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Denying bail to man accused in NDPS case, Punjab & Haryana HC directs lower court to expedite trial as accused in custody since 2015

Read Order: Gurdev Singh alias Debu v. State of Punjab 

LE Staff

Chandigarh, August 25, 2021: While dismissing the bail application of a man accused in a narcotics case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has directed the lower court to conclude the trial in the matter within the next four months saying the accused cannot be denied the right to a free and speedy trial.

The petitioner, Gurdev Singh alias Debu, had sought regular bail for the second time in a case pertaining to an FIR dated July 9, 2015 under Section 22 of the NDPS Act, 1985, Sections 25/54/59 of Arms Act and 399, 402, 382, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the IPC, registered at Police Station Dehlon, District Ludhiana, Punjab.

The State Counsel opposed the plea by submitting that there was an alleged recovery of one kilogram of contraband Heroin, which falls in commercial quantity, and also one pistol 0.32 bore and two live cartridges from the petitioner, and also that the petitioner has suffered nine other convictions.

“In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to extend the benefit of bail in favour of the petitioner,” said the Bench of Justice Tejinder Singh Dhindsa.

The Bench, however, noted that the petitioner was arrested on 09.07.2015, investigation in the case has been concluded, the chargesheet has been presented and the charges were framed on 08.04.2016. 

“Trial is still going on. The right of every accused to a free and speedy trial cannot be denied,” the HC said.

“While dismissing the instant petition seeking regular bail, directions are issued to the trial Court to make an earnest endeavour to expedite the trial and in any case to conclude the same within a period of four months from today,” the Bench said.

High Court asks Panchkula court to not pronounce verdict in murder case against Gurmeet Ram Rahim after victim’s son alleges ‘manipulation’

Read Order: Jagseer Singh v. CBI And Anr

LE Staff 

Chandigarh, August 25, 2021: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has restricted a Special CBI Court in Panchkula from pronouncing till further orders the judgement in a case pertaining to murder charges against self-proclaimed godman Baba Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh. 

The High Court’s decision came in response to a petition filed by Jagseer Singh, son of Ranjeet Singh who was allegedly murdered by Ram Rahim, seeking transfer of the case from the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Panchkula to any other CBI Court in the States of Haryana, Punjab or U.T., Chandigarh.

The transfer has been sought on several grounds including that the case is pending for arguments since December, 2019 and has been adjourned a number of times. Even the Public Prosecutor has been seeking time, the petitioner’s counsel contended. 

The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner alleged that everything has been “manipulated” through the respondent No.2 — K.P. Singh, Public Prosecutor for the CBI — and that he has been interfering in the administration of justice and is influencing the entire proceedings.

“Though, some personal oral aspersions are also made against the Special Judge, however, the same are not recorded in this order as those are not stated on oath by the petitioner,” the Bench of Justice Arvind Singh Sangwan noted.

“Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has, thus, submitted that the petitioner has reasonable apprehension that he may not get justice from the Special Judge, CBI Court, Panchkula,” the Bench added.

The High Court thus issued notice to the Presiding Officer/Special Judge, CBI, Panchkula seeking his response and restraining him from pronouncing the judgement in the matter as scheduled on August 26, 2021. The HC listed the case for next hearing on August 27, 2021.

The High Court also directed that the CBI will also file a specific affidavit about the appointment of K.P. Singh, Public Prosecutor for CBI Court at Panchkula, along with his posting order with the reply, if any.

The case here pertains to an FIR dated 10.07.2002 registered under Sections 302, 34, 120-B IPC at Police Station Sadar Thanesar, District Kurukshetra (Haryana)  and a case dated 03.12.2003 as per which Ranjeet Singh was murdered by Baba Gurmeet Ram Rahim in 2002. 

Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh already stands convicted for 20 years rigorous imprisonment regarding the allegation of rape of two women followers by a judgement dated 28.08.2017 and also stands convicted for life regarding murder of a Sirsa based journalist Ram Chander Chatterpati, who had published an article in his newspaper, regarding sexual exploitation of Sadhvis in Dera. 

According to the petitioner’s counsel in the present case, the accused suspected that Ranjeet Singh was behind the circulation of the anonymous letter in this regard.

