In Criminal Appeal No. 1693 of 2022-SC- Sec.125 CrPC falls within Constitutional sweep of Article 15(3), reinforced by Article 39 of Constitution; Such provision is measure of social justice specially enacted to protect women and children: SC
Justices Bela M. Trivedi & Dinesh Maheshwari [28-09-2022]

Read Order: ANJU GARG & ANR. Vs DEEPAK KUMAR GARG

Mansimran Kaur

New Delhi, September 29, 2022: Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial suffering of a woman who is required to leave the matrimonial home, so that some suitable arrangements could be made to enable her to sustain herself and the children, the Supreme Court has observed. 

The Division bench of Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Dinesh Maheshwari dismissed the  present appeals   directed against the judgment and order dated September  10, 2018 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Revision of 2017, whereby the High Court dismissed the Revision application filed by the appellants, challenging the order passed by the District Judge, Family Court-1. 

The division bench was of the view that the High Court thoroughly  misdirected itself by not granting the maintenance to the appellant-wife. 

The Family Court through order dated December 9, 2016  had dismissed the Maintenance Petition filed by the appellants under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., qua the first appellant- wife ) and her daughter Ms. Megha Garg  had allowed the application qua the son- the second appellant  granting him maintenance allowance of Rs. 6,000/- per month from the date of filing of application till he attained the age of 18 years. 

The short facts giving rise to the present Appeal are that the appellant no.1 and the respondent had married on December 17, 1991 as per the Hindu rites and out of the said wedlock, two children i.e., daughter Megha Garg and son Rachit Garg were born. 

The appellants (original applicants) filed the Maintenance Petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the respondent alleging inter-alia that the respondent was subjecting the appellant-wife to utmost cruelty and physical and mental torture. 

As a result thereof, she had to leave her matrimonial home along with children time and again. Allegations were also made against the respondent that he was demanding Rs. One crore as dowry from the father of the appellant no. 1. 

Ultimately, the appellant along with her children left the matrimonial home in 2010 and started residing in a rental premises. According to the appellants-applicants, the respondent had failed and neglected to maintain them, and they being unable to maintain themselves, the Maintenance Petition under section 125 of Cr.P.C. was filed. 

The Family Court had granted Interim Maintenance Allowance of Rs. 40,000 per month in favor of the appellants, however, the daughter Megha having attained majority, no interim maintenance was granted to her.

Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants had preferred the revision application before the High Court, which was dismissed through the impugned order.

After considering the submissions of the parties, the Court noted that Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial suffering of a woman who is required to leave the matrimonial home, so that some suitable arrangements could be made to enable her to sustain herself and the children, as observed by this Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena & Ors.

 In Chaturbhuj vs, Sita Bai, it was held that the object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife, by providing her food, clothing, and shelter by a speedy remedy. As settled by this Court, Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children.  It also falls within the Constitutional sweep of Article 15(3), reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India, the Bench held.

 The Family Court, in the instant case had not only overlooked and disregarded the aforesaid settled legal position, but had proceeded with the proceedings in an absolutely perverted manner.

 The very fact that the right of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses of the appellant-original applicant was closed, as he had failed to appear before the Family Court despite the issuance of warrants, clearly established that he had no regards for his own family nor had any regards for the Court or for the law, the Court further noted. 

In absence of any evidence on record adduced by the respondent disputing the evidence adduced by the appellant, the Family Court could not have passed the order believing the oral submissions of the counsel for the respondent. She had clearly stated as to how she was harassed and subjected to cruelty by the respondent, which had constrained her to leave the matrimonial home along with her children, and as to how the respondent had failed and neglected to maintain her and her children. She had also proved by producing documentary evidence that her father had paid money to the respondent from time to time to help the respondent for his business. 

Even if the allegations of demand of dowry by the respondent were not believed, there was enough evidence to believe that money was being paid to the respondent by the father of the appellant-wife, which substantiated her allegation that the respondent was demanding money from her father and was subjecting her to harassment, the Court further noted. 

The  Family Court granted the Maintenance petition so far as the appellant-son was concerned, nonetheless had thoroughly mis-directed itself by not granting the maintenance to the appellant-wife, the Court observed.  Such an erroneous and perverse order of Family Court was unfortunately confirmed by the High Court by passing a very perfunctory impugned order. The High Court, without assigning any reasons, passed the impugned order in a very casual manner, the Court noted. 

This Court would have remanded the matter back to the High Court for considering it afresh, however considering the fact that the matter was pending before this Court since the last four years, and remanding it back would further delay the proceedings, this Court deemed it proper to pass this order. 

In view of the same, the appeals were accordingly allowed.