While all major financial centres are now subject to an anti-money laundering framework, mainly due to the work of the Financial Action Task Force, many experts feel that not enough is being done to stop the huge flow of illicit funds that has been going through the banking sector. This article critically discusses whether the fight against money laundering is being won or lost.


Many would be traumatized to learn that their wealth invested in a trustworthy institution, unwittingly doing business with banks involved in Money Laundering (ML) and Financing of Terrorism or even seize up in such activities themselves.1 Over the past several decades, there has been ever-growing public and political concern with the threat posed by contemporary and sophisticated forms of transnational criminal undertakings.2 The worldwide belief is that great development has been achieved through the endeavor of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international bodies. This essay seeks to furnish an analysis as to whether that belief is precise. FATF has enjoyed an exceptional amount of triumph in raising awareness about ML/ Terrorism Financing (TF) and persuading states around the world to pledge to counter these serious threats to international security. In my opinion, FATF recommendations have caused most countries to take required steps that make them materialized to be better at protecting against ML than they actually are, and that in reality, these countries lack the obligatory effectiveness in their supervision. The outcomes of the essay support the idea that most of the countries are not doing so great as it would appear on the surface. 

It is specified that measures need to be taken by policy makers on several grounds. So as long as there exists an extensive inconsistency between the ability to stock illicit financial activity in developed and developing countries, the roots of all major financial centers will remain highly unprotected to abuse. 

Before discussing and analyzing about the fight against ML being won or lost; it is imperative to provide a brief description about ML, and some of its most relevant issues, as well as a description of FATF, its working, recommendations and what goes into establishing an effective anti-money laundering (AML)/ Countering Financial Terrorism (CFT) regime. Then, will talk briefly about other global and regional bodies that are also concerned with the fight against ML. Next, the evidence is presented which talks about the deficiencies that exist in AML frameworks.3 Finally, several suggestions for actions will be proposed along with conclusions. 


The term ML originated from the gangster Al Capone, who was put behind bars for tax evasion; converting his ill-gotten profits through launderettes to make it appear legal.4 ML is a global phenomenon. It is about concealing the origin and ownership of money earned from illegal means. In practice, illegal crimes include – fraud, bribery, corruption, drug trafficking, terrorism, arm trafficking.5 It is a type of “Dirty Money” and the comprehensive purpose of ML offence is to convert dirty money into clean money for concealing wealth, avoiding taxes, increasing profits and becoming legal.6 Criminals have constantly tried to conceal their money. The larger the amount illegally earned, the more difficult it becomes to disguise its origin and enjoy the profits of crime. Sudden, unaccountable wealth can draw the attention of officials. To camouflage the unlawful nature of money, criminals must go through three separate stages of ML:7 the first step involves the placement of the stolen funds converted into a more portable and less conspicuous form within a financial institution (F.I) or use of those funds to buy an asset.8 The second step, layering, seeks to obscure the origin of funds. In this phase, the money launderers frequently transfer the funds to various FI of various countries, making it tougher for law enforcement experts to follow the chain. In the last step, the funds must be integrated back into the financial system or economy, in the form investments, real estate or business ventures.9 Most ML systems depend on professional advisors who intentionally or unintentionally help in the layering and integration stages. These advisors are typically accountants, lawyers and agents known as Trust and Service Providers.10 The problems with the ML is that criminals function on an international basis – In this respect, national borders prove to be a motivation rather than a hurdle as far as money launderers are concerned. This is why an increasing number of individual criminals and criminal groups carry out their business in illegal products in global markets as well as becoming involved in international ML. They can select the weakest connection in the chain i.e. the country with the feeblest rules, where banking and professional secrecy is most rigorous and where bank administration is least effective and where the authorities shows no concern in international cooperation and permits criminal money to enter its financial system (FS) thus providing criminal access to global FS. This biased competition created by countries, which fascinate illegal funds through weak laws, and or their tax implementation – at the cost of countries with stern regulations – highlights the necessity of a global approach to fighting ML.11


