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District and Sessions Judge is fully competent to discharge employee during probation period if his work & conduct is found deficient: HC

Read Order: Bhupinder Singh v. District And Sessions Judge, Sangrur And Another 

LE Correspondent

Chandigarh, August 11, 2021: Dismissing the appeal of a terminated employee serving in the district court in Punjab’s Sangrur, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the District and Sessions Judge is fully competent to discharge the employee during probation period, if his work and conduct is found to be deficient.

The case pertains to the appellant who was appointed as peon in the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Sangrur by appointment letter dated 5.8.2019. As per the appointment letter, he was on probation for a period of two years and if his work and conduct is not found satisfactory then his services shall be terminated without any notice.

The appellant was found absent from the duties repeatedly, for which his explanation was called but the same was found unsatisfactory. Thereafter, a discreet inquiry was ordered to be conducted on which it was found that the peon was facing three criminal cases regarding which he never disclosed to his employer.

He was asked to furnish his explanation regarding the same. He did not deny the fact regarding registration of the criminal cases. This being the position, as the peon was under probation, the District and Sessions Judge did not deem it fit to initiate disciplinary inquiry against him and rather terminated the peon’s services by impugned order dated 3.6.2020.

The terminated peon filed a writ petition in the High court to challenge the said order of termination of his services. The Single Judge heard him at length and finally dismissed his petition.

Thereafter, he filed an appeal before the division bench and that too stands dismissed in the present petition by the bench of Justice Rajan Gupta and Justice Karamjit Singh.

The main thrust of the contentions raised by the counsel for the terminated employee was that since the termination order passed by the District and

Sessions Judge is stigmatic, therefore the same stands vitiated due to non-holding of the departmental inquiry.

The bench, however, observed that undisputedly, the appellant was found absent from duty on several occasions. He was granted an opportunity to explain his position. However, the explanation given by the appellant was found to be not satisfactory by the competent authority.

The record shows that three criminal cases were registered against him and in one such case he was arrested on 6.11.2019 by the police of Police Station Joga and was released on bail on 15.11.2019. The appellant gave no intimation or information regarding the same to his department.

According to the bench, the competent authority while passing the impugned order simply gave the brief detail of the aforesaid facts, which were concealed by the appellant from the department. 

“This being the position, the learned Single Judge rightly observed that whatever the stigma was attached to the character of the appellant (petitioner therein) on account of these criminal cases, already stood attached somewhere else because of the fact that the petitioner is facing these cases and he also remained in jail on account of the same,” the Division Bench said.

“The learned Single Judge further observed that the impugned order passed by the competent authority does not attach any additional quantum of stigma to the antecedents of the appellant (petitioner therein). Needless to say that had the competent authority not mentioned these facts in the impugned order then it would have been termed as a non-speaking order and would have vitiated for this reason alone, observed the bench.

Concluding the matter, the bench stated, “The impugned order does not disqualify the appellant from future employment as per his eligibility and suitability. It is simpliciter an order of termination of the services of the petitioner. In a sense, it is order of the discharge of the appellant from the service. The District and Sessions Judge was fully competent to discharge the employee during probation period, if his work and conduct was found deficient. Even as per the appointment letter (Annexure P-2), the appointment of the appellant was purely on temporary basis and liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reasons.”

Tenanted premises are deemed to be vacant in law pursuant to death of partners occupying it, in absence of legal heirs as per partnership deed: SC

Read Judgement: Davesh Nagalya (d) & Ors v. Pradeep Kumar (d) Thr. Lrs. And Ors

LE Staff

New Delhi, August 11, 2021: The Supreme Court has ruled that after the death of both partners and in the absence of any clause permitting continuation of the partnership by the legal heirs, the non-residential tenanted premises is deemed to be vacant in law as the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. 

While reiterating that partnership stands dissolved by death of a partner in terms of Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act, 1932 a Division Bench of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice A.S. Bopanna observed that the tenant is deemed to cease to occupy the premises in question and consequently, the tenanted property has fallen vacant as well.

The case pertains to an application, filed by Pradeep Kumar (successor-in-interest of tenant Tika Ram) before the Court of Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun, the District Magistrate, averring inclusion of Subhash Chand in the proposed business of sale of milk, which was opposed by the landlord. 