Haryana Govt’s 2016 Notification specifying criteria for exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ within backward classes, is flagrant violation of judicial declaration made in Indira Sawhney-I: Top Court

Read judgment: Pichra Warg Kalyan Mahasabha Haryana (regd.) & Anr vs. State of Haryana & Anr

LE Correspondent

New Delhi, August 25, 2021: The Supreme Court has ruled that the Haryana Government’s 2016 notification specifying the criteria for exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ within the backward classes, is in flagrant violation of the directions issued by the SC in Indra Sawhney & Others v. Union of India & Others (Indra Sawhney-I) and is at variance with the 1993 memorandum issued by the Union of India. 

The criteria mentioned for identifying such of those persons who are socially advanced have not been taken into account by the Government of Haryana while issuing the notification dated August 17, 2016, said the Top Court. 

“Strangely, by the notification dated 17.08.2016, the identification of ‘creamy layer’ amongst backward classes was restricted only to the basis of economic criterion. In clear terms, this Court held in Indra Sawhney-I that the basis of exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ cannot be merely economic,” observed the Division Bench of Justice L Nageswara Rao and Justice Aniruddha Bose. 

The Bench observed that in spite of Section 5(2) of the Haryana Backward Classes (Reservation in Services and Admission in Educational Institutions) Act, 2016 making it mandatory for identification and exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ to be on the basis of social, economic and other relevant factors, the State of Haryana has sought to determine ‘creamy layer’ from backward classes solely on the basis of economic criterion and has committed a grave error in doing so.

The observations came pursuant to a challenge against Notifications dated Aug 17, 2016 and Aug 28, 2018 issued by the State of Haryana (1st Respondent), as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India

Going by the background of the case, the State Government issued a notification on Aug 17, 2016 specifying that the sections of backward classes earning above Rs. 6 lakh per annum shall be considered as ‘creamy layer’ u/s 5 of the 2016 Act. 

Later, students aspiring to be admitted to MBBS course for the academic year 2018-2019 in the quota for backward classes filed writ in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging such notification on the ground of sub-classification of backward classes, with preference in reservation given to a particular section of a backward class group. 

The High Court thereon set aside the notification on the ground that the sub-classification of the backward classes was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The High Court also directed the counselling of students to be held afresh on the basis of the earlier criteria existing prior to the 2016 Act. 

The State of Haryana questioned the correctness of the judgement of the High Court before the Apex Court, which was however declined. On the same day, the State Government issued a notification, whereby the criteria for computing annual income were fixed as ‘gross annual income’, which shall include income from all sources. 

Accordingly, students who qualified in NEET-2018 and sought admission to MBBS and BDS courses in the backward classes quota, filed writ in the High Court, assailing the legality and validity of the notifications, but in vain. 

The present petition was therefore filed seeking a direction to the Respondents to provide reservation to backward classes in Haryana under the Haryana Backward Classes Act, 2016 by considering the existing defined criteria of ‘creamy layer’ by the National Commission for Backward Classes or the criteria used by the State of Haryana prior to the 2016 Act. 

After thoroughly examining the factors which were given emphasis in the various opinions rendered in Indra Sawhney-I for determining ‘creamy layer’ amongst the backward classes, the Apex Court held that persons from backward classes who occupied posts in higher services like IAS, IPS and All India Services had reached a higher level of social advancement and economic status and therefore, were not entitled to be treated as backward. 

Such persons were to be treated as ‘creamy layer’ without any further inquiry, added the Top Court. 

Accordingly, the notification dated Aug 17, 2016, giving liberty to the State Government to issue a fresh notification within a period of 3 months from August 24, 2021 after taking into account the principles laid down by the SC in Indra Sawhney-I and the criteria mentioned in Section 5(2) of the 2016 Act for determining ‘creamy layer’.

AO must pass speaking order culling out reasons as to how grant of refund is likely to affect revenue, before withholding it u/s 241A: Calcutta HC

Read Judgement: MCNALLY BHARAT ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED & ANR vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF THE INCOME TAX, CIRCLE 1(1) KOLKATA & 6 OTHERS

Pankaj Bajpai

Kolkata, August 25, 2021: The Calcutta High Court has ruled that the power of the Assessing Officer (AO) under section 241A of the Income Tax Act can be exercised not only after he forms an opinion that the refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue, but after receiving prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner.

The High Court held that an order for refund after assessment u/s 143(3) of the said Act pursuant to a notice u/s 143(2) is subject to appeal or further proceeding.