FATF has come out as the prominent international body for evolving and encouraging AML/CFT controls, a self-described “Policy Making body” that works to bring about supervisory and legislative improvements.12 The alarming increase in ML motivated the General Assembly of the United Nations at the Vienna Convention in 1988 to take a Universal vow to put a stop to ML13 and in 1989 the G-7 Summit in Paris set up the FATF to act as an inter-governmental body and build relations with various governments to tackle this cancerous problem. Its aim is to develop and encourage the proposed actions at a National and international level to fight against ML/TF.14 FATF has series of regulations, which were established in 1990; issuing 40 recommendations15 covering FS and its regulations, criminal justice, law enforcement, and problems regarding international cooperation and to serve against the recycling of funds derived from illegal means.16 These recommendations have been revised in 1996 and 2003 and are currently being revised in order to stay effective and well organized. After the attacks of September 11 2001, another eight recommendations were issued and one in 2004, comprising a total of 49 recommendations.17 The FATF’s significance lies in the fact that it has had an incredible success in getting countries around the globe to implement into its main principles and treat the 40+9 seriously. This “international” methodology to global governance has been made possible by two essential tools employed by the FATF: the mutual evaluation process (MER) and the ability to “name and shame” uncooperative states. The FATF supervises periodic Analyses of member countries’ to act in accordance with the 40+9 Recommendations, and assembles and publishes a detailed description of its outcomes in MER’s. This evaluation procedure is a central pillar in the FATF’s efforts to promote strong AML/CFT standards. In explaining the role of the MER, the FATF states: 

“The extent of these evaluations is to consider whether the necessary laws, guidelines or other measures required under the new standards are in force and effect, that there has been a complete and proper implementation of all essential measures and that the system in place is effective and well organized.

The evaluations are accompanied by a team of experts from the financial, legal and law enforcement fields, and include comprehensive on-site visits to the jurisdiction including general meetings with government officers and private sector entities. In terms of content, MERs include an outline of the economy, the system of government and financial sector of the country being assessed, and then a close inspection of the country’s compliance with each of the 40+9 Recommendations in turn, including recommendations for improvement. The degree of compliance with each Recommendation is ranked in one of four ways: “Compliant,” “Largely Compliant,” Partially Compliant,” and “Non-Compliant.” A standard MER will run to about 300 pages, which provides a sense of the detail and comprehensive analysis that goes into each assessment. The FATF’s mutual evaluation process thus symbolizes an excellent way for countries to identify the advantages and disadvantages of their domestic AML/CFT regimes and, more prominently, to target areas for improvement. 

The second tool that has brought the FATF influence in the international field goes hand-in-hand with its MER, and that is the ability to “name and shame” uncooperative states. International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) in 2007 provides a technique for the FATF “to identify and to reply to jurisdictions with strategic flaws in their AML/CFT regimes that pose a danger to the international FS. Countries with sufficiently serious insufficiencies, as identified in the MER, are given the chance to advance their controls within a reasonable amount of time. If they fail to do so, the FATF can openly identify the jurisdiction and advise that states take counter actions to “protect themselves” from the risks coming from this jurisdiction. In practice, this means that the state is basically blacklisted from doing business with a majority of main financial centers around the world—because the respectable “heavy-hitters” of banking and finance in the United States, Europe and elsewhere prohibit or strictly limit financial transactions with institutions situated in a country designated as uncooperative by the FATF. 

The FATF’s occurrence as a valuable supporter of strong worldwide AML/CFT controls, and its success in raising consciousness regarding the menaces of ML and TF and in convincing states to progress in these areas is an outstanding achievement. Scholars have proclaimed that the FATF’s MER “seems to have an empirically visible impact with respect to improving banking systems and regulations, and it has been projected that “about 130 jurisdictions representing 85 percent of the world population, and about 90-95 percent of worldwide economic output, have made at least a political promise in implementing FATF recommendations.” 

However, while nobody would discuss that developing countries have particularly robust overall controls or that there are no important gaps that need to be focused, there is nevertheless a risk that the level of compliance among these countries is exaggerated. To justify this, it is necessary to examine deeper into the different types of FATF Recommendations and precisely what goes into building a strong domestic AML/CFT regime.