It was argued by the landlord that Subhash Chand was a sub-tenant and hence Pradeep Kumar had put such person in possession of the shop who was not a member of their family and thus the property would be deemed to be vacant u/s 12(2) of the Act. 

However, the District Magistrate permitted Subhash Chand to be inducted as a partner. Thereafter, remaining unsuccessful before the District Judge as well as the High Court, the appellant filed an application for review before the High Court on the ground that pursuant to the death of the tenant, Pradeep Kumar i.e., one of the partners of the firm, the partnership does not survive in view of Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act. 

The counsel for the appellant argued that in terms of Section 42(c), the partnership stands dissolved by law and there is no clause in the partnership deed which permits the legal heirs of the deceased partners to continue with the partnership firm. 

The review application was also dismissed which came to be challenged in the present appeal contending that the High Court had failed to take into consideration death of one of the partners leading to deemed vacation of the premises.

After considering all facts and averments, the Apex Court found that the order of permitting Subhash Chand as partner with Pradeep Kumar has come to an end by efflux of time and operation of law. 

“In terms of Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act, partnership stands dissolved by death of a partner. The High Court has not taken note of such fact in the review petition and failed to take into consideration the subsequent events which were germane to the controversy. Subhash Chand, the other partner also died during the pendency of appeal,” observed the Bench.

Therefore, with the death of both partners and not having any clause permitting continuation of the partnership by the legal heirs, the non-residential tenanted premises is deemed to be vacant in law as the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building, added Justice Gupta.

The Top Court thus set aside the order passed by the High Court in Review Application and directed the appellants to take recourse to remedy as may be available to them and may proceed in accordance with law and the provisions of the Act.

HC denies bail in NDPS case as accused facing prosecution in five cases

Read Order: Hardeep Singh v. State Of Punjab

LE Correspondent

Chandigarh, August 11, 2021: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has denied bail to an accused in a drugs trafficking case after it was found that he is still facing prosecution in four more cases.

This was the second petition for grant of bail, pending trial, in a criminal case arising from an FIR dated 30.11.2018, registered under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (NDPS) Act, 1985, at Police Station Lehra, District Sangrur, Punjab.

As per the prosecution, the petitioner was found in conscious possession of banned narcotic substances — 125 vials (100 ml each) of Wincirex containing intoxicating syrup and 700 intoxicating tablets of Carisoma.

The first petition of the accused was dismissed on 14.11.2019 after the counsel for the State submitted that the petitioner was involved in two more cases under the NDPS Act and two under the Excise Act and one with regard to theft.

In the present petition, the counsel representing the petitioner contended that the petitioner stands acquitted in one case under the NDPS Act. He, hence, contended that petitioner who has suffered incarceration for approximately 2 years and 7 months should be granted bail, the HC noted.

“The learned counsel for the petitioner admits that the petitioner is still facing prosecution in as many as 5 cases including this one. Hence, no ground to grant concession of bail is made out,” sated the bench of Justice Anil Ksheterpal.

There can’t be straitjacket formula to ascertain if modesty of woman is outraged: Bombay HC

Read Judgment: Shrikrushna vs. State of Maharashtra

Pankaj Bajpai

New Delhi, August 11, 2021: The Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court has ruled that the very act of throwing a chit on a woman which professes love for her and contains poetic verses, albeit extremely purely written, is sufficient to outrage her modesty.

The High Court, however, modified the sentence of imprisonment imposed for offences punishable u/s 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to the period already undergone by the applicant, saying the applicant deserved a chance to reform and further incarceration was not likely to be of any avail 

A Single Bench of Justice Rohit B. Deo enhanced the amount of fine to Rs. 50,000/- for offence punishable u/s 354 IPC and Rs. 40,000/- for offence punishable u/s 509 IPC. In addition to the amount of Rs. 35,000/- which is to be paid to the victim/informant by virtue of the trial Magistrate’s order, Justice Deo also ordered to impose additional fine of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the informant/victim.

“The modesty of a woman is her most precious jewel and there cannot be a straitjacket formula to ascertain whether modesty is outraged,” stated the Bench. 

It also said, “the very act of throwing a chit on her person which professes love for her and which contains poetic verses, albeit extremely, purely written is sufficient to outrage the modesty of a woman”.

