In RSA No.407 of 1995-PUNJ HC- If compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to interest of minor, then he has every right to challenge consent decree on attaining majority: P&H HC
Justice Jagmohan Bansal [05-01-2023]

 

Read Order: Siri Chand and Others v. Ram Gopal and Others

Monika Rahar

Chandigarh, January 23, 2023: The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has held that a compromise which is founded on fraud, suppression or coercion is bad in the eyes of law. 

“A decree based upon fraud may be set aside because fraud nullifies everything. If a compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to interest of a minor, he has every right to challenge consent decree on attaining majority”, the Bench of Justice Jagmohan Bansal held. 

Rampat, issueless and owner of an agriculture land, executed a Will in 1968 in favour of sons (Angad, Sispal, Jagdish and Ram Gopal) of Puran Singh (his cousin). 

Inder Singh and Biro are real siblings of Puran Singh. Wazira, Modan, and Siri Chand- children of Dhannu (cousin of Puran Singh) who were appellants in present appeal, challenged aforesaid Will by way of a civil suit which came to be decreed in their favour by the Trial Court which declared the Will to be invalid and made appellants entitled to half share of the land in question. 

The respondents filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Sirsa, during the pendency of which, a compromise was arrived at between the contesting parties. According to this compromise, 62 kanal land came in the share of present appellants. The respondents No. 6 and 7 herein were parties to appeal before Appellate Court but were not parties to compromise. They preferred an RSA before this Court which was allowed. The High Court upheld the compromise decree, however, remanded the matter to the extent of rights of respondents No. 6 and 7. 

The Additional District Judge, Sirsa after remand, passed judgment and decree, according to which, half share of the suit land came in the share of respondents No. 5 to 7 and 62 kanal land came in the share of present appellants. The rest came in the share of the first four respondents. 

The first two respondents challenged the compromise judgment(s) and decree(s) on the ground that the compromise decree was passed in violation of mandate of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”) because at the time of compromise, they were minors. The suit was dismissed, thus, the respondents filed an appeal which was allowed. The present regular second appeal assailed the judgment and decree whereby compromise, judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge was set aside.

The following three questions arose before the Court- whether respondents could challenge consent/compromise judgments and decrees passed by Additional District Judge before Senior Sub Judge i.e. a Court different from Court which passed consent/compromise decree; whether act of parents was prejudicial to the interest of respondents herein; and whether suit for simple declaration without relief of possession was maintainable?

With respect to the first question, the Court opined that the suit before Senior Sub Judge assailing the consent decree was not maintainable and the respondents herein, were supposed to approach the same court i.e. the Court of Additional District Judge which passed consent decree on the basis of compromise, in case of any grievance. The Bench observed that while Rampat executed Will in favour of his cousin’s sons, none of them was minor. Ram Gopal and Jagdish had 

Further, while noting that the appellants before courts below raised a question of principle of res judicata, the bench observed that the question of maintainability of suit is a pure question of law which can be raised at any stage, thus, appellants were well within their right to raise question of maintainability of suit before incorrect forum. 

Another aspect which the Court observed was that the Will was challenged by appellants herein and decree was passed in their favour. The bench noted that the Will was in favour of four persons, two of whom were parties qua the compromise decree up to this court and two persons challenged the compromise decree before Civil Court and Appellate Court. 

“If a compromise decree is set aside, it would amount to adjudication of suit in favour of four persons in whose favour Will was executed though two of them have already settled their dispute way back in 1984-85. It would also amount to declaration of earlier adjudication by different courts including this court a futile exercise”, the Court observed. 

Thus, the Court held that the present appeal deserved to be allowed on the sole ground that the consent decree was not challenged before the same court which passed consent decree.

With respect to the second issue, the Court opined that the compromise arrived at by father of the respondents was prejudicial to the interest of the respondents who were minor at the time to execution of compromise, thus, compromise and consent decree was contrary to mandate of Order 32 Rule 7 of CPC.

The Bench observed, 

“The Courts time and again has clearly held that a compromise which is founded on fraud, suppression or coercion is bad in the eye of law. A decree based upon fraud may be set aside because fraud nullifies everything. If a compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to the interest of a minor, he has every right to challenge the consent decree on attaining majority.”

In view of peculiar facts and findings, the court did not find that parents of respondents acted in prejudice to the interest of the respondents herein, thus, the Bench held that it could not be concluded that compromise was against the interest of minors or first Appellate Court passed consent decree contrary to the interest of minors. 

“The respondents are unnecessarily trying to disturb the settled litigation. It is contrary to the principle of res judicata. Every matter deserves to be put to rest. Parties cannot repeatedly raise their grouse on the basis of one or another ground. Such type of litigation is against public policy”, the Bench held. 

Regarding the third and the last issue, the Court held that in the case in hand, the land in question was in the possession of appellants. The Bench added that the respondents herein filed various applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC for restraining the appellants from selling the land or restraining them from dispossessing from the suit land which came to be dismissed. 

While observing that the counsel was not disputing the fact that land in question, at the time of filing suit assailing compromise decree, was in the possession of appellants, the Bench observed, 

“In view of above-cited judgment of this Court and undisputed fact that land at the time of filing suit was in the possession of the appellants herein and respondents did not seek relief of possession of land, the suit seeking declaration was not maintainable”. 

 Appeals arising out of impugned judgment and decree, were thus allowed.  