While allowing the assessee’s petition on the claim of refund, the Single Bench of Justice Arindam Mukherjee observed that the very essence of passing of order u/s 241A is application of mind by AO to issues which are germane for withholding refund on the basis of statutory prescription contained in such section. 

The dispute in the case arose on account of denial of refund by the Central Processing Centre even though the assessment was completed on returned income. 

The refund of the entire tax deducted at source claimed by the assessee was assessed under the provisions of Section 244A. However, the assessee on checking the refund status at the TIN-NSDL website, found a message displaying the thereat, “Your Assessing Officer has not sent the refund to the refund banker, please contact your Assessing Officer.” 

The assessed refund was, thus, not refunded to the assessee, and was rather withheld as per provision of Section 241A. 

In the instant case, Justice Mukherjee found that after notice for refund was issued, the refund was withheld with no reasons given. 

On a combined reading of Section 143 with Section 241A, it can be discerned that by virtue of the new proviso, it is now mandatory to process the return u/s 143(1), and proceed with grant of the refund determined therein, unless sufficient reasons exist u/s 241A prima facie demonstrating that the grant of refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue, opined Justice Mukherjee. 

The High Court went on to reiterate that the scope of the power u/s 241A is narrow, making it clear that a speaking order is required to be passed culling out the reasons as to how the grant of refund is likely to affect the revenue. 

Observing that recording of reasons to substantiate why such withholding is necessary, the High Court said that the powers under this revenue friendly provision of Sec 241A cannot be used in a mechanical manner without application of mind. 

Since refund can be withheld only after recording reasons and obtaining approval of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, the High Court directed the AO to issue refund to the assessee. 

While considering application u/s 482 CrPC at stage of framing of charge, High Court should not have entered into appreciation of evidence: SC

Read Judgement- Saranya v. Bharathi and another 

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, August 25, 2021: Setting aside the judgment of the Madras High Court whereby the entire criminal proceedings against the respondent were quashed, the Apex Court has observed that the High Court while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., entered into appreciation of the evidence and considered whether on the basis of the evidence the accused is likely to be convicted or not, which was not permissible at this stage of framing of charge.  

The appeal in question had been filed by the complainant, wife of the deceased , pursuant to an FIR lodged against the respondent and one other person (first accused) for various offences under the Indian Penal Code pertaining to murder and cheating among others.

It was alleged that the complainant and her husband were introduced to one Vela alias Velayutham, who is the first accused in this case, by the respondent. They were told that Velayutham  was employed at Guindy Employment Exchange and if they gave money, he could arrange Government employment for them.

The complainant further asserted that believing him they gave Rs. 4 lakhs to Velayutham who promised that the deceased would get the appointment order. It was also alleged that he had asked them to come to a flat where they were offered some powder claimed to be ‘Prasadam’ which was the cause for her husband’s death and her drowsiness.

Later, when the case was pending for committal before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, the respondent approached the High Court praying for quashing the entire charge sheet and the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quashed and set aside the entire charge sheet and the criminal proceedings against her. Hence, the complainant filed this appeal before the Top Court.

The appellant’s counsel mainly contended that despite the fact that there was ample material against the respondent, the High Court had quashed the entire criminal proceedings/charge sheet by entering into the merits of the allegations and appreciating the evidence on record, which at this stage and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not permissible.

The Bench of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice M.R.Shah  affirmed that quashing the chargesheet against the respondent was not justified. The High Court had evidently ignored what had emerged during the course of investigation.

The Top Court clarified that during the course of the investigation, the investigating officer had collected very important evidence in the form of call details between both accused persons which were in the proximity of the time of commission of offence and even thereafter. 

Therefore, when the first accused had been chargesheeted for the offences under Sections 420, 302 r/w 109 IPC and when there was ample material to show at least a prima facie case against the respondent herein, the High Court had committed a grave error in quashing the chargesheet/entire criminal proceedings qua her in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

 “The High Court has entered into the appreciation of the evidence and considered whether on the basis of the evidence, the accused is likely to be convicted or not, which as such is not permissible at all at this stage while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court was not as such conducting the trial and/or was not exercising the jurisdiction as an appellate court against the order of conviction or acquittal,” noted the Division Bench.

The Apex Court referred to the judgment in Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak, (2019) 13 SCC 62, wherein it was observed that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. 

Elucidating on this judgment, the Court said, “It is further observed and held that at this stage the High Court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded the accused chargesheeted or against whom the charge is framed is likely to be convicted or not.”