These observations came pursuant to a complaint lodged by 45-year-old Mrs. ‘S’ in Akola Police Station alleging obscene gestures and throwing of chit professing love, by the owner of a neighboring grocery shop, which resulted in culmination of the investigation leading to submission of a final report, wherein the applicant abjured guilt.

In defence, it was pleaded that a false complaint was lodged since Mrs. ‘S’ purchased grocery on credit and she was not inclined to pay the applicant-accused the amount due.

On the basis of contents of the chit and the other materials on record, the Magistrate and the Appellate Court held the accused guilty of offences punishable u/s 354, 506 and 509 of the IPC.

Justice Deo, however, refused to undertake a microscopic examination of the evidence on record and found that there was no material, except a bald general statement that some threat was issued, to bring home the charge u/s 506 of the IPC. 

The Bench noted that the sine qua non ingredient of Section 506 is criminal intimidation as defined in Section 503 of the IPC. 

A bare perusal of Section 503 would reveal that the threat must be with intent to cause injury either to person, reputation or property and the intent must be to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, added the Bench. 

The High Court therefore held that the conviction recorded u/s 506 of the IPC was unsustainable, by observing that as per the evidence, the applicant threatened Mrs. “S” that the contents of the chit should not be disclosed.  The nature of the threat, the words used, whether the words used were such as would cause alarm and whether the complainant/informant as a fact was alarmed, are aspects within the realm of speculation. 

Insofar as charge u/s 354 and 509 of the IPC was concerned, taking into cumulative effect of the evidence on record, particularly, the version of Mrs. “S”, it was suggestive that the view concurrently taken was a plausible view, added the Court. 

However, the High Court in its agreement with the conviction recorded u/s 354 and 509 of IPC, observed that the evidence of Mrs. “S” that the applicant used to flirt, make gestures like pouting of lips, on occasions used to hit her with small pebbles, is confidence inspiring. 

Lastly, the High Court expressed that while the applicant did outrage the modesty of Mrs. “S” by throwing on her person a chit professing his love and by certain acts and gestures like pouting of lips and throwing small pebbles, the applicant deserved a chance to reform and further incarceration was not likely to be of any avail.

It was also observed that the applicant had already undergone 45 days of incarceration and considering the date of the incident or commission of offence, as the provisions of law stood then, there was no minimum sentence provided for offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC. It is only by the 2013 amendment that minimum sentence is provided.

Hence, the Division Bench modified the sentence of imprisonment imposed for offences punishable u/s 354 and 509 of the IPC to the period already undergone.

Illegal sale of independent floors in Chandigarh: Supreme Court stays UT survey

Read Order: MAMTA GUPTA v. RESIDENTS WELFARE ASSOCIATION & ORS 

LE Correspondent

New Delhi, August 11, 2021 : The Supreme Court has stayed the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s direction to hold a survey whereby properties/buildings were to be identified from the office of the Estate Officer wherein shares to the extent of 50 %, 30 % or 20 % were sold or transferred to a person outside the family of the original owner/shareholder.

The High Court had passed these directions in its order dated July 27, 2021 pursuant to a petition contending that there had been illegal sale of independent floors in Chandigarh in violation of the UT’s rules.

The petition in question was filed by different Resident Welfare Associations seeking issuance of directions to restrain the official respondents from permitting residential plots in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, which are single dwelling units, to be constructed or utilised as apartments.

The petitioners projected that such activity is not permitted and is rather expressly barred under the existing rules, regulations and by-laws of the UT Administration.

However, few city residents filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court against the said HC order.

In its order, the SC stated, “We are informed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the writ petition is listed for hearing before the High Court on 11.08.2021. The pendency of this Special Leave Petition shall not deter the High Court from continuing with the hearing of the writ petition.  However, the direction issued by the High Court for conducting a physical survey of properties/buildings to be identified by the Estate Officer where there has been transfer of shares is stayed.”

What was the HC order?

Read Order: Residents Welfare Association and Anr v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors

This petition was filed seeking issuance of directions to restrain the official respondents from permitting residential plots in the Union Territory of Chandigarh which are single dwelling units to be constructed or utilised as apartments.

The stand taken by the petitioners pertained to the fact that there was a huge outcry against the provision for having apartments, on the ground that such activity would completely alter and finish the character of the City and the existing infrastructure in terms of sewerage, water, electricity, parking, traffic etc. was wholly insufficient to take on the extra load. Under such a situation the Apartment Rules of 2001 were repealed vide notification dated 01.10.2007.

