In CRA-D-97-DB of 2010 (O&M)-PUNJ HC- Extra-judicial confession is weak kind of evidence, however, when such confession is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence, it can be believed by trial Court: P&H HC
Justices Sureshwar Thakur & N.S.Shekhawat [12-10-2022]

Read Order: Kanwar Pal @ Palu v. State of Haryana

Monika Rahar

Chandigarh, October 26, 2022: While dealing with an appeal by a drunkard murder convict who killed his own wife and two minor children to get rid of them, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that no doubt extra-judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence, however, when such confession is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence, it can be believed by the trial Court. 

“Whenever a Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution, intends to base a conviction on an extra judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities or does not appear to be cogent, it may be unsafe for the Court to base a conviction on such an confession”, the Bench of Justices Sureshwar Thakur and N.S.Shekhawat held. 

The Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the Trial Court whereby the appellant was held guilty for murder and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 

An FIR was registered when the death by strangulation, of the appellant’s wife and two minor children, was reported by the father of the deceased wife who found the dead bodies of the three lying on a bed having marks on their necks signaling killing by strangulation.

The accused was presented before the Police by the uncle of the deceased-wife along with one other, where he was formally arrested by the police and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of investigation and finding sufficient incriminating evidence, the accused-appellant was chargesheeted.

The prosecution examined the complainant who stood the test of cross-examination and reiterated his statement made in the FIR. The second prosecution witness was uncle of the deceased-wife who testified that the appellant, a drunkeard and idel man, murdered his niece and her two children, by colluding with his father and brother. He also deposed that the appellant visited him after commission of the crime and confessed that he was ashemed of the fact that often visited women of easy virtues and thus had a suspicion that he was suffering from AIDS, and therefore, he murdered his wife and children.

The Counsel for the appellant challenged the judgment of the Trial Court on the ground that the entire chain of circumstances was not established beyond reasonable doubt so as to leave any room for a hypothesis, which was not compatible with the innocence of the accused. It was argued that the facts of the case may raise a grave suspicion that the appellant might have committed the crime, but such strong suspicion cannot take the place of the proof, which is the sole responsibility of the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt. 

It was also vehemently contended that no motive was established by the prosecution for the appellant to kill his own wife and two minor children. Further, the Counsel argued that the motives (shame due to AIDS) were not corroborated by any independent evidence or any complaint being lodged against the appellant at any point of time, infact, the Counsel added that the medical report regarding AIDS was found to be negative. 

At the very outset, the Court noted that in this case, there was no eye witness and the entire case of the prosecution rested on circumstantial evidence. Thus, the Court observed that the normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an adverse inference of guilt of the accused is sought to be drawn must be cogently and conclusively established. 

Thus, the circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that even in all human probabilities the crime was committed by the accused and they should be capable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence, the Bench added. 

Further, on the factual aspects of the case, the Court observed that there was enough incriminating evidence and the prosecution evidence had established that the deceased along with her two children was staying in her home with the present appellant and that plea of alibi taken by the appellant failed because he did not adduce any evidence to support the said plea. 

The Court also observed that all the three deceased were subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant within four walls of the house and it was impossible to find witnesses and it was obligatory on the appellant to satisfy the Court as to how, where and in what manner Sushma and her two children parted company with him. 

This was based on the principle that as per the case of the prosecution, the appellant was residing with his wife and their two children and it was for the appellant to explain the circumstances, in which, they parted the company. “No such valid plea, duly substantiated by the evidence, has been raised by the present appellant. Thus, the prosecution had discharged the initial burden and provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be safely invoked in the instant case”, the Court held. 

On the argument of the appellant’s counsel on lack of motive, the Court held that in this case, the prosecution led sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the complicity of the appellant in the crime. The Court observed that the complainant categorically argued that the appellant/accused used to remain idle at home and tortured his wife and two minor children, thus, ultimately, to get rid of all of them, he committed the murder of his three family members. Still further, the Bench observed that the appellant, in order to mislead, stated before the uncle of the deceased wife that he was suffering from AIDS and consequently, he murdered his family, to save them from the stigma.

“Apparently, the murder was committed as the appellant wanted to get rid of his family members”, the Bench held while also adding,

“No doubt, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the motive should ordinarily be proved against the accused, however, the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case”. 

Further, on the question of extrajudicial confession, the Court held that no doubt extra judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence, however, when such confession is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence, it can be believed by the trial Court. 

“Whenever a Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution, intends to base a conviction on an extra judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities or does not appear to be cogent, it may be unsafe for the Court to base a conviction on such a confession”, the Court added. 

Also, the Court opined that no doubt, the testimony of a related witness has to be scrutinized with care and circumspection, but it can always be believed if the same inspires confidence.

Finding substance in the case of the prosecution, the instant appeal was dismissed.