FATF 40+9 recommendations can be classified into four categories; those including the legal system, preventive measures for financial institutions and other entities and national and international cooperation.18 FATF recommendations 5-13, 21 and 22 describe the part of the Preventive measures system that administers to the private sector. These recommendations are designed to build a five-part requirement. (1) Create and maintain customer identity including beneficial owner, (2) create and preserve an up-to date customer profile, (3) observe transactions to see if they are suitable for the customer profile of transactions that are legal, (4) if not, inspect further any such transaction to see if it represents the proceeds of crime including the origin of funds, and (5) if so, inform about the transaction to the Financial Intelligence Unit, along with an explanation of why the Financial institution believes that the transaction is dubious. Recommendations 18,19 and 26-34 talks about the supervisory system as well as prosecution system and criminal investigation. The Private sector role emphasis on three fundamental objective; Firstly, to exclude possible criminal elements from the FS, Secondly, to give financial information to law enforcement authorities that can be used in criminal investigations, and the Third, is to discover customers who might be criminals by requiring the private sector to observe customer transactions. 

1. Customer- Identification, Profiling and Record- Keeping

FATF recommendation necessitates that FI must identify their customers, including the beneficial owner, which in the case of lawful persons includes taking equitable measures to identify the physical persons who own and rule the legal persons. Recommendation 12, comprehend these requirements to certain designated Non- financial businesses professionals (DNFBP), which include lawyers, accountants, notaries (professional enablers who help launderers in hiding assets), real estate agents (as it is of high value; it is frequently used as an Investment Vehicle by launderers), casinos 

(Dealing with cash that can be exchanged for chips), providing laundering opportunities. Recommendation 5 makes it necessary for FI and DNFBP to ascertain the purpose and deliberate nature of the business relationship of a possible client and knowledge of the customer’s profile and their business. This fulfils two purposes; (1) if customers identity and profile cannot be found, the financial institution must end the business relationship or not accept a transaction, and (2) future transactions of accepted customers can be estimated against the baseline of normal or classic transactions. A significant Development in 2003 Recommendations was the introduction of an optional risk-based approach.19 According to FATF a relevant person must create and maintain suitable and risk-based approach relating to Customer due diligence (CDD), record keeping, internal control, risk assessment, and ongoing monitoring.20 FI is needed to undertake CDD measures when; starting business relations, carrying out infrequent transactions, there is suspicious of ML/TF, or the FI has doubts about the accuracy of previously acquired customer identification data.21 FATF recommendation 5, allows FI and DNFBP to control the extent of customer due diligence measures on a risk- sensitive basis depending on the kind of customer, transaction and business relationship and be able to show to his supervisory authority that the extent of measures is suitable in view of the threats of ML.22 Recommendation 10 demands that FI and DNFBP maintain customer track records, including transaction and identification records sufficient to allow reconstruction of individual transactions sufficient for proof in a prosecution and that these data be maintained for at least 5 years and be accessible for careful examination by the competent authority. This along, with Recommendation 5, authorizes investigation and prosecutorial authorities (lawyers) who tries to prove someone guilty to follow the money of criminal suspects 

2. Transaction Monitoring and Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR):

Recommendation 11, entails that FI and DNFBP pay particular attention to complicated, unusual large transactions and unusual sequence of transactions with no apparent economic or observable lawful purpose, “inspect” as far as possible the background and purpose of transactions and show the findings in writings. Recommendation 13 requires that a FI and DNFBP report immediately to the governmental Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the funds earned are the result of a criminal activity. The system describes this as filing a suspicious transaction report. Recommendation 15 requires FI to evolve internal control, rules, policies and procedures for AML programs including internal training and audit capacities. Recommendation 25 entails that government authorities create guidelines and give feedbacks to help FI in detecting and reporting doubtful transactions.