It was submitted also that a large number of single dwelling units are being surreptitiously converted into apartments. The precise contention raised was that residential plots being self-contained independent units cannot be further subdivided into separate units, and  sale of independent units even floor wise is not liable to be permitted.

On the contrary, in the joint written statement filed on behalf of the respondents it was averred that submission of building plans or revised building plans are to be considered and passed as a single unit and not floor wise. Still further in a subsequent affidavit of the Assistant Estate Officer, Chandigarh it had been deposed that no sale of defined portion/plot of building is permissible, nor any such sale has been recognised by the Chandigarh Administration except those registered during 2001 to 2007 when the Chandigarh Apartment Rules, 2001 were in vogue.

The HC had passed the directions after the submission was made that in the year 2001, the Chandigarh Administration notified Rules called the Chandigarh Apartment Rules, 2001 whereby even single residential units wherever they existed in the city of Chandigarh could be subdivided into apartments.

While ordering the survey, the HC had asked the UT estate department to carry out a physical inspection of such identified buildings/dwelling units to find out as to whether the sale of share(s) actually translated into the buyer occupying an independent floor in the otherwise composite dwelling unit or to find out as to whether independent floors are in the process of being constructed commensurate to the share(s) that has been purchased in such dwelling unit.

The Division Bench of Justice Tejinder Singh Dhindsa and Justice Vivek Puri had clarified that it would be open for the official respondents to seek the cooperation/assistance of the concerned police authorities/law enforcement agencies to facilitate the carrying out of the physical inspection of the premises in question. It was further directed that this entire exercise be carried out under the supervision of the Chief Architect, UT Chandigarh.

The HC bench held that this was to ensure that such exercise does not become overly time consuming and the object was only towards a fact finding exercise with the view that it ought to be a sample exercise. The same was confined from the date of filing of the instant petition till 31.12.2019. Still further the exercise was to confine only with regard to residential buildings.

Intention of JJ Act is to grant bail to juvenile irrespective of nature or gravity of offence, says HC while granting bail to 16- yr-old in rape case

Read Order: Ravi Singh v. State of Punjab

Vivek Gupta

Chandigarh, August 10, 2021 : Granting bail to a 16-year-old in a rape case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that from a bare reading of the provisions of Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it appears that the intention of the legislature is to grant bail to the juvenile irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed by him.

“The bail can be declined only in such cases where reasonable grounds are there for believing that the release is likely to bring the juvenile into association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice,” added the bench of Justice Jaishree Thakur.

The bench cited similar legal precedents in Manoj Singh vs State of Rajasthan 2004, Lal Chand vs State of Rajasthan, Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and Udaibhan Singh alias Bablu Singh vs. State of Rajasthan 2005(4) Crimes 649.

The Petitioner was arrested in 2020 following an FIR registered under Sections 376, 376AB of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) at Police Station Moonak, District Sangrur, Punjab.

Later, the Juvenile Justice Board, Sangrur declined his bail plea and the same was affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana.

The petitioner in his petition in the High Court prayed for setting aside the impugned orders passed by both these Courts.

The petitioner mainly argued that the bail application of the petitioner had been dismissed by both lower Courts only on the ground that the victim is aged five years and since the petitioner and the victim belong to the same village, his release would defeat the ends of justice. 

The Petitioner contended that a perusal of the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur would reflect that there was no evidence on record to establish that there was likelihood of the juvenile coming in association with any known criminal or his release on bail would expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger.

It was also submitted that the petitioner has been in the observation home since November 9, 2020 and he is ready to abide by all the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the High Court while considering his petition for grant of bail.

Deciding the matter, the HC Bench stated that the only ground on which the bail of the juvenile is rejected by both the Courts is that he and the victim belong to the same village added with the fact that the victim was aged 5 years at the time of alleged incident.

“The term ‘ends of justice’ is not defined in the Juvenile Justice Act and therefore, has to be interpreted keeping in view the statement and object of the statute and the legislative intent behind it. There is no doubt that the Juvenile Justice Act is a beneficial legislation and it is a settled position of law that gravity or seriousness of the offence would not be a ground to decline concession of bail to the juvenile. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has also not pointed out any material available on record to show that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is likely to come into the association of any known criminal if released on bail, or his release will expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or as to how his release would defeat the ends of justice,” observed the Bench.

