In terms of Sec83 of Registration Act, prosecution may be lodged by or with the permission of Sub-Registrar in whose territory the offence has been committed, clarifies Apex Court
Justices B.R. Gavai & Sanjay Karol [14-02-2024]
 

Read Order: NAVIN KUMAR RAI v. SURENDRA SINGH AND ORS. ETC [SC-CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 890-891 OF 2024]

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, February 16, 2024: While observing that the power to set in motion the criminal machinery is totally distinct from the cancellation of registration of the document, the Supreme Court has restored a quashed FIR and consequent case registered u/s 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860to the file of the concerned district Court.

The facts of the case were such that one Purushotam Kumar (A-1) forged a Power of Attorney (PoA) on the basis of which transfer of certain land in favour of Bikash Kumar Singh, S/o Surendra Singh (A-2), Surendra Singh (A-3) with the latter witnessing the sale transaction stood registered with the Registrar having competent jurisdiction at a place known as Giridih. The original owner Naveen Kumar Rai, having learnt of such an illegal transaction instituted proceedings before a Civil Court seeking a declaration of the transaction to be null and void.

Independently, the District Deputy Registrar, Giridih initiated an inquiry in terms of Circular No.15/R(Miscellaneous)Public Applications-04/16 (Circular) dated Nil resulting in the passing of an order, prima facie holding A-1 to have forged the PoA impersonating Naveen Kumar Rai, leading to the execution of a sale deed which document also stood registered with the very same Authority. Resultantly, on the basis of such an inquiry both the documents i.e., the PoA and the sale deed stood cancelled. Further, on the basis of the communication dated 15th October, 2020 that of the District Deputy Registrar, Giridih, FIR bearing the above-noted particulars stood registered by SahdeoMehra, against seven accused persons including A-1, A-2 and A-3.

Assailing the said action of initiation of criminal proceedings, the accused persons preferred separate writ petitions. The appeals before the Supreme Court called into question the correctness of a common judgment by which the Jharkhand High Courtquashed the FIR registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).The FIR was quashed via the impugned judgment on the ground that the original owner had already initiated civil proceedings, no act of “criminality” could be said to be “made out”; initiation of criminal prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of Court and the alleged action “appears” to be “a civil wrong” in relation to which, “with respect to the same cause of action” the title suit was pending.

The Division Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Sanjay Karol was of the view that the premise on which the Court proceeded in quashing the FIR was on the wrong assumption, interpretation, and application of the law.

It was argued before the Bench that the Circular stood quashed vide a judgment titled as Vinod Shankar Jha @ Binod Shankar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. with connected writ petitions.“Be that as it may. We are of the opinion that such a decision would have no bearing on the merits of the instant appeals”, the Bench said while adding that the Circular primarily envisaged action for cancellation of the document by the authorities itself, whereas the power to set in motion the criminal machinery is totally independent and distinct from the cancellation of registration of the document.

It was also elucidated that Section 82 and 83 of the Registration Act, 1908, empowers the Inspector General; the Registrar; or the Sub-Registrar, in whose territories, district, or sub-district, the offence stands committed to commence prosecution.

Given that the FIR against which the petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) had been preferred were offences contained only in the IPC, the Bench opined that the Court was required to consider whether any of the well-established grounds that are enumerated in judgments of this Court viz., State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtraand reiterated inPeethambaran v. State of Kerala  were made out or not.

The Bench also clarified that the Court’s observation that because there is no order of the Inspector General, “in spite of that this FIR has been lodged by the District Sub-Registrar, Giridih, which is against Section 83 of the Registration Act, 1908” as demonstrated (supra) was completely divorced from the text of the Section itself, for, it providesthat a prosecution may be lodged by or with the permission of the Sub-Registrar in whose territory the offence has been committed.

Noting that for such reasons the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in the attending facts and circumstances, was unjustified and entirely unsustainable, the Bench allowed the appeals while asking the appellant to appear before the Court on 01.03.2024.