Recommendations 18,19,26-34 focus on three objectives: the first is to confirm that private sector acts in accordance with their preventive measures responsibilities. The second is to ensure the STR’s of appropriate cases of suspected crime is being investigated. It is decided by FIU, which analyzes these reports and then decided which should be further investigated and forwards to the appropriate authority (police). In order to ensure acceptance with preventive measures, Recommendation 23 requires that FI and DNFBP be subject, to sufficient regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of preventive measures, while Recommendation 29 and 17 require that supervisors have enough powers to ensure compliance includes the imposition of a sanction. Techniques used by Private sector to implement preventive measure:

3. Suspicious Transaction Analysis and Referral for Investigation 

Recommendation 26 requires that countries create a FIU that acts as a national Centre for the analysis, receiving and circulation of STR and other significant information regarding ML. moreover, it states that FIU should have access to on a timely basis to the administrative, financial and law enforcement information that is needed in undertaking its functions, including the analysis of STR. Recommendation 10, mentions that competent authorities should have access to the information’s kept by FI and DNFBP.23 Finally, recommendation 40 ensures that their competent authorities can constructively, rapidly and successfully provide the comprehensive range of international cooperation in relation to ML, associated serious offences and TF. Countries should allow their authorities to use the most systematic means to cooperate. These authorities are required to use clear channels or techniques for the successful transmission and implementation of requests for information or assistance.24


The FATF cannot work in isolation in order to effectively protect the global financial system. It relies on the partnerships with the FATF Regional and global bodies to extend the successful implementation of the FATF recommendations beyond its own membership.25 The following organizations are also concerned with the fight against ML on a global and regional basis:

The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) is concerned with the fight against illegal manufacture; trafficking and misuse of narcotics as well as fighting ML have been strengthened since 1992. 

International Police Organization (INTERNPOL) functions as a financial clearinghouse with the purpose of simplifying the exchange of information on international financial flows.

Council of Europe: The Pompiduo Group, interministerial collaboration group, a multi-disciplinary within the Council of Europe, deals with the battle against illegal drug trading and drug abuse. 

Organization of American States (OAS) objective is to improve national criminal law and international cooperation as well as strengthening the role performed by the financial system in efforts to combat ML.

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF): In November 1992, the country ministers in Jamaica passed “the Kingston Declaration on ML”. The declaration clearly approves the 40 FATF recommendations as well as 19 recommendations particular to the region, which were formulated at the Aruba conference (1990), and binds the CFATF member states to apply these recommendations. 

European Police Authority (EUROPOL): The duty of this authority is to collect and examine intelligence and to improve cooperation between member states on the issues of stopping cross-border organized crime, drug smuggling and related ML within the EU context.26