Thus, the High Court was of the view that no purpose would be served in keeping the Petitioner in custody. The impugned orders were held to be not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, were set aside.

Moral wrong of not coming to aid of fellow human in distress, does not amount to holding a person guilty of a crime: Supreme Court

Read Judgement: Parubai vs. State of Maharashtra

Pankaj Bajpai

New Delhi, August 11, 2021: The Supreme Court has ruled that the moral wrong of not coming to the aid of a fellow human being in distress cannot be a circumstance to hold a person guilty of a crime which is as serious as murder, unless the other circumstances in the chain point to the accused so as to lead to an irresistible conclusion of being guilty. 

The Apex Court made the observations while acquitting, on benefit of doubt, the appellant who was accused of setting fire to the house where she lived as second wife, leading to the death of her husband’s first wife and their two children.

A Division Bench of Justice A.S Bopanna and Justice Hemant Gupta observed that second marriage, the desire for domestic dominance and the execution of document for maintenance a day before registration of the marriage, cannot be held as a strong motive for an alleged crime where the appellant would destroy her own house. 

The Bench noted that the High Court held the appellant guilty of pouring kerosene around the deceased and her children and setting them on fire since the appellant had not received any injuries in the fire, and had failed to explain the reason for the eruption of fire in view of such obligation to explain under section 106 of the Evidence Act. The Bench held the High Court’s reasoning as not sustainable in the present circumstance. 

Details of the Case

The house where the appellant being the second wife and her family were residing was engulfed in flames. Although the appellant came out of the house unscathed, the first wife (Mandabai) and her children died due to burn injuries. Noticing that no injuries were sustained by the appellant, her father-in-law lodged a complaint and also implicated her.

When the matter went before the Sessions Court, it was observed that the appellant was sleeping in the same room as the deceased was sleeping and that the appellant did not suffer any injuries. These were held as the circumstances to rule out the possibility of accidental fire.

The Sessions Court opined that adverse inference can be drawn that the appellant set fire to the house. The fact that she was the second wife and the husband of the appellant had executed an agreement transferring his land in favour of deceased Mandabai (first wife) was held as the motive to commit the offence, more particularly since she wanted to “establish her dominance in the house”.

The matter then went before the High Court which discarded the extra-judicial confession by the father-in-law, opining that the father-in-law who was the informant could not have happily accepted the appellant as the second wife of his son when he had already got married to the first wife, now deceased. 

However, the High Court concluded that the appellant was guilty of committing the offence since she had not sustained the slightest injury due to the fire which means that she left the house well in advance to the spreading of fire. 

What the Supreme Court said

After considering the arguments and the observations made by High Court and Sessions Court, the Apex Court found that the conclusion reached by the High Court was on the assumption made only due to the fact that the appellant had not suffered injuries in the fire accident. 

“It is no doubt true that the incident which occurred in this case, if caused by any person with an intention to cause death, is certainly gruesome as it resulted in the death of three persons of which two were small children and is unpardonable. However, in a case where the appellant was proceeded against mainly based on the extrajudicial confession said to have been made to her father-in-law and the said evidence has been disbelieved by the High Court as not being trustworthy, the issue would be as to whether the chain of circumstances to convict the appellant is complete,” opined Justice Bopanna. 

“It takes a person lot of courage or be overdriven with compassion to get back into the house to save somebody else and not doing so may be considered as morally wrong for not coming to the aid of fellow human being in distress, but it cannot be a circumstance to hold a person guilty of a crime which is as serious as murder unless the other circumstances in the chain point to the accused so as to lead to an irresistible conclusion of being guilty,” the Bench observed.

The Apex Court also said that though the High Court had employed the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in its concluding paragraph, however the reasoning preceding the same are only “conjectures and surmises”.

“The case itself is that the fire had erupted at midnight when the appellant and others were sleeping and she came out shouting. The explanation for the cause of fire by the appellant would have arisen only if there was any other evidence to the effect that the appellant was already awake and was outside even before the fire erupted,” observed the Bench. 

