of a pre-existing vulnerability or medical condition, because of which the victim may have suffered ‘unusual damage’. However, none of the orders - be it District, State Commission or the NCDRC referred to any such condition.

 

Thus, setting aside the Awards of the NCDRC as also the State Commission and restoring the Award as passed by the District Forum, the Bench ordered that a sum of Rs 5 lakh ought to be paid expeditiously by the respondents to the appellant for being medically negligent and providing services deficient in nature. The sum of Rs 5 lakh is also accompanied by interest simple in nature @ 9% from the date of the award passed by the District Forum. Additionally, the Bench also imposed a cost of Rs.50,000 to be paid in terms of the cost of litigation.