In RSA No.407 of 1995-PUNJ HC- If compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to interest of minor, then he has every right to challenge consent decree on attaining majority: P&H HC Justice Jagmohan Bansal [05-01-2023]

Read Order: Siri Chand and Others v. Ram Gopal and Others

Monika Rahar

Chandigarh, January 23, 2023: The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has held that a compromise which is founded on fraud, suppression or coercion is bad in the eyes of law. 

“A decree based upon fraud may be set aside because fraud nullifies everything. If a compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to interest of a minor, he has every right to challenge consent decree on attaining majority”, the Bench of Justice Jagmohan Bansal held. 

Rampat, issueless and owner of an agriculture land, executed a Will in 1968 in favour of sons (Angad, Sispal, Jagdish and Ram Gopal) of Puran Singh (his cousin). 

Inder Singh and Biro are real siblings of Puran Singh. Wazira, Modan, and Siri Chand- children of Dhannu (cousin of Puran Singh) who were appellants in present appeal, challenged aforesaid Will by way of a civil suit which came to be decreed in their favour by the Trial Court which declared the Will to be invalid and made appellants entitled to half share of the land in question. 

The respondents filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Sirsa, during the pendency of which, a compromise was arrived at between the contesting parties. According to this compromise, 62 kanal land came in the share of present appellants. The respondents No. 6 and 7 herein were parties to appeal before Appellate Court but were not parties to compromise. They preferred an RSA before this Court which was allowed. The High Court upheld the compromise decree, however, remanded the matter to the extent of rights of respondents No. 6 and 7. 

The Additional District Judge, Sirsa after remand, passed judgment and decree, according to which, half share of the suit land came in the share of respondents No. 5 to 7 and 62 kanal land came in the share of present appellants. The rest came in the share of the first four respondents. 

The first two respondents challenged the compromise judgment(s) and decree(s) on the ground that the compromise decree was passed in violation of mandate of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”) because at the time of compromise, they were minors. The suit was dismissed, thus, the respondents filed an appeal which was allowed. The present regular second appeal assailed the judgment and decree whereby compromise, judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge was set aside.

The following three questions arose before the Court- whether respondents could challenge consent/compromise judgments and decrees passed by Additional District Judge before Senior Sub Judge i.e. a Court different from Court which passed consent/compromise decree; whether act of parents was prejudicial to the interest of respondents herein; and whether suit for simple declaration without relief of possession was maintainable?

With respect to the first question, the Court opined that the suit before Senior Sub Judge assailing the consent decree was not maintainable and the respondents herein, were supposed to approach the same court i.e. the Court of Additional District Judge which passed consent decree on the basis of compromise, in case of any grievance. The Bench observed that while Rampat executed Will in favour of his cousin’s sons, none of them was minor. Ram Gopal and Jagdish had 

Further, while noting that the appellants before courts below raised a question of principle of res judicata, the bench observed that the question of maintainability of suit is a pure question of law which can be raised at any stage, thus, appellants were well within their right to raise question of maintainability of suit before incorrect forum. 

Another aspect which the Court observed was that the Will was challenged by appellants herein and decree was passed in their favour. The bench noted that the Will was in favour of four persons, two of whom were parties qua the compromise decree up to this court and two persons challenged the compromise decree before Civil Court and Appellate Court. 

“If a compromise decree is set aside, it would amount to adjudication of suit in favour of four persons in whose favour Will was executed though two of them have already settled their dispute way back in 1984-85. It would also amount to declaration of earlier adjudication by different courts including this court a futile exercise”, the Court observed. 

Thus, the Court held that the present appeal deserved to be allowed on the sole ground that the consent decree was not challenged before the same court which passed consent decree.

With respect to the second issue, the Court opined that the compromise arrived at by father of the respondents was prejudicial to the interest of the respondents who were minor at the time to execution of compromise, thus, compromise and consent decree was contrary to mandate of Order 32 Rule 7 of CPC.

The Bench observed, 

“The Courts time and again has clearly held that a compromise which is founded on fraud, suppression or coercion is bad in the eye of law. A decree based upon fraud may be set aside because fraud nullifies everything. If a compromise decree is based upon fraud and is contrary to the interest of a minor, he has every right to challenge the consent decree on attaining majority.”

In view of peculiar facts and findings, the court did not find that parents of respondents acted in prejudice to the interest of the respondents herein, thus, the Bench held that it could not be concluded that compromise was against the interest of minors or first Appellate Court passed consent decree contrary to the interest of minors. 

“The respondents are unnecessarily trying to disturb the settled litigation. It is contrary to the principle of res judicata. Every matter deserves to be put to rest. Parties cannot repeatedly raise their grouse on the basis of one or another ground. Such type of litigation is against public policy”, the Bench held. 

Regarding the third and the last issue, the Court held that in the case in hand, the land in question was in the possession of appellants. The Bench added that the respondents herein filed various applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC for restraining the appellants from selling the land or restraining them from dispossessing from the suit land which came to be dismissed. 

While observing that the counsel was not disputing the fact that land in question, at the time of filing suit assailing compromise decree, was in the possession of appellants, the Bench observed, 

“In view of above-cited judgment of this Court and undisputed fact that land at the time of filing suit was in the possession of the appellants herein and respondents did not seek relief of possession of land, the suit seeking declaration was not maintainable”. 

 Appeals arising out of impugned judgment and decree, were thus allowed.