The Top Court also noted that it has come in evidence that in the subject house, cooking is also done and material pertaining to the tractor including diesel can was also kept therein. Therefore, the circumstance that the appellant was not injured in the incident cannot be the basis to rely on the presence of kerosene stains as a circumstance that she had set fire by sprinkling kerosene.

Therefore, reiterating that the links in the chain of circumstances is necessary to be established for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the Top Court set aside the judgment passed by the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence ordered by the Sessions Court.

On I-T Dept’s plea, HC asks trial court not to proceed further in tax evasion case against Punjab CM, Son

Read Order: Deputy Director of Income Tax v. Raninder Singh 

LE Correspondent

Chandigarh, August 11, 2021: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has directed a trial court in Ludhiana not to proceed further in income tax evasion cases against Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh and his son Raninder Singh.

The High Court took note of the Income Tax department’s submission that the trial court is likely to pass a fresh order in the matter in view of the revisional court’s November 2018 order that had quashed the summons issued to the father-son duo, which is subject matter of challenge regarding the admissibility of the digital information. 

Both respondents, though aware of the proceedings before the High Court, have not appeared before the court as notice could not be served on them since 2019 when the High Court took cognisance of the matter.

The HC said if the trial court passes further order, it “would cause grave prejudice since the respondents have not put in appearance herein being unserved but aware of the proceedings before this Court, which would be clear from the order dated 20.07.2021, passed by the CJM, Ludhiana”.

“This court is of the opinion that the CJM should not pass any further orders,” the bench of Justice GS Sandhawalia stated, while posting the matter for further hearing on November 18. 

The bench also directed that the Income-Tax department as well as the accused be served notices for the adjourned date.

The Chief Minister and his son are both facing three cases concerning allegations of amassing wealth in foreign countries.

The I-T department has claimed that the chief minister’s son is a direct beneficiary of the assets maintained and controlled through foreign business entities. These include accounts with HSBC Private Bank, Geneva. Raninder is also a trustee of the UK-based Jacaranda Trust. However, the CM and Raninder have denied any association with these entities.

Following the I-T department’s petition, in April 2017 the Ludhiana trial court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Jaapinder Singh had summoned CM Amarinder Singh and Raninder to attend court hearings and face trial in the three cases filed against them for alleged tax evasion and amassing wealth in foreign countries.

However, claiming that they were wrongly summoned, the father-son moved revision petitions in the upper court. In November 2018, the court of Additional Sessions Judge Rajeev K Beri quashed the summon orders passed by the trial court.

In 2019, the Income Tax department moved the High Court against the order issued by the court of ASJ Beri.

During the last hearing, the I-T department had told the HC bench that the trial court is likely to pass the final order on the stay of the proceedings that is now restricted by the bench of Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia.

“The trial Court is likely to pass a fresh order, keeping in view the observations made on 27.11.2018, which is subject matter of challenge herein regarding the admissibility of the digital information and thus, would cause grave prejudice since the respondents have not put in appearance herein being unserved but aware of the proceedings before this Court, which would be clear from the order dated 20.07.2021, passed by the CJM, Ludhiana,” the HC said.

“Keeping in view the above, this Court is of the opinion that the CJM should not pass any further orders on the complaint which has been remanded to him. Let the respondents (CM and his son), as per the office report, be served by way of dasti process, for the date already fixed in the main case, i.e. 18.11.2021,” stated the bench.

SEBI says it has power to take action against entities connected to those involved in price manipulation

Read Order: SEBI Order in matters of GLOBAL INFRATECH AND FINANCE LTD

LE Staff

New Delhi, August 11, 2021: The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in exercise of its powers conferred under section 19 read with sections 11(1), 11(4) & 11B of the SEBI Act. 1992, restrained Noticee Nos. 1 to 10 and 42 to 46 in a case concerning Global Infratech & Finance Ltd from accessing the securities market and buying, selling or dealing in securities, either directly or indirectly, in any manner for specified periods of time.

Furthermore, if SEBI observed that a company’s scrip was manipulated, it had the power to take action against the entities involved in price manipulation. Thus, if entities were connected to entities involved in price manipulation, SEBI had the power to take action against such entities, observed Madhabi Puri Buch (Whole Time Member). 

