SC discusses customary practice of limited grant of land for service to be rendered by the grantee in Punjab region; says Bhondedar can have no legitimate claim over suit land
Justices Hrishikesh Roy & Sanjay Karol [09-11-2023]

Read Order: LAJJA RAM & ORS v. RATI CHAND & ORS. ETC [SC-CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2835-2836/2011]

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, February 7, 2024:  The Supreme Court has clarified that when the services were ceased to be rendered towards the management, maintenance and upkeep of the shamlatdeh land, limited grant so made to the bhondedar, by the proprietors i.e., the biswedars, in lieu of such services, stood extinguished.

The facts of the case suggested that in the year 1982, NarainDass (Dfdt. No. 1) initiated an earlier proceeding for declaration and occupancy rights, before Asst. Collector against the Palwal Gram Panchayat. The Asst. Collector held that Narain Dass was entitled to hereditary rights, under Sections 5 & 8 of the Punjab Mujara Act, 1887 (Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887) and the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953. This arose from the longstanding service of NarainDass’ ancestors as mujaras (tenants) relating to the shamlatdeh land, for over 60 years. It was held that the land did not vest in the Gram Panchayat.

Subsequently, Narain Dass sold the shamlatdeh land to Lajja Ram & his sons (Defendant Nos. 2-5) through multiple sale deeds. Aggrieved by the above alienation of the common village land, the inhabitants of the village &biswedars (proprietors) of the land (Respondents) filed a Suit for declaration, possession & injunction but the same was dismissed.  It was also held that the sale deeds transferring ownership rights from NarainDass (Dfdt. 1) to Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. 2-5) were valid. The Court noted that Narain Dass, while serving as the bhondedar of the shamlatdeh land, continued to provide service to the landlord, and such service would be considered equivalent to payment of rent, thereby making Narain Dass also a tenant of the suit land.

When the Respondents approached the Additional District Judge, the First Appellate Court with the common judgment. Simultaneously, the Court negated NarainDass’ (Dfdt. 1) claim, since he had limited right and was not competent to alienate the suit property. Thus, the annulment of sale deeds to Dfdts No. 2-5 with a directive to restore the suit land possession to the common village pool was ordered.

The transferee Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. No. 2-5) then filed the RSA before the High Court.The High Court particularly noted that Narain Dass had no title or authority to sell the suit land to Dfdts. No. 2-5. The sale, executed by an incompetent party without a valid title, was deemed by the High Court as insufficient to confer valid title to Dfdts. No. 2-5. Consequently, the High Court upheld the First Appellate Court's decision decreeing the suit against Dfdts. No. 2-5, and dismissed the second appeal under the impugned judgment.

At the outset, the Division Bench of Justice Hrishikesh Roy &Justice Sanjay Karolmade it clear that the term ‘bhondedar’ has no statutory or legislative definition. But over a period of time, the term has been equated with limited grant of land for service to be rendered by the grantee and is a customary practice in the Punjab region for proprietors of land as well as the larger village community, to set apart a parcel of land to be held rent-free towards a temple, mosque or shrines, or granted on favourable terms to a saint, pandit or any other person belonging to a religious order. The bhondedar could be ejected upon failure to fulfil the conditions of grant or even at the will of the proprietors. Essentially, it was a method of compensation for certain services, by granting rentfree land, the Bench noted.

The Top Court opined that abhondedar renders secular services towards the village community as well as the biswedars (proprietors)  and is granted a parcel of land rent-free, within a village by the biswedars in lieu of payment for services rendered. A bhondedar can be ejected from such piece of land in case of failure to render assigned services or fulfil conditions of such grant.

Noting that the aforementioned characteristic features suggest that the rights available to Dfdt. No. 1 as the bhondedar, were conditional and not boundless. He could exercise limited rights as long as he rendered service towards the village in his capacity as the bhondedar. It was further clarified by the Bench that a bhondedar or dholidar does not possess title or ownership right of the property that is granted to him, as a bhonda or dholi.

Moreover, considering the fact that the Dfdt. No. 1 not only ceased to render the required services but also relocated to a different place soon after unauthorisedly selling the suit land to Dfdts. 2-5, the Bench came to the conclusion that the bhondedarNarainDass could have no legitimate claim whatsoever, over the suit land.

It was also asserted by the Top Court that the High Court had rightly held that the suit was filed within time as the biswedars' right to challenge the sales by the bhondedar would commence only from the date on which they became aware of such sales.

“The upshot of the aforementioned discussion is that when the services were ceased to be rendered towards the management, maintenance and upkeep of the shamlatdeh land, the limited grant so made to the bhondedar, by the proprietors i.e., the biswedars, in lieu of such services, stood extinguished”, the Bench said.

“The oft-quoted statement full of wisdom – “Before the reward, there must be labour. You plant before you harvest. You sow in tears before you reap joy.” – attributed to author Ralph Ransom perfectly encapsulates the current situation, emphasising upon the inherent connection between effort and reward”, the Bench said.

The Top Court opined that as soon as the bhondedar had ceased rendering services, the concerned land should have returned to the common village pool. The bhondedar could not have transferred his limited possessory rights or alienated the said property to the Appellants. The Appellants, as transferees, could not have derived any legal right over the suit land either. Thus, the Bench dismissed the appeals,