Read Order: Jai Pal Kamia v. Main Pal & Another
Chandigarh, April 20, 2022: While dealing with a revision petition impugning the Execution Court order in an eviction matter, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that it is not within the domain of the Executing Court to allow the tenant-judgment debtor to engage any handwriting expert for the comparison of the signatures of the landlord on the compromise deed and other documents so as to look into and decide the controversy between the parties qua the same.
The Bench of Justice Meenakshi I. Mehta made the above-stated observation of law on the ground that the Executing Court cannot travel beyond the scope of the decree.
The facts culminating in the filing of the present petition are that the respondents (‘the landlords’) filed a petition against the tenant under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 for seeking his eviction from the shop on the ground floor and one room on the first floor of the property (‘the demised premises’) on the grounds of non-payment of the arrears of rent as well as personal necessity.
During its pendency, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement of their dispute and in pursuance thereof, the said petition was allowed directing the tenant to vacate the demised premises in a time-bound manner. But, he did not comply with the said order and therefore, the landlords preferred the Execution Petition for seeking the possession of the said premises.
However, the tenant filed the Objection petition in the said execution proceedings while averring that landlord sworn an affidavit in 2017 deposing regarding the payment of Rs. 25 lac to him (tenant) by way of two post-dated, one of which (worth Rs.10 lac) was dishonoured and then, the afore-named landlord entered into a fresh settlement with him and executed a compromise-deed agreeing therein that he (landlord) would execute the Sale Deed qua his share in the demised premises in his (tenant’s) favour, in lieu of the payment of the said amount of Rs. 25 lac but thereafter, the landlords filed the Execution Petition.
The Execution Court dismissed the objection so filed and the appeal of the tenant against this order was also dismissed.
While restating the objections of the tenant filed before the execution Court the counsel for the tenant argued that n the Objection petition was wrongly dismissed without first deciding the application as moved by him for engaging the handwriting expert for the comparison/ verification of the signatures of the above-named landlord on the compromise deed and other relevant documents and that the Appeal preferred against the said order was also erroneously dismissed vide the impugned judgment.
He further contended that the factum of the said compromise deed having been executed between the parties, was required to be taken into consideration by the Executing Court in view of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance was placed upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in ‘Tanzeem-e-Sufia vs. Bibi Haliman and Others’ AIR 2002 Supreme Court 3083, in support of his contentions.
Per-contra, the counsel for the respondents argued that the above-mentioned affidavit and compromise deed were forged and fabricated documents and the same were never sworn/executed by the said landlord and even otherwise, the compromise, as claimed to have been arrived at between the parties, was an event subsequent to the passing of the eviction order and therefore, the genuineness and veracity of the same could not be looked into and adjudicated upon by the Executing Court and the same was not covered under the provisions of Section 47 of the CPC.
The court, while recording its dissatisfaction with the contention of the petitioner’s counsel, observed that the affidavit was shown to have been sworn on February 21, 2017 whereas a perusal of the copies of the statements of the tenant and landlord showed that the same were recorded by the Rent Controller on March 02, 2017, i.e after the alleged attestation of the said affidavit but strangely, there was not even a whisper about this affidavit in these statements. Thus, the Court opined that as per the affidavit, the above-said Eviction Petition was to be withdrawn by the landlord on that very day (February 21, 2017) itself but the same was, rather, allowed on April 20, 2017, in view of the statements of the parties as recorded on March 02, 2017, and had, thus, not been withdrawn in terms of the afore-discussed depositions as contained in the said affidavit.
Also, the Court noted that the tenant did not come forward with any fair, candid and justifiable reason as to why he had not pressed for the compliance of the terms and conditions of the alleged settlement, as detailed in the affidavit and rather, preferred to make a statement for allowing the said Eviction Petition against him.
“These facts cast a shadow of doubt on the version of the tenant qua the said affidavit”, asserted Justice Mehta.
Further, on the issue of execution of the compromise deed, the Court observed that the said deed was executed after the passage of the eviction order. Thus, the Court held that undoubtedly, by virtue of Section 47 CPC the Executing Court is required to the determination of the questions pertaining to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree but it is also well-settled that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the scope of the decree and it being so, the dispute regarding the execution, genuineness and truthfulness of the said compromise deed could, by no stretch of the imagination, be construed to be the matter falling within the four corners of the said provisions.
Lastly, regarding the plea pertaining to the pendency of the said application, as moved by the tenant-Objector for engaging the handwriting expert, the Court held that the Executing Court cannot travel beyond the scope of the decree and therefore, it would not be within the domain of the Executing Court to allow the tenant-judgment debtor to engage any such expert for the comparison of the signatures of the landlord on the compromise deed and other documents so as to look into and decide the controversy between the parties qua the same and it being so, the plea regarding the pendency of the said application at the time of the dismissal of the Objection petition filed by the tenant, pales into insignificance.
As a sequel to the foregoing discussion, the Court did not find any illegality, infirmity, irregularity or perversity in the impugned order and the judgment so as to warrant any interference by the Court.
Resultantly, the present revision petition was dismissed.