Read Order : Harvinder Kaur v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

Monika Rahar

Chandigarh, January 13, 2022: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed a petition which sought quashing of a complaint pending before the Trial Court, owing to the fact that the case involved triable allegations and that no ground was made out to quash the impugned complaint and the consequential proceedings which arose therefrom.

In reaching the above conclusion the bench of Justice Harnaresh Singh Gill referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Kaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, in which the Top Court relied upon its earlier decision in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and held that when there are serious triable allegations in a complaint, it is improper to quash FIR in the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Through this petition, the petitioner sought quashing of the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent under Section 138 r/s Sections 141 and 142 of the N.I. Act and also of all consequential proceedings which arose therefrom.

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that the complaint in question was filed on February 5,2020, whereas the resolution to file the complaint was passed on January  6, 2020. Further, it was submitted that the said resolution did not contain any averment regarding the authorised person having witnessed the transaction or possessing due knowledge about the transaction.

It was also argued that on January 6, 2020, a legal notice was issued whereas the complaint was filed on January 5,2020. He contended that the cheques in question were given by the petitioner to the respondent as security for taking a loan.

On legal position, the Counsel argued that no complaint under Section 138 of the Act was maintainable qua security cheques and that the petitioner already repaid the amount but the respondent- complainant wrongly claimed some balance amount. It was further submitted that the petitioner already obtained a Court order restraining the respondent-complainant from taking forcible possession of the vehicle in question and that in the presence of such a stay order, the Bank/ financial institution could initiate appropriate proceedings, but not proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act.

The Court did not find the petitioner’s plea strong enough to quash the impugned complaint. Further, the Court also observed that the main points of contention in the case, namely, repayment of money by petitioner and the factum of the transaction were questions of fact that could be decided based on evidence led before the trial Court.

The petition was thus dismissed. 

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