Trial Court while awarding multiple sentences, must specify whether these sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, rules P&H HC

Read Order: Suresh Chand v. Ajit Singh Dahiya and Others

Monika Rahar

Chandigarh, January 7, 2022: While considering a quash petition, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has recently held that the Court of the first instance while awarding multiple sentences of imprisonment in a trial, must specify, in clear terms, as to whether the said sentences would run concurrently or consecutively and in case, they were to run consecutively, the order (sequence) in which the same would run.

In this case, the petitioner along with two other persons was tried in an FIR under Sections 302/307/34 of IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act of 1959. The Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh convicted and sentenced the petitioner alone for life imprisonment under Section 302 of the IPC and term sentences of five years each was given to two under Section 25 of Arms Act. This order did not specify as to whether the sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. But, on the same day, the same Judge issued a conviction warrant wherein it was specifically mentioned that all the substantive sentences would run concurrently. 

Suddenly, after more than 13 years, an application under Section 353 r/w Section 362 of Cr.P.C. was made by the first respondent alleging that the conviction warrant was forged and that the petitioner should be convicted according to the sentence order. The Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, while allowing this application, ordered the sentences awarded to the petitioner to run consecutively. The judge also held that the conviction warrant sent to the Jail Authorities could not be taken into consideration. Hence, the petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the order allowing the above- mentioned application. 

At the outset, the Bench of Justice Vikas Bahl recorded its finding on the scope of an application under Sections 353 r/w section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and observed that a party is not entitled under these sections to go back to the Trial Court to seek directions of nature that were sought in the present case. Further, it noted that neither of the said sections envisaged the setting aside of a conviction warrant or issuance of a direction to the authorities to comply with any order.

“Once the Additional Sessions Judge finally disposed of the matter, the appeal and the SLP against which had already been adjudicated, the moving of the present application, after a period of 13 years after the passing of the order of sentence, before the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, was not maintainable, moreso under section 353 r/w 362 of Cr.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge had become functus officio, and thus could not have entertained the said application”, said the Bench. 

The Court further observed that the Additional Sessions Judge, while issuing the warrant under Section 425 of Cr.P.C., was performing his judicial functions and the same could not be stated to be a ministerial act. Thus, the conviction warrant issued by the Judge under his signatures on the same date when the order of sentence was passed, specifically directing all the substantive sentences to run concurrently, was a judicial act. 

The Court while stating that the order of sentence and the conviction warrant were to be read and understood together, observed that in the absence of any specific direction to the effect that the term sentence was to precede life imprisonment, it became clear by itself that the term sentences were intended by the trial court to run concurrently with the life sentence. 

The Court also stated that the impugned Order did not consider the fact that the respondent’s application came after more than 13 years, when the petitioner’s case for release was at the final stage, and thus, the same was held by the Court to be against the legitimate expectation that the petitioner had for all these years with respect to his release. 

The first respondent’s counsel argued that in collateral proceedings (under Section 482) words cannot be read into a judgment, more so when the appeal and further appeal against the impugned judgment were dismissed. Refuting this plea the Court said, after reflecting on the plight of the petitioner stated, “The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is for setting aside the order dated 07.10.2021 (order allowing first respondent’s application) and the prayer is not for reading any words into the order of sentence or for reviewing the same. Since, in the impugned order, Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh had considered the import of the order of sentence… without considering the relevant law on the point and without considering the fact that the application was not maintainable, thus, it is within the ambit of this Court to set aside the said order and protect the legal rights of the petitioner.”

The petition, for quashing of the impugned order, was allowed and the first respondent’s application was set aside.