Drawbacks in the AML framework make it susceptible to corrupt money flowing into the economy. At the heart of the problem is the fact that there are numerous supervisory bodies, mostly private sector institutions running AML efforts in sectors such as banking, property and luxury goods. This patchwork of supervisors results in a system, which is structurally unreliable and presents an unpredictable, uncertain and unhelpful environment for businesses that are intending to stand by the rules.27 After over 28 years of ML prevention, the outcomes are disappointing: organized crime and drug trafficking still prosper. Banks face an extraordinary burden because of their active participation in money laundering prevention. The various prevention schemes have deteriorated the basic rights of the bank clients, who have to pay for the preventive measures. The task of fighting against ML is becoming more difficult, due to the increasingly worldwide and virtual nature of financial services, permitting crypto currencies (bit coins) and easily accessible anonymization tools to disguise criminal activity and frustrate the identification of beneficial owner. Controlling much of this mega-illegal activity are global ML syndicates, who offer their facilities at scale to criminal networks, and are highly good at exploiting gaps in the financial system. These are the challenging situations within which AML framework of the banking sector presently operate. They set a very high bar for success in restraining the international flows of illicit funds. And we are nowhere near attaining that standard. Why is the success ratio of the system so insignificant and what can be done about it? Global banks invest billions of dollars each year meeting strict AML policies. Financial crime compliance has become a vast and an expensive business, reflecting the high significance of bringing order to systemic attempts to stop the criminal misuse of the financial system. So why has this level of investment not brought a better strategic impact on the problem? One main reason identified by global banks, law enforcement authorities and the FATF, is that the supervisory regime is highly inefficient and disorganized. To meet regulatory principles banks run sophisticated procedures to monitor millions of transactions, producing high amounts of alerts for individual assessment by compliance officers. The present system designed to prevent ML/TF is based on a faulty theoretical structure.28 According to a senior executive, in one international bank only some 5% of those assessed ever reach the standard of being filed as a STR to law enforcement. The rest are rejected. The strategic goal of the entire system seems to have become lost in the detailed design and application of the regime. That’s not to say that the rules themselves don’t seem to be vital. They represent the necessary building blocks from which a successful impact can be made. That has not been accomplished yet because the underpinning investment has lacked focus and has generally failed to abuse the intelligence potential of the statistics held within the financial sector.29 Michael Foot, the Financial Services Authority’s managing director described the condition as “highly sub-optimal”. In a lecture attended by building society leaders, Mr. Foot said that the current measures to combat the laundering of the proceeds of drug and other related crimes through banks and building societies was not satisfactory. He told his audience that there was “a great arrangement of ML going on throughout the UK”. John Good fellow, chairman of the Building Societies Association, said: “In the UK, and my own building society in particular, we take the prevention of ML very seriously. “However, though we are filing more and more notices, it seems they are vanishing into a black hole. We have no idea if the cases we report are even being examined. What result our efforts are having on combating ML crime in the UK remains a mystery.”30 In the UK, around 75% of corruption cases involving property are investigated by the Metropolitan Police’s Proceeds of Corruption Unit (POCU) involved unknown companies registered in secrecy jurisdictions. The report “Corruption on Your Doorstep”, confirms that purchasing property is one of the ML methods of choice for corrupt individuals. Between 2004-2005 the POCU, now the International Corruption Unit (ICU) operating within the NCA, discovered £180m worth of property was under investigation as being the profits of corruption. The statistics shows that companies registered in offshore jurisdictions own over 36,000 properties in London. Unidentified companies own almost 10% of properties in Westminster. This is likely to be undervalued, as many titles in the Land Registry held by offshore entities contain no evidence of the price paid for the property. Corrupt individuals make use of the UK’s Tier 1 (investor) visa system – commonly known as golden visas – to secure citizenship in the UK, thereby receiving an implicit authorization of their money’s legitimacy from the UK state. Immigrants can apply for permanent citizenship after five years by investing £2m into the UK’s economy. The waiting duration can be reduced to three years by investing £5m and those investing £10m can be awarded permanent residency after two years. There are number of difficulties with this system which leave it vulnerable to abuse from corrupt individuals. Despite the clear threat of ML through the Tier 1 visa process, there is no dedicated system of ML checks for applicants. In addition to the worrying lack of checks, there is no transparency around the system.31

The current European Union (EU) AML framework does not prevent illegal money from flowing through Europe’s financial Centre’s according to a new report by Transparency International EU. Despite the political eloquence and public outcry following Panama Papers Russian Laundromat exposures there are still major issues when it comes to both AML rules and their implementation by European countries.32 Deutsche Bank has been penalized more than $630m for failing to prevent $10bn of Russian ML and exposing the UK FS to the risk of financial crime. Previously also Deutsche Bank has been penalized in January 2017 £500m for Russian ML offences, January 2017 £75m to resolve a US government case over hiding tax liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service in 2000, November 2015 £200m for breaking US sanctions with Iran and Syria. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority imposed its largest-ever fine – £163m for ML offences on Germany’s biggest bank, which it said had wasted several opportunities to lock down on the activities of its Russian operations as a result of feeble systems to detect financial crime between 2012 and 2015.33 Back in 2012, HSBC lost £1.2 billion for having insufficient ML controls. The bank had provided banking services and American dollars to banks in Saudi Arabia in spite of their networks to TF. In 2010, Wachovia paid federal authorities a total amount of £123.7m for willingly lacking to establish an adequate AML system and subsequently authorizing, from 2004-2007, the transmission of an estimated £292.5 billion into dollar accounts from money exchangers in Mexico that the bank did business with.34 Recently, Commonwealth Bank of Australia confesses multiple violations in ML case. The Austrac case, when first exposed in August 2017, sent shockwaves through Australian banking sector, increasing political pressure for a public inquiry into banks’ misconduct that was finally approved last month December.35