The Court also found that the respondent, who was serving in the Secretariat, was in touch with the deceased and the complainant as she used to go to the Xerox shop owned by the deceased and she introduced the first accused to the couple. The Bench noted that there was sufficient material on record raising strong suspicion against the respondent.

Thus, the Top Court has allowed the appeal and has asked the Magistrate to proceed further with the case, in accordance with law. 

Filing of complaint case, issuance of legal notice would not amount to ‘abetment’ to suicide under Section 306 IPC: Delhi HC

Read Judgement: ATUL KUMAR v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, August 25, 2021: The Delhi High Court has recently ruled that issuance of a legal notice and filing of a complaint case by the petitioner would not amount to ‘abetment’ to suicide punishable under Section 306 Indian Penal Code (IPC)

“It cannot be said that by filing a criminal complaint against the deceased, the petitioner had the mens rea to instigate or goad the deceased to commit suicide; and further, that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide,” said the Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri. 

This petition had been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., on behalf of the petitioner, assailing the order whereby the closure report qua only the petitioner was not accepted.

This case arose out of an FIR, registered under Section 306 IPC, in pursuance of a complaint filed by the complainant (wife of the deceased) against the petitioner, who is a resident of USA,  and two police officers, nearly 44 days after the date on which suicide was committed by her husband Arvinder Singh Grewal.

It was stated from the petitioner’s side that he had purchased a vintage motorcycle from the deceased but despite the receipt of complete payment in the year 2012, the deceased did not handover the possession of the vintage motorcycle. The petitioner came to India and on legal advice, had a legal notice issued to the deceased. Later, a criminal complaint for offences punishable under Sections 420/406 IPC read with Section 120B IPC was also filed against the deceased.

The petitioner, thereafter, left India on the intervening night of 5th and 6th December, 2014. On December 9, 2014, the deceased committed suicide and left behind a suicide note naming the present petitioner as the reason for taking the extreme step.

The petitioner submitted that taking legal recourse to one’s remedy, by no stretch of imagination, amounts to abetment. It was also submitted that as the petitioner had left India earlier and the suicide was committed by the deceased on a later date the same cannot be said to be a direct result of any act of the petitioner.

While setting aside the impugned order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge which directed the Trial Court to proceed with the matter, the Court was of the opinion that necessary ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC were not made out against the petitioner.

The Bench observed that the transaction between the petitioner and the deceased relating to purchase of a vintage motorcycle is an admitted fact. Whether the motorcycle was delivered to the petitioner or not, would have been established after inquiry. 

It cannot be said that by filing a criminal complaint against the deceased, the petitioner had the mens rea to instigate or goad the deceased to commit suicide and further, that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. Even as per investigation, the deceased was called to the Police Station only once on December 6, 2014 which was three days before he committed suicide, opined the Court.

Also, the acceptance of closure report qua the two police officers by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and its affirmation by the ASJ, had not been challenged by the complainant and had attained finality.

In the instant case, it was also noteworthy that on the day the deceased was called to the Police Station, the petitioner had already left India a night earlier. Also, from a perusal of the suicide note, it was probable that a portion of it was written on November 28, 2014 and the note was completed on a later date. In this note, the deceased also mentioned that he was mentally disturbed, noted Justice Ohri. 

The High Court found that neither any live link nor any proximity between the acts of the petitioner and the act of committing suicide by the deceased was discernible. Furthermore, the requisite mens rea on part of the petitioner was also lacking. It could not be said that the petitioner had abetted or instigated the deceased to commit suicide and that the deceased was left with no option but to commit suicide.

Delving into the law relating to abetment, the Court postulated that to attribute the acts of the petitioner as abetment, there has to be some causal link and proximity of the acts of the petitioner with the deceased committing suicide. It has to be shown that the petitioner did an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option. 

“It also has to be shown that the petitioner’s act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that they committed suicide. Further, the prosecution has to show that the petitioner had the mens rea to commit the offence,” added the Bench.

CCI slaps Rs 200 crore penalty on Maruti Suzuki for imposing ‘Discount Control Policy’ on dealers

Read Order: In Re Alleged Anti-competitive conduct by Maruti Suzuki India Limited

Pankaj Bajpai

New Delhi, August 25, 2021: While taking suo motu cognizance, the Competition Commission of India has imposed a Rs 200 crore penalty on Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. for indulging in anti-competitive conduct of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) in the passenger vehicle segment by way of implementing Discount Control Policy vis-à-vis dealers. 