In the present case, SEBI had taken action against Noticee Nos. 42 to 46, since it was during investigation that they were preferential allottees connected to Global Infratech & Finance Ltd (GIFL) through fund transactions and connected to LTP contributor through GIFL and had sold shares at artificially inflated price. 

Hence, SEBI initiated enforcement action against them for alleged violation of Prohibition of Fraudulent & Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations on the basis of their connection with GIFL through fund transactions and thereby with entities involved in price manipulation; their selling of shares during price rise period at artificially inflated/manipulated price. 

SEBI stated that as per ICDR (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulation 2(za), promoter included person/persons: in control of issuer; instrumental in formulation of a plan or programme pursuant to which specified securities were offered to public; named in offer document as promoters. 

In the present case, allegation against Noticee Nos. 13 to 36 was on the basis of the Company’s version that they were promoters as mentioned in shareholding pattern. As per documentary evidence, Noticees did not fall within purview of the above definition. Besides, Noticees submitted they were neither involved in affairs of GIFL nor knew its directors. No documentary evidence was available on record of involvement of these Noticees in managing affairs of GIFL or their awareness of knowing its directors, noted MP Buch. 

Hence, as it was difficult to reasonably conclude that Noticee Nos. 13 to 36 were promoters of GIFL, MP Buch in the order recorded that allegation that Noticees were connected to GIFL by virtue of them being its promoters did not stand established. 

Moreover, no allegation against Noticee Nos. 13 to 41 of LTP contribution, price manipulation, volume manipulation, circular trades, reversal trades, synchronised trades, etc. could be proved. Hence, Noticee Nos. 13 to 41 could not be said to be involved in alleged fraudulent scheme and violation of PFUTP Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and 4(1), opined MP Buch. 

However, considering connection of Noticee Nos. 1 to 7 between themselves as well as with GIFL, their trading behaviour as sellers was not found genuine. MP Buch found them to have acted under a premeditated scheme where under they placed orders in such a manner so as to raise LTP significantly. 

The trading pattern exhibited intent to increase price of scrip every day with significantly low volumes and also appeared to be devoid of any economic rationale. Thus, preponderance of probability led to conclusion that trades were executed by Noticee Nos. 1 to 7 in a manipulative manner for increasing price of scrip of GIFL, noted MP Buch. 

Hence, the SEBI in its order concluded that allegation of violation of provisions of PFUTP Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1), 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(e) against Noticees stood established. 

Apex Court asks Election Commission to publish criminal antecedents of political candidates through mobile app

Read Judgment: Brajesh Singh vs. Sunil Arora & Ors

Pankaj Bajpai

New Delhi, August 10, 2021: The Supreme Court today issued directions to political parties to publish information regarding the criminal antecedents of candidates on the homepage of their websites, thus making it easier for the voters to get the information. 

Significantly, the Apex Court directed the Election Commission of India to create a dedicated mobile application containing information published by election candidates regarding their criminal antecedents, so that at one stroke each voter gets such information on his/her mobile phone. 

A Division Bench of Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and Justice BR Gavai delivered the judgement on contempt petitions filed by Brajesh Singh and Manish Kumar, who alleged that the Court’s earlier directions passed on February 13, 2020, were flouted by political parties during the Bihar Assembly Elections.

It was submitted that while eight parties complied with the Apex Court’s 2020 directions to some extent, two parties namely Communist Party of India and the Nationalist Congress Party have completely flouted these directions during the Bihar elections.  

The counsel for CPI (M) and NCP tendered unconditional apologies for the act of the CPI (M) for fielding four candidates with criminal antecedents, whereas the NCP fielding 26 such candidates. 

The counsel for Election Commission, senior advocate Harish Salve, favoring action against parties that were found in egregious violation, said that though there would be larger concerns of too many parties being thrown out of the political arena, they may have to be made to understand that this is not optional. 

The Amicus Curiae, senior advocate K.V. Viswanathan, also contended that such violation should attract action and that if such deterrent would not be there, parties will simply violate it. 

The Top court clarified that the details which are required to be published, shall be published within 48 hours of the selection of the candidate and not prior to two weeks before the first date of filing of nominations. 

The Bench also asked the ECI to bring such noncompliance by the political party to the notice of the Supreme Court as being in contempt of the Court’s Orders/directions, which shall in future be viewed very seriously, if any political party fails to submit such compliance report with the ECI. 