The well-known legislative framework against ML still needs to be intensified by developing robust legislative rules, well-organized national and international cooperation between institutions and authorities and adequate policies are required. The foremost aim of the legislation should be the need to have stricter regulations on the subject of CDD and reporting of STR’s, which previously restricted its identification procedure in the adoption of the clause “know your customer” which led to very limited outcomes.36 Analysis of patterns and trends in ML, institutions and sectors of the economy occupied by criminals, effect of ML in the national economy should be made. Pursuit of a flexible, repetitively developing strategy by all countries with regard to a systematic approach to fighting drug cartels, with the purpose of preventing Money Launderers gaining political influence, in order to eliminate weak links in the FS caused by unreliable measures should be revised.37 There should be transparency to the Tier 1 investors visa system with public disclosure of who is investing, how much investing, what they are investing in and their financial assets and interests. There should be re-thought about the supervisory regime for the UK’s AML procedures, especially for professional enablers. The supervisors should meet the good practice standards of transparent enforcement, risk-based approach, and guarantee that all the countries around the globe effectively implement FATF measures regarding Professional enablers.38 What is lacking in any systematic way from the existing mutual evaluations is a prominent assessment of how well a jurisdiction is implementing the standards and whether this successfully limits financial crime.39 FATF should emphasis on ways to influence countries to improve their oversight and supervision of domestic entities in order to create successful ML/TF regimes.40 FATF should encourage supervisors to carry out anonymous shopping exercises to see whether FI is properly implementing the AML rules. One of the criticisms of the existing FATF MER is that they are opaque, long, and do not do enough to specify top priorities for changes that countries need to make. FATF should review the 40+9 recommendations to ensure that MER provides a prioritized work plan for assessed countries. This can then be followed up by the assessment experts to ensure the country is working towards successful compliance. If MER becomes shorter, simpler and more prioritized they will gather more attention in assessed countries.41 FATF should also ensure that all the transactions, which are actually “suspicious”, should be reported to and investigated by the appropriate authority. The national authorities should take more effective actions against ML/TF at all stages from the identification of bank clients opening an account through investigation, trial and penalty of assets. At the global level, the FATF should also monitor and take actions to encourage implementation of the standards.42 Fight against ML is resource intensive; therefore, a special budget should be assigned for the capacity building of staffs through training. Timely guidance and support of foreign- trained instructors in combating ML should be taken. Implementation of AML measures should be transparent, reliable and well timed. The Collection, maintenance and distribution of information related to clients should be managed properly. Dealings taking place in the banking sector should be checked on daily basis.43


The existing system designed to prevent ML/TF does not work well,44 as it fails to achieve its own original goals, which is to reduce predicate offence. It is erroneous to conclude that the current AML framework is not strong enough45 because FATF has enjoyed an extraordinary amount of achievement in raising awareness about ML/TF problems and encouraging states around the world to commit to countering these serious dangers to international security. However, a closer investigation of what has truly been done to stop these crimes worldwide lack the effective oversight and regulatory systems necessary to ensure that their national institutions have robust controls in place. Only a continuous and imaginative determination to create effective ML/TF controls on a global scale will have a chance of making the international financial system a secure place in which to operate.46 Also, good progress has been made on many fronts, countries globally reconsidering the adequacy of their AML regimes and taking remedial actions.47 A number of recommendations, rules, and policies have been introduced to combat ML, which has improved the situation since 1990, but, however, the fact that it lacks universal implementation of the established standards makes it vulnerable to abuse. The supervisory and regulatory regimes are also highly disorganized and inefficient. The endeavor to combat ML is endless because criminals will always seek new ways to move the proceeds of crime. It is a battle that needs constant vigilance and is not so much a matter of fight against ML being won or lost, but of just trying to stay up-to-date with the latest tactics.48


Preeti Ahluwalia is a practicing Advocate at the Delhi High Court. She has pursued her BA. LL.B from Amity University, Noida and  LL.M in International Business Law from the University of Leeds, United Kingdom. Ms. Ahluwalia has secured a distinction in her Master’s thesis. Recently, she secured 74% in a certification course on Blockchain and the Law. Ms. Ahluwalia has interest mostly in Research and Writing in all areas of law ( personal interest in Blockchain Technology, bitcoins, legality, AI). 