The Coram of Ashok Kumar Gupta (Chairperson), Sangeeta Verma (Member) and Bhagwant Singh Bishnoi (Member), also directed Maruti to cease and desist from continuing with such conduct. 

The present suo motu cognizance was taken by the Commission pursuant to an allegation by a Maruti dealer assailing its anti-competitive sales policy being violative to the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002

Accordingly, upon receiving direction from the CCI, the Director General (DG) conducted an investigation and found that Maruti had instructed its dealers to not offer discounts to the customers beyond the mandate prescribed by Maruti itself and had also appointed Mystery Shopping Agents (MSA) to keep a serious watch on its discount control policy.

After considering the report by the DG, the Commission found that Maruti had an agreement with its dealers whereby the dealers were restrained from offering discounts to the customers beyond those prescribed by Maruti, i.e. it had a ‘Discount Control Policy’ in place. 

The Coram further noted that if a dealer wanted to offer additional discounts, it would need to mandatorily obtain Maruti’s prior approval, and any dealer found violating the Discount Control Policy was threatened with imposition of penalty, not only upon the dealership but also upon its individual persons, including Direct Sales Executive, Regional Manager, Showroom Manager, Team Leader, etc.

To enforce such anti-competitive policy, Maruti had appointed MSA who used to pose as customers to Maruti Dealerships to find out if any additional discounts were being offered to customers, and based on their ‘Mystery Shopping Audit Report’, would impose penalty on the dealership and its employees along with threats of stopping supplies, observed the Commission. 

The CCI thus found that Maruti not only imposed the Discount Control Policy on its dealers but also monitored and enforced the same by monitoring dealers through MSAs, imposing penalties on them and threatening strict action like stoppage of supply, collecting and recovering penalty and utilization of the same. 

Accordingly, the Commission held that Maruti’s conduct, which resulted in appreciable adverse effect on competition within India, is in contravention of Sec. 3(4)(e) r.w.s. 3(1) of the Competition Act.

Petitions challenging constitutional validity of newly inserted provisions of Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 are maintainable: Gujarat HC

Read Judgment: Peter Jagdish Nazareth vs. State Of Gujarat

LE Correspondent

Ahmedabad, August 25, 2021: The Gujarat High Court has upheld the maintainability of petitions challenging the Constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Gujarat Prohibition Act of 1949 claiming them to be ultra vires the Constitution of India as being hit by Articles 14, 19 and 21 thereof. 

Noticing that the petitioners have assailed some of the provisions of the 1949 Act on the ground that they violate the Right to Privacy, a Division Bench of Chief Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Biren Vaishnav observed that the Apex Court in the case of Justice K.S.Puttuswamy (Privacy-9J) vs. Union Of India [(2017) 10 SCC 1] for the first time had recognized the “Right to Privacy” of the citizen as a fundamental right. 

However, the same has never been tested before in the context of personal food preferences weaved within the right to privacy, added the Bench. 

The counsel for the Petitioners contended that the Act, to the extent it makes the provisions with regard to use, consumption and possession of liquors which may consist of or contain alcohol but which are not intoxicating liquors, was beyond the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact. 

On the other hand, counsel for the State opposed the maintainability of the petition by contending that the validity of the entire Act was under challenge, tested and upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay and another vs. F.N. Balsara [AIR 1951 SC 318]. 

After considering the arguments, the Division Bench found that the provisions which are a subject matter of challenge, are pertaining to prohibition of import, transfer, possession and buying of liquor, consumption and use thereof, prohibition of entry in state of intoxication, prohibition of vendor to sell liquor to anyone except permit holders, permit to use or consume liquor on warships, troopships and in messes and canteen of armed forces and various provisions pertaining to permits. 

“The challenge therefore as opposed by the State as being cosmetic in nature and that the substance of challenge has not changed, is a submission not accepted at this stage as the newly added provisions in our opinion are not mere cosmetic in nature but they confer valuable rights,” noted the High Court. 

The petitions challenge new provisions like the validity of Section 24-1B and other newly added provisions and therefore the petitions have to be heard on merits and cannot be severed as part maintainable and part not-maintainable, added the Bench.

