In FAO No. 2750 of 2015-PUNJ HC- Limitation shall not begin from date of gaining knowledge of arbitral award but from receipt of copy of award, holds P&H HC
Justice Avneesh Jhingan [24-05-2023] 

Read Order: M/s Atlanta Electricals (P) Ltd Vs. Superintending Engineer, MM-II, PKL And Another 

Tulip Kanth

Chandigarh, May 26, 2023: While considering an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the dismissal of objections under Section 34, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has opined that once objections u/s 34 were dismissed as time barred, the District Judge should not have considered the merits of the case.

“Under Section 31(5) of the Act, the arbitrator is under an obligation to deliver signed copy of the arbitral award to the parties. As per Section 34(3) of the Act, the limitation to file objections begins from the date of receipt of arbitral award”, Justice Avneesh Jhingan held.

In this matter, the appellant was a successful bidder for a tender issued by Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. for supply of high power transformers. The terms and conditions provide for dispute resolution through arbitration. The arbitration proceedings initiated at the instance of the Nigam culminated in award. The objections filed by the appellant were dismissed as time barred as well as on merits.

The appellants contended that that the objections filed were within time and the limitation would start running from the service of copy of the award. It was argued that once the objections were dismissed as time barred, the court had no jurisdiction to decide the matter on merits.

The Bench opined that the District Judge had dismissed the objections as time barred on the ground that the appellant had the knowledge of passing of the arbitral award. 

“There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that limitation shall not begin from the date of gaining knowledge of the award but from receipt of copy of the award”, the Bench said while further noting that there was no finding recorded on the basis of the material available on record that when arbitral award was delivered to the appellant or that ingredients of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were fulfilled for invoking presumption of service of a document.

The Bench also reaffirmed that once the objections under Section 34 of the Act were dismissed as time barred, the District Judge should not have considered the merits of the case. 

“Without commenting on the merits of the case, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back for deciding the objections under Section 34 of the Act afresh, including the issue of limitation”, the Bench held while disposing off the petition.