[1] Brandon James Reddington, ‘Assessing the true effectiveness of AML/CFT controls in developing countries’ (Georgetownedu, April 15, 2011)

<https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553564/reddingtonBrandon.pdf? Sequence=1> accessed 25 March 2020

[2] Council of Europe Press, Dirty Money (Council of Europe 1995) 13-14

[3] Brandon James Reddington, ‘Assessing the true effectiveness of AML/CFT controls in developing countries’ (Georgetownedu, April 15, 2011)

<https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553564/reddingtonBrandon.pdf? Sequence=1> accessed 25 March 2020

[4] Joras Ferwerda, ‘The Economics of Crime and Money Laundering: Does Anti-Money Laundering Policy Reduce Crime?’ (Universiteit Utrecht, Nov, 2008)

<https://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rebo_use_dp_2008_08-35.pdf>> accessed 3 April 2020

[5] Mark Gregory, ‘Stashing the cash: banks, money laundering and the battle against illegal logging’ (Fern making the EU work for people and forests, September 2015)

<http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/Money%20Laundering%20final%20report%20191015_a. >accessed 25 March 2020

[6] UsmanKemal Muhammad, ‘”Anti-money laundering regulations and its effectiveness”‘ [2014] 17(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 416-427

[7] Miriam Wasserman, ‘Dirty Money’ [2002] 12(1) Regional Review 1st Quarter 14

[8] ibid p14

[9] HeidiM Schooner and Michael Taylor, Global Bank Regulation Principles and Policies (Academic Press 2010) 224-225


(Transparency International UK fighting corruption worldwide, April 2016) <http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/paradise-lost/#WkVzKiOcY_V> accessed 25 March 2020

[11] Johannes Dumbacher, ‘The fight against money laundering’ [July, 1995] 30(4) INTERECONOMICS 177-186

[12] (FATF Website) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/> accessed 30 December 2017

[13] Jackie JohnsonY. C. Desmond Lim, (2003) “Money laundering: has the Financial Action Task Force made a difference?”, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 10 Issue: 1, pp.7-22

[14] Essay UK, Essay: International initiatives to fight money laundering. Available from:

<http://www.essay.uk.com/essays/law/essay-international-initiatives-to-fight-money-laundering/> [30-12-17]

[15] UsmanKemal Muhammad, ‘”Anti-money laundering regulations and its effectiveness”‘ [2014] 17(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 416-427

[16] Jackie JohnsonY. C. Desmond Lim, (2003) “Money laundering: has the Financial Action Task Force made a difference?”, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 10 Issue: 1, pp.7-22

[17] HE Ping, ‘The measures on combating money laundering and terrorism financing in the PRC: From the perspective of financial action task force’ [2008] 11(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control; London 320-330

[18] Brandon James Reddington, ‘Assessing the true effectiveness of AML/CFT controls in developing countries’ (Georgetownedu, April 15, 2011)

<https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553564/reddingtonBrandon.pdf? Sequence=1> accessed 29 March 2020


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[20] Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? (Routledge 2012) 77

[21] Fatf, ‘INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION updated October 2016’ (Financial Action Task Force, February 2012) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf>accessed 4 April 2020

[22] Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? (Routledge 2012) 77


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[25] Fatf, ‘Financial Action Task Force Annual Report 2015-2016’ (FATF Website, 2017) 

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[26] Johannes Dumbacher, ‘The fight against money laundering’ [July, 1995] 30(4) INTERECONOMICS177-186

[27] Steve Goodrich, ‘PARADISE LOST: ENDING THE UK’S ROLE AS A SAFE HAVEN FOR CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS, THEIR ALLIES AND ASSETS’ (Transparency International UK fighting corruption worldwide, April 2016) 

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[29] Rob Wainwright, ‘How we are losing the fight against global money laundering’ (LinkedIn website, 25 Oct 2017) 

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[30] Anne Ashworth, ‘Money laundering fight ‘being lost’’ (The Times Website, 19 May 2013) 

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(Transparency International UK fighting corruption worldwide, April

[32] Admin, ‘Major flaws in European anti-money laundering regimes exposed by new Transparency International EU report’ (Transparency International EU, 25 April 2017) 

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[33] Jill Treanor, ‘Deutsche Bank fined $630m over Russia money laundering claims’ (The guardian, 31 Jan 2017) 

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[34] Holly Whitehead, ‘Top 5 Money Laundering Cases of the Last 30 Years’ (International Compliance Training, 22 July 2016) 

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