Further, the Bench reiterated that the submission of the State opposing the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that once some of the provisions are held valid the whole Act is held to be valid as the provisions of the Act are not severable, needs to be examined. 

When entirely new sections and the amended provisions of the existing Sections are under scrutiny, the petitioners cannot be ousted on the plea that the whole Act has been held to be valid, added the Court. 

Therefore, observing that the petitions cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of maintainability, the High Court listed the matter for final hearing on Oct 12, 2021. 

Punjab & Haryana High Court grants anticipatory bail to man who lent his car to neighbour accused in criminal case

Read Order: Narender v. State Of Haryana

LE Staff

Chandigarh, August 24, 2021: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has made absolute the pre-arrest bail granted earlier to a man who is co-accused in an attempt to murder case apparently because he had lent his car to a neighbour who then shot a man with a gun.

The petitioner, Narender, is facing charges in an FIR dated September 13, 2020 under Sections 307, 34 IPC and Sections 25, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959, registered at Police Station Rohtak Sadar, District Rohtak, Haryana. 

He was granted anticipatory bail during the last hearing of the matter before a coordinate bench of the High Court.

Hearing the plea on August 20, 2021 for making the anticipatory bail absolute, a Bench of Justice Vikas Bahl noted that the petitioner’s counsel had submitted before the coordinate bench that the allegations against the petitioner are that Sonu — who is in prison and a recovery was made from him after he shot a man named Amit with whom he had a money dispute — had borrowed the petitioner’s car on September 13, 2020 account of a medical emergency.

When the car was not returned to the petitioner, he asked for the same and Sonu replied that the car was taken in police custody on account of some traffic violation. The car is registered in the name of mother of the petitioner, his counsel submitted.

The petitioner has been attending the police station repeatedly and there is no overt-act on his behalf in the commission of the offence in any manner, his counsel said.

The Bench of Justice Bahl noted that the petitioner’s counsel submitted that he has joined the investigation and has not been attributed any injury and in fact, the complainant has resiled from his statement.

The State counsel, on instructions from ASI Satish Kumar, has submitted that the petitioner has joined the investigation and is not required any further, the bench further noted.

“Keeping in view the above said facts and circumstances, moreso, the fact that the petitioner has joined the investigation and is not required any further, the present petition is allowed. Interim order dated 27.05.2021 is ordered to be made absolute,” the Bench said.

Taking suo motu cognizance, Allahabad HC charges contempt action against advocate for using abusive language

Read order: In Re ASOK PANDE (Suo-Motu Contempt Petition) 

LE Correspondent

Prayagraj, August 24, 2021: The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) has taken suo motu contempt action against advocate Asok Pandey for using abusive language in Court and terming the judges as ‘goondas’. 

A Division Bench of Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi and Justice Dinesh Kumar Singh observed that Pande had committed ex-facie contempt and had a long history of misbehavior inside and outside the court room and committing contempt of the Court. 

The dispute arose on August 16, 2021 when the Court took suo motu cognizance in a PIL in respect of the Bar Association Election. When the Court was hearing the Returning Officer and Chairman of the Elders’ Committee of Awadh Bar Association, Pande barged into the court room and came to podium without uniform and started shouting on top of his voice. 

When the Court asked him about his capacity to address the Court, he said he was a Member of the Avadh Bar Association and had every right to address the Court. When the Court asked that why he was not in uniform, he said that would not don the advocate’s uniform as he had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code for Lawyers.

When the Court warned the advocate of removal from the court premises if he would not behave properly, he used abusive language against the judges and said that the Judges were behaving like ‘goondas’. 

Noticing that Pande continued to create unpleasant atmosphere inside the Court and went on to disturb the Court proceedings amounting to interference with the administration of justice and scandalizing the court, the Division Bench called for his removal from the Court Room in order to maintain serenity and decorum of the Court proceedings, dignity of the High Court and majesty of law. 

The Bench also ordered that Pande be kept in custody of the court till 3 PM so that he could come to Court and express his remorse and tender unconditional apology to the court for his outrageous behavior. 

“A minuscule minority of the Lawyers are bringing disrepute to the noble profession and trying to browbeat Judges and interfere with administration of justice. It is the duty of the Judges and Advocates’ community to uphold the majesty of law and maintain the purity in justice delivery system. The dignity of judges cannot be allowed to be polluted by these disgruntled and publicity seeking persons,” said the Division Bench. 