Expressing discontent over the failure on the part of several political parties to disclose and publicize the criminal antecedents of the candidates they had fielded for the Bihar Assembly elections last year, the Supreme Court called it to be derogatory of the orders passed by it on Feb 13, 2020.

In furtherance of the directions already given by the Constitution Bench in Public Interest Foundation v. Union Of India, the Supreme Court said that voters should be enabled to have an informed choice while exercising their right to vote. 

The SC clarified that its earlier direction passed in 2020 was only to provide information to the voter so that his right to have information as to why a particular political party has chosen a candidate having criminal antecedents and as to why a political party has not chosen a candidate without criminal antecedents, is effectively guaranteed. 

“There are various factors which a political party takes into consideration while selecting a candidate. As a citizen who possesses requisite qualifications and is not disqualified under any of the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951, has a right to contest an election and a voter has a right to vote a candidate of his choice, a political party would also have the discretion to choose a candidate of its choice,” the Bench observed.

The Court also made it clear that “though a political party would have the freedom of selecting candidates of its choice, though having criminal antecedents, what would be required is to give reasons in support of such selection, and the reasons could be dependent on various factors including qualifications, achievements and other merits”. 

Although the Apex Court said that its directions in no way impinge upon the right of a political party to choose a candidate of its own choice, it passed various directions in order to make the right of information of a voter more effective and meaningful. 

Those directions are:

1. Political parties are directed to publish information regarding criminal antecedents of candidates on the homepage of their websites, thus making it easier for the voter to get to the information that has to be supplied. 

2. The ECI is directed to create a dedicated mobile application containing information published by candidates regarding their criminal antecedents, so that at one stroke, each voter gets such information on his/her mobile phone;

3. The ECI is directed to carry out an extensive awareness campaign to make every voter aware about his right to know and the availability of information regarding criminal antecedents of all contesting candidates. This shall be done across various platforms, including social media, websites, TV ads, prime time debates, pamphlets, etc. 

4. The ECI is also directed to create a separate cell which will also monitor the required compliances so that this Court can be apprised promptly of non-compliance by any political party of the directions contained in this Court’s Orders, as fleshed out by the ECI, in instructions, letters and circulars issued in this behalf;

5. If any political party fails to submit such compliance report with the ECI, the ECI shall bring such noncompliance by the political party to the notice of the Supreme Court as being in contempt of the Supreme Court’s Orders/directions, which shall in future be viewed very seriously. 

SC issues notice on petition challenging HC order which decided that oral exchange of land is not permissible in Punjab’s rural areas

Read Order: Gurnam Singh v. Bant Singh & Ors

LE Correspondent

Chandigarh, August 10, 2021: The Supreme Court has issued notice to the Punjab government after a petitioner challenged an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that dismissed his plea in a property case on the ground that registration is necessary for affecting oral exchange of property in the rural areas in Punjab.

In his special leave petition, the counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgement of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported as Sardara Singh And Anr. vs. Harbhajan Singh And Ors. as well as a Single Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported as Paramjit Singh vs. Ratti Ram to contend that oral exchange is permissible in rural areas in the State of Punjab and that registration is not necessary for affecting such oral exchange.

The Apex Court issued notice on the Special Leave Petition as well as on the prayer for interim relief, returnable within six weeks.

During the High Court proceedings, the petitioner contended that the provision of Section 54 of Punjab’s Transfer of Property Act, made applicable by virtue of what is stipulated in Section 118, is not applicable to rural areas The counsel contended that even as per the circular dated 18.9.1989 issued by the Department of Revenue of the Government of Punjab, registration of any exchange of an immovable property, in such areas, is also not compulsory.

Deciding the matter Gurnam Singh And Another v. Bant Singh And Others on March 13, 2020, the bench of Justice Amol Rattan Singh ruled, “As regards the aforesaid contention, I find myself unable to agree with learned counsel, in view of the fact that though he is absolutely correct in saying that Section 118 of the T.P. Act not being applicable to the rural areas of the State of Punjab even today, therefore, compulsory registration of an exchange of immovable property (even of a value of more than Rs. 100/-) would not be compulsory, yet, what obviously cannot be ignored, in the opinion of this court, is that Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, does not carve out any exception as regards compulsory registration of a document the subject matter of which is an immovable property of a value of more than Rs 100.”