In CR.A.Nos. 572-573 OF 2019-SC- Law provides full coverage to person established to be child on date of offence to avail benefits under Juvenile Justice Act even if case has been finally decided & such person has attained majority: SC
Justices B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath & Sanjay Karol [03-03-2023]

Read Judgment: KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, March 13, 2023: While upholding the conviction but setting aside the sentence imposed upon the appellant-accused in a case of rape and murder of a minor girl, the Supreme Court has opined that the object under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015  is only to ensure that if the juvenile could be brought into the main stream by awarding lesser sentence and also directing for other facilities for welfare of the juvenile in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under the Act.

“Having considered the statutory provisions laid down in section 9 of the 2015 Act and also section 7A of the 2000 Act which is identical to section 9 of the 2015 Act, we are of the view that merits of the conviction could be tested and the conviction which was recorded cannot be held to be vitiated in law merely because the inquiry was not conducted by JJB. It is only the question of sentence for which the provisions of the 2015 Act would be attracted and any sentence in excess of what is permissible under the 2015 Act will have to be accordingly amended as per the provisions of the 2015 Act”, the Larger Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sanjay Karol opined.

The appellant in this case was charged for offences under sections 363, 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code , sections 5(m)/6 of the POCSO Act and sections 302 and 201 IPC. The Trial Court convicted the appellant for all the offences. The appeals assailed the correctness of the judgment whereby a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, affirmed the death sentence awarded by the Trial Court and at the same time dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against his conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court and the death reference forwarded by the Trial Court was affirmed. During the pendency of these appeals, the appellant moved an application under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 claiming juvenility. This Court required the Trial Court to submit its report after due inquiry as to whether the appellant was a juvenile on the date when the offence in question was committed. 

Pursuant to the said order, a report had been received from the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge as per which the appellant’s date of birth was found to be conclusively proved as July 25, 2002. The date of the incident being December 15, 2017, the appellant was 15 years 4 months and 20 days of age on the date of the incident.

It was submitted from the appellant's side that that for the present appellant was only pressing the plea of juvenility and if he failed on that count then the issue of conviction and sentence would be addressed.

The Bench took note of the fact that the report was based upon documentary evidence as also oral evidence of the present head-mistress, the retired headmaster, five teachers of the primary institution and also the guardian of the appellant. 

It was noticed by the Top Court that the institution was not a private institution but it was a government primary school and the Bench did not find any reason to dis-believe or even doubt the testimony of government servants both working and retired. 

In addition to the mark sheets by the Institution, there was also the date of birth certificate issued by the institution. Further, the original Scholar register and other documents were also produced before the Trial Court in the inquiry. Without finding any reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court regarding the date of birth of the appellant, the Bench accepted the report of the Trial Court and held that the appellant was aged 15 years, 4 months and 20 days on the date of the incident.

The Bench also rejected the arguments of the State on the ground that birth certificate from a government primary school was available and there was no reason to doubt its correctness when it had been duly proved in the inquiry before the Trial Court.

Placing reliance on section 9, the Bench said, “The proviso to sub-section (2) further makes it clear that such a claim can be raised before any Court and the same could be recognised at any stage even after the case has been finally decided. The claim so made would be determined in accordance with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the rules made thereunder even if such person has seized to be a child whether on or before the commencement of 2015 Act. The law provides full coverage to a person who is established to be a child on the date of the offence to avail the benefits admissible to a child under the 2015 Act even if the case has been finally decided and also such person has attained majority.”

The Bench also held that the appellant having been held to be a child on the date of commission of the offence, the sentence imposed had to be made ineffective.

“In the present case, the appellant is held to be less than 16 years, and therefore, the maximum punishment that could be awarded is upto 3 years. The appellant has already undergone more than 5 years. His incarceration beyond 3 years would be illegal, and therefore, he would be liable to be released forthwith on this count also”, the Bench added.

Thus,approving its view in Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Satya Deo alias Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Top Court upheld the conviction of the appellant. However, the sentence was set aside. 

“Further as the appellant at present would be more than 20 years old, there would be no requirement of sending him to the JJB or any other child care facility or institution. Appellant is in judicial custody. He shall be released forthwith”, the Bench ordered.