In Civil Appeal No. 6190 of 2023 -SC- In departmental inquiries, strict & technical rules of evidence & procedure do not apply, observes Top Court while setting aside Gauhati HC order & restoring penalty on public servant convicted for sexual harassment
Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala & Justice Manoj Misra [06-11-2023]

Read Order: Union of India and Others V. Dilip Paul

Chahat Varma

New Delhi, November 8, 2023: In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court has restored the penalty imposed on a public servant who was convicted for sexual harassment. The Apex Court found that the Gauhati High Court had made a significant error in its judgment and order by setting aside the penalty on technical grounds.

In the said case, the Gauhati High Court had allowed a writ petition filed by Dilip Paul (respondent/original petitioner) and set aside the penalty of withholding 50% of his pension for all times to come. The penalty was imposed on him in disciplinary proceedings initiated based on allegations of sexual harassment.

The case involved a complaint of sexual harassment filed by a female employee against the respondent, who was serving as the Area Organizer at the Service Selection Board (SSB) office in Rangia, Assam.

First, the High Court took the view that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted by the competent authority to inquire into only the first complaint dated 30.08.2011, however, the Central Complaints Committee during the course of its inquiry also looked into the allegations levelled in the second Complaint dated 18.09.2012 which it could not have. Secondly, the Central Complaints Committee while conducting the inquiry, could not have assumed the role of a prosecutor by putting questions to the witnesses. According to the High Court, the same vitiated the inquiry proceedings. Thirdly, the Central Complaints Committee could be said to have based its findings on surmises and conjectures. The High Court recorded that the case was one of No Evidence.

A three-judge bench of Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra remarked, “Sexual harassment is a pervasive and deeply rooted issue that has plagued the societies worldwide. In India, it has been a matter of serious concern, and the development of laws to combat sexual harassment is a testament to the nations commitment towards addressing this problem.”

The bench noted that a significant turning point in addressing the pressing issue of sexual harassment of women in the workplace can be traced back to the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others [LQ/SC/1997/1113]. In this case, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment in the workplace as a violation of a woman's fundamental right to equality and dignity.

The bench observed that Rule 3C of the 1964 Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and the Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965 Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, read with the 2006 Standing Order, collectively constitute the comprehensive legislative framework for addressing sexual harassment in the context of Central civil services and posts.

The bench emphasized that in disciplinary proceedings, the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority are considered as the fact-finding authorities. Therefore, during the process of judicial review, the courts should refrain from acting as appellate bodies or reevaluating the evidence. The scope of judicial review of the courts is limited only to the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure.

Further, the bench provided guidance on how the courts should exercise their powers of judicial review in matters related to disciplinary proceedings, especially those involving sexual harassment. It referred to the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [LQ/SC/1999/42], wherein the court emphasized that courts should not be overly influenced by minor discrepancies or hyper-technicalities. When assessing allegations, the context of the entire case must be considered, and the courts should exercise caution before showing sympathy or leniency towards the accused party.

The bench also clarified that under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order, a complaint regarding sexual harassment could be made to the complaints committee, irrespective of whether a prior complaint had already been made to another authority. In this particular case, it was noted that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted on August 6, 2012, and its first hearing took place on September 25, 2012. The second complaint was filed by the complainant before the Central Complaints Committee on September 18, 2012. The bench determined that the second complaint had been promptly filed right after the committee was constituted and well before its first hearing.

The bench rejected the reasoning given by the High Court, which stated that the scope of inquiry of the Central Complaints Committee was restricted to the content of the first complaint. The bench stated that the existence of the committee was based on the 2006 Standing Order and not solely on the complaint itself. Additionally, even if it was assumed that the committee owed its existence to the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order allows for the filing of a complaint to the committee after it has come into existence.

Thus, the bench concluded that there was no legal restriction preventing the Central Complaints Committee from investigating the allegations presented in the second complaint dated 18.09.2012. In departmental inquiries, strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure do not apply.

Further, the bench noted that in the case of Sakshi v. Union of India and Others [LQ/SC/2004/716], this Court had observed that in sensitive matters, especially those involving crimes against women, victims might not be able to openly disclose the entire incident due to fear or embarrassment. The victims often faced embarrassing questions during their testimony. To address this issue, the Court issued directions that for cross-examination of victims, the questions should be given to the presiding officer, who would then ask them in clear and non-embarrassing language.

The bench stated that there appears to be no statutory prohibition or logical reason to restrict the power of the complaints committee to ask questions to witnesses only within the context enumerated in the provision. The complaints committee, acting as an inquiry authority and, to some extent, akin to a presiding officer in light of the Sakshi case, should have the authority to pose questions on its own.

‘If the observations of the High Court are accepted, it would lead to a chilling effect, whereby the complaints committee which is deemed to be an inquiry authority would be reduced to a mere recording machine”, said the bench.

Also, the bench highlighted that there was some evidence on record that supported the allegations of sexual harassment made by the complainant. However, the High Court did not delve into the sufficiency of evidence, as it acknowledged that it was not permitted to determine the guilt of a public servant based on the adequacy of evidence. Instead, the High Court focused primarily on technical arguments raised by the respondent.

Based on the above-mentioned reasons, the Court concluded that the appeal should be allowed. It found that the High Court had made a significant error in its judgment and order. Consequently, the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was restored.