The Bench reiterated that the past conduct of Pande and ex facie contempt committed by him in the court room leave them with no scope other than charging him for committing ex facie contempt of the court. 

Besides initiating these contempt proceedings, the High Court also directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to examine the past conduct of Pande, in order to decide whether such a person is worthy of being part of the noble profession, and take appropriate disciplinary proceedings against him. 

HC allows Habeas Petition of murder accused, says delay in disposal of representation by District Magistrate & Central govt

Read Judgement: Kanhaiya Awasthi Thru Next Friend Shivangi Awasthi v. U.O.I. Thru Secy. Home Affairs New Delhi & Ors 

Tulip Kanth

Lucknow, August 24, 2021: The Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court recently quashed the detention order passed under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (NSA) against Kanahaiya Awasthi, an accused in the murder case of journalist Subham Mani Tripathi.

“Accordingly, there was cumulative delay in disposal of the representation of the petitioner by the District Magistrate, Unnao as well as Central Government. Thus, having regard to the nature of detention and rigor of law, we are of the view that there was disproportionate delay at both the ends,” reasoned the Bench of Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Saroj Yadav.

“Suffice is to hold that even though there is no fixed period of time for disposal of representation, the underlying message in the law is that all the concerned authorities, who are empowered to issue, approve or revoke detention orders, are duty bound to consider and dispose of the representations as expeditiously as possible. By now, it is also the settled principle of law that even if some delay in consideration of the representation may not become fatal to the detention but non-explanation of the same would certainly impeach the detention order,” added the Court.

The petitioner was arrested and detained in judicial custody pursuant to an F.I.R. being lodged by the brother of the deceased alleging that the journalist, who was a district correspondent of a news daily published from Unnao, was murdered by the petitioner and other co-accused persons.

Later, the District Magistrate, Unnao, on considering the recommendation of the sponsoring authority, invoked provisions of the N.S.A. and passed the order of detention which has been impugned in the instant Habeas Corpus Petition.

The detenue filed his representation to the Uttar Pradesh Advisory Board (Detention), Lucknow, Secretary (Home), Union of India, as well as the Secretary, Department of Home, State of U.P. The State Government then confirmed the detention order and later extended the period of detention tentatively for six months from the actual date of detention i.e. since September 6, 2020.

Challenging the impugned order, it was argued by the counsel for the detenue that the proceedings recommending invocation of N.S.A. had been initiated by the sponsoring authority much belatedly, after two and half months of the alleged solitary incident of murder, which itself created a doubt on the veracity of the entire proceeding for invocation of preventive detention under N.S.A. 

It was also contended that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in adjudication of the representation of the detenue by the Central Government, hence constitutional safeguard provided to the detenue under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution had been violated.

Allowing the Habeas Corpus Petition, the High Court opined that both the District Magistrate, Unnao and the Central Government were at fault. The detenue had submitted a representation on September 22, 2020 but the District Magistrate, Unnao took nine days in forwarding the same to the State Government and Central Government and there was no explanation on behalf of the District Magistrate in forwarding the petitioner’s representation beyond nine days. 

According to the Division Bench, this procedural lacuna resulted in loss of nine days in forwarding the representation of the detenue by the District Magistrate. Moreover, it was also noted that the Central Government though has received the petitioner’s representation on October 5, 2020 but it could only be processed on October 14, 2020 when it was placed before the Under Secretary and the reasons for such a delay or day to day explanation in dealing with the file had not been made in the affidavit.

Furthermore, the file relating to the petitioner’s representation reached the office of Joint Secretary and, thereafter, report was sought from Central Agency and in doing so, 13 days time was taken by the Agency and no explanation was provided for this delay as well.

The High Court further noted that it is true that neither Article 22(5) of the Constitution nor N.S.A. has prescribed time limit for consideration of representations. 

However, the Bench mentioned that if one looks at various provisions of N.S.A., prescribing specific periods for furnishing grounds of detention, approval of the detention by the State Government, submitting report to the Central Government and Advisory Board, the period prescribed for considering the detention order and representations by the Advisory Board, etc. the intention of the legislature can safely be inferred that representations of detenues have to be considered with all promptitude.

Accordingly, the Bench was of the view that there was delay in forwarding the petitioner’s representation on the part of the District Magistrate, Unnao and also delay in disposal of the petitioner’s representation on the part of Union of India, had substance and on this count, the impugned